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Abstract
This thesis is composed of three papers, each of which makes a distinct contribution to the 
study of the political economy of monetary policy. The first paper reassesses our empirical 
understanding of central bank independence (CBI) and its relationship with economic 
performance. To overcome flaws in existing indices commonly used to test the economic 
impact of CBI, I propose a Bayesian item-response approach to the measurement of cross­
national CBI levels. After generating a new set of CBI scores I present a simulation 
extrapolation procedure enabling researchers to properly account for measurement error when 
using these scores in subsequent regressions. Using these methods to replicate a prominent 
existing study yields strong empirical evidence for a conditional economic impact of CBI.
The second paper examines whether politicians use central bank appointments to induce 
electoral monetary policy cycles. An item-response model is used to measure the monetary 
policy preferences of appointees to the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee 
(MPC) based on interest rate voting records. Comparing the preferences of new appointees 
with their predecessors and studying movements in the median MPC ideal point over time, 
there has not been a straightforward electoral cycle in MPC appointments. Nevertheless, 
central bank appointments are important to UK monetary policy, since they have clearly 
shifted the median MPC ideal point. The third paper conducts a uniquely clean test for 
partisan central bank appointments by examining the National Bank of Poland (NBP), where 
we can observe the interest rate voting behaviour of different central bankers directly 
appointed by different partisan political actors. A novel statistical model of interest rate 
voting is derived and estimated, yielding monetary policy preference estimates for each 
appointee. In line with a partisan appointments hypothesis, parties with a more right-wing 
economic ideology tend to appoint central bankers with more restrictive monetary policy 
preferences.
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1 Introduction
Monetary policy is one of the most important economic tools at a state’s disposal and 
monetary policy decisions have significant economic consequences (Clarida et al. 1999; 
Friedman 2001, 2008). Contemporary economic theory says that by altering the supply of 
money and credit in the economy, a monetary policy authority can induce changes in both the 
rate of inflation and also -  because of rigidities in the way economic actors adjust to price 
movements -  in levels of output and employment. This theoretical assertion is supported by 
empirical research showing that monetary policy has a significant effect on inflation and 
output (Romer and Romer 1988, 2004; Bemanke and Blinder 1992). Emphasising the 
growing consensus among economists regarding this issue, Clarida et al. note that “there now 
seems to be broad agreement that the choice of how to conduct monetary policy has 
important consequences for aggregate activity” (1999 p. 1661). Going further, Friedman 
argues that based on “the evidence from experience, in one country after another,” it is clear 
that monetary policy “powerfully affects a country’s economy, for either good or ill” (2001 
p.9976).
If monetary policy is important for economic outcomes in society, then any political 
factors that influence monetary policy decisions are also important for economic outcomes in 
society. This logic compels us as political scientists to study and understand how and when 
political forces drive monetary policy. Given the economic importance of monetary policy, 
political elites in society will have a strong incentive to influence monetary policy -  and 
through it, economic outcomes -  for ideological or electoral ends (Nordhaus 1975; Hibbs 
1977). The process in which these political interests interact with institutional rules, 
bureaucratic actors and economic agents to shape monetary policy outcomes, is the political
9
economy o f monetary policy. The three papers in this thesis contribute to our understanding 
of this process, presenting new empirical methods and measures for the study of this topic 
and deploying these to gain new substantive insights.
In doing so, these papers draw upon a variety of literatures that deal with different 
aspects of the political economy of monetary policy. Prominent among these is the work on 
central bank independence (e.g. Cukierman 1992, 2008; Alesina and Summers 1993; 
Eijffinger and Schaling 1993; Amone et al. 2006; Alpanda and Honig 2009, 2010). The main 
theoretical argument for central bank independence contends that delegating monetary policy 
to a central banker who is more inflation-averse (or ‘conservative’) than politicians -  and 
who can thus credibly commit not to induce a surprise inflation, unlike politicians -  will 
improve a country’s inflation performance (Rogoff 1985).
In line with this prescription, there has been a remarkable global trend toward 
greater central bank independence over the past two decades (Blinder 2005; Cukierman 2008; 
Davies and Green 2010). During this period many countries, such as Canada, Japan, New 
Zealand, Poland, South Korea, Sweden and the UK, along with the sixteen Euro-zone 
member states, have adopted laws that significantly enhance the independence of their central 
banks. In each of these countries -  and as had already been the case for several decades in a 
small number of other countries, including the United States and Germany -  central bankers 
now make regular monetary policy decisions without the participation of elected politicians 
and without requiring formal government approval for these decisions. Politicians may 
choose targets for the central bank -  such as a certain level of inflation or a more general goal 
of ‘stable prices’ -  but they do not have a formal input into the bank’s regular monetary 
policy decisions regarding key instruments -  such as the interest rate at which it lends to 
private financial institutions, directions for open market operations, or the reserve 
requirements imposed on private banks. The scale of the convergence on this model for
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monetary policy-making institutions has led some observers to conclude that “the movement 
toward central bank independence has seemed unstoppable in recent years” (Davies and 
Green 2010 p. 141).
Yet despite this major global trend, the effort to gather robust empirical evidence 
concerning the economic consequences of central bank independence is still ongoing (e.g. 
Crowe and Meade 2008; Alpanda and Honig 2009, 2010; Alesina and Stella 2010). The first 
paper in my thesis (Chapter 2) contributes to this effort by addressing a key methodological 
question: how can we properly measure central bank independence so as to empirically test 
whether it improves economic performance? To tackle this problem I present a new 
Bayesian ordinal item-response approach to the measurement of central bank independence 
and demonstrate how researchers can appropriately use the new measures generated by this 
approach to test the economic impact of central bank independence. Like many of the main 
existing central bank independence measures, the Bayesian ordinal item-response approach 
that I present uses data sets containing categorical indicators which code central bank 
characteristics for different countries. However, unlike the existing central bank 
independence measures that are based on this indictor data, the new approach that I present 
aggregates indicators according to a principled statistical measurement model, accounting for 
the categorical nature of indicators and acknowledging measurement error. After inspecting 
the new measures of central bank independence that result, I also present a simulation- 
extrapolation technique that enables researchers to employ these new measures as inputs in 
regression analysis while properly accounting and correcting for measurement error. Finally, 
I use these new measures and methods to replicate a prominent existing study which showed 
that central bank independence can have a positive impact on economic performance, but that 
this is conditional on political context. In this application, using the new measures and 
properly accounting for measurement error leads to substantive inferences that reinforce our
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confidence in the original findings and that are actually more consistent with the substantive 
theory the original study sought to test.
But however well we quantify the level of central bank independence across 
countries over time, in conducting analyses at this level of aggregation we inevitably risk 
obscuring the nuances of the relationship between central bankers and politicians. By 
studying these interactions in more contextual detail, we can develop a more rounded and 
thorough understanding of the politics of monetary policy. For example, in a context where 
there are strong formal constraints on politicians’ ability to directly influence monetary policy 
-  which, as we have seen, is the case in many countries today -  do politicians still attempt to 
exert a indirect influence on monetary policy via central bank appointments? If so, what 
exactly are their motives? And when are they likely to be successful in these attempts? In 
particular, how do common institutional practices, such as the use of committees to make 
monetary policy decisions, condition this influence?
The second two papers in this thesis (Chapters 3 and 4) address these questions by 
conducting more fine-grained country-specific analyses of the political economy of monetary 
policy. In thinking about politicians’ motives with regard to monetary policy, a useful 
starting point is the political business cycle literature, which yields two main schools of 
thought as to what are the ends when politicians try to influence any macroeconomic policy 
(see Franzese 2002 for an excellent review of this literature). First, the ‘electoral business 
cycle’ theory argues that politicians generally seek to maximise their chances of re-election 
by using macroeconomic policies to create economic expansions in the run-up to elections 
(Nordhaus 1975). Thus, politicians’ monetary policy incentives will depend on the electoral 
timetable. In contrast, the ‘partisan business cycle’ theory posits that politicians’ motives 
regarding macroeconomic policies are determined by their partisan preferences over the 
short-run trade-off between inflation and unemployment (Hibbs 1977). As a result, this
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second school of thought argues that politicians from left- and right-wing parties will seek to 
induce systematically different economic outcomes through monetary policy: lower 
unemployment at the expense of higher inflation for left-wing parties, and lower inflation at 
the expense of higher unemployment for right-wing parties.
The early formulations of these theories -  and empirical tests of them -  often naively 
assumed that politicians had complete control over policy instruments (e.g. Nordhaus 1975; 
Hibbs 1977; Alesina and Sachs 1988). More recent theoretical and empirical work has taken 
a more “context-conditional” approach (Franzese 2002 p.371), asking whether and how 
politicians may influence macroeconomic outcomes given varying levels of international and 
domestic constraints on macroeconomic policy. With regard to monetary policy, important 
progress has already been made in understanding the effect of international constraints, such 
as formal or informal currency pegs (Clark and Hallerberg 2000; Plumper and Troeger 2006, 
2008). Meanwhile, the literature on domestic constraints has examined the potential for 
political cycles in monetary policy in the context of relatively high levels of formal central 
bank independence. This latter literature focuses mainly on the German Bundesbank 
(Lohmann 1997,1998; Vaubel 1997; Berger and Woitek 1997, 2005) or the US Federal 
Reserve (Gildea 1990; Havrilesky and Gildea 1992; Morris 2000; Chang, 2001, 2003; 
Chappell et al. 2005) and analyses politicians’ ability either to ‘directly’ influence monetary 
policy using overt pressure on the central bank, or to ‘indirectly’ influence monetary policy 
via appointments to the central bank.
Empirical studies into these forms of influence have increasingly focused on the 
voting records of central bank committees (e.g. Chappell et al. 2005; Chang 2001, 2003; 
Berger and Woitek 2005). Such records detail the monetary policy stance of individual 
central bankers at each monetary policy meeting, allowing researchers to observe the 
monetary policy-making behaviour of central bankers appointed under varying political
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conditions and therefore test whether their behaviour accords with different theories political 
influence over monetary policy. The second and third papers in this thesis build on this 
particular strand of work. Both papers introduce new statistical methods for the analysis of 
central bank committee voting records and show how these methods can be applied to test for 
electoral or partisan appointments to these monetary policy-making committees.
The second paper of the thesis shows that the Bayesian item-response models which 
are commonly employed to perform spatial analyses of legislator preferences (Martin and 
Quinn 2002; Clinton et al. 2004) can be usefully applied to the study of central bank 
committee voting. Estimating these models using Markov chain Monte Carlo methods 
(MCMC) yields measures of central banker monetary policy preferences which can in turn be 
used to perform a variety of tests as to whether appointments to central bank committees are 
subject to political influences. The paper derives a ‘spatial’ model of interest rate voting on a 
central bank committee, where central bankers have ideal points on an underlying ‘dove- 
hawk’ dimension which taps the relative restrictiveness of monetary policy given economic 
conditions. It then estimates this model using the voting records of the twenty-five 
individuals who served on the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England between 
1997 and 2008, generating a new set of measures of these central bankers’ monetary policy 
preferences.
These measures are used to test for an electoral cycle in central bank appointments. 
The UK between 1997 and 2008 provides a favourable environment for an electoral cycle in 
appointments because a single party (the Labour Party) dominated government throughout 
this period and central bank appointment procedures allowed the government of the day to 
dominate central bank appointments. However, by comparing the preferences of new Bank 
of England appointees with those of their predecessors, and using preference estimates to 
chart the movement in the median member of the Monetary Policy Committee over time, this
14
paper shows that there does not appear to be a straightforward electoral cycle in Bank of 
England appointments. Nevertheless, it does provide evidence that central bank 
appointments matter, in the sense that the government was able to shift the position of the 
median voter on the Monetary Policy Committee over time.
The third paper in this thesis further develops the methods employe in the second 
paper, and applies these to the case of the Monetary Policy Council of the National Bank of 
Poland to test for partisan appointments to central banks. The Polish case provides an 
opportunity to conduct a uniquely clean test for partisan central bank appointments because, 
not only can we observe the monetary policy voting behaviour of individual central bankers 
in Poland (via published voting records), but these central bankers have been appointed by 
clearly identifiable, and differing, partisan political actors. Due to the unusual nature of the 
voting data for the Monetary Policy Council, standard legislative item-response models are 
not the most appropriate techniques for generating central banker preferences estimates in the 
Polish case. Therefore, in this paper I derive a novel hierarchical model of interest rate 
voting in the Council. This takes account of the discrete nature of the vote choices made by 
Polish central bankers and also utilises proposal-related information. As a result, when the 
model is estimated -  using Bayesian MCMC methods -  it yields measures of central banker 
preferences on an interest rate scale whose magnitude is easily interpretable. Using the 
resulting preference measures, I show that Polish central bankers appointed by parties with a 
more right-wing economic ideology do tend to prefer higher interest rates than those 
appointed by parties with a more left-wing economic ideology. But despite this clear 
evidence that politicians do attempt to make partisan central bank appointments, analysis of 
movements of the pivotal voter in the Polish central bank suggest that the magnitude of 
politicians’ influence on policy is often restricted. Analysis suggests that this is due to a
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combination of politicians’ inability to appoint entirely reliable agents ex ante, together with 
certain key institutional features of the Council.
Overall then, the three papers in this thesis each make distinct substantive 
contributions to the study of the political economy of monetary policy. The first paper shows 
that we can measure levels of central bank independence over time and across countries in a 
more principled statistical manner and, in doing so, reveals that we can only measure this 
latent concept with substantial measurement error. It also reinforces our confidence in 
existing inferences regarding the economic impact of central bank independence by showing 
that these inferences hold when we properly account for measurement error. The second 
paper provides a spatial framework for the analysis of central bank committee voting records 
and uses this to show that, even in the UK context where conditions would seem to be most 
conducive to an electoral cycle in central bank appointments, there is little evidence that this 
type of cycle occurs. Finally, by analysing central bank committee voting records in the 
Polish context -  where we are able to perform a uniquely clean test for partisan appointments 
-  the third paper in my thesis shows that different political parties do appear to appoint 
central bankers with different monetary policy preferences, but that certain key institutional 
features constrain the impact of these appointments on monetary policy.
Although these three papers each deal with a different substantive aspect of the 
political economy of monetary policy, they are also united by their empirical methodological 
approach. Whatever the substantive context, each paper places an emphasis on the principled 
measurement and characterization of uncertainty regarding a key latent variable that is not 
easy to measure -  whether this variable relates to central bank independence levels or the 
monetary policy preferences of individual central bankers. Each paper also demonstrates 
how Bayesian measurement models, when estimated via Markov chain Monte Carlo 
methods, can prove very useful for these purposes. The introduction of these methods to the
16
study of the political economy of monetary policy, and the application of these methods to 
generate new measurements of key variables, represent two of the most important overall 
contributions of this thesis.
The remainder of this text is structured as follows. In the next three chapters I 
present each of my three papers in turn. Then in the final chapter I summarise the 
contributions of these papers and discuss how future research can usefully apply and extend 
the methods and lessons learnt here.
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2 Cross-national comparisons of central bank 
independence: how much information do we really have 
and how best can we use it?
Abstract
Robust empirical evidence concerning the economic effects of central bank independence 
(CBI) can aid in the design of appropriate monetary policy-making institutions. But existing 
tests for these effects are potentially flawed because they measure CBI using indices that (1) 
aggregate component indicators according to restrictive a priori assumptions, and (2) treat 
resulting CBI scores as if they are measured without error. This paper helps scholars to 
address these problems. First, I introduce an item-response approach to the measurement of 
CBI and use this to generate a new index. The resulting measures aggregate component 
indicators in a more principled fashion and are accompanied by estimates of measurement 
error variance. Second, I present methods that allow us to properly utilise these new 
measures and their accompanying measurement error estimates when analysing the economic 
effects of CBI. When these methods are used to replicate a prominent study of the 
relationship between CBI and economic performance results suggest that the reported impact 
of CBI in the original study is robust both to re-measurement and to uncertainty in the new 
measures. Results re-enforce our confidence in the impact of CBI, and even suggest that this 
may be stronger than originally estimated.
Keywords: Monetary policy, central bank independence, measurement error, item response 
theory.
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2.1 Introduction
Monetary policy can have a major impact on inflation, growth and unemployment.
Therefore, political and institutional factors that influence monetary policy can have an 
important bearing upon a country’s economic performance too. The “time-inconsistency” 
theory emphasises this point, predicting that countries where elected politicians exercise 
discretion over monetary policy will experience suboptimal inflation levels because these 
politicians cannot credibly commit not to use monetary policy to induce surprise inflation 
(Kydland and Prescott 1977; Barro and Gordon 1983). As a solution to this commitment 
problem political economists have advocated central bank independence: delegating 
monetary policy-making responsibility to a central bank that is incentivised to pursue price 
stability and can do so without political interference (Rogoff 1985).
Removing a key macroeconomic policy from the control of an elected government 
and delegating it to an unelected agency entails a cost in terms of democratic accountability 
(Alesina and Tabellini 2008). As a result, it is desirable that society is able to evaluate robust 
empirical evidence regarding the extent to which increased central bank independence 
(hereafter CBI) is actually likely to lead to improved economic outcomes. To this end, over 
the past three decades many scholars have sought to test whether, across countries and over 
time, higher levels of CBI are associated with lower levels of inflation and lower inflation 
variability. For example, in their comprehensive review of the literature on CBI, Amone et 
al. (2006, p.75-78) list twenty-eight such studies conducted in the final three decades of the 
last century, and the number has continued to grow since in the first decade of this century 
(e.g. Clark and Hallerberg 2000; Cusack 2001; Keefer and Stasavage 2003; Crowe and 
Meade 2008; Alpanda and Honig 2009).1
1 In addition to these studies, which focus on the economic impact o f CBI, measures of CBI have also found 
wider use in the political economy literature. For example, researchers have used these measures to empirically 
analyse the political determinants and political consequences of CBI (e.g. Hallerberg 2002; Bernhard and 
Leblang 2002).
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In attempting to test for its economic benefits scholars face the problem that 
operationalising CBI is not a straightforward task. This is because the level of CBI in a 
given country at a particular time is a latent variable that cannot be observed and measured 
directly (Brumm 2000; de Haan et al, 2003). Rather, we can measure it only indirectly by 
using information from observable indicators which we believe to be (at least partially) a 
function of the underlying level of CBI in a country. Indeed, in the majority of empirical 
studies CBI is measured across countries using an index constructed from a set of component 
indicators, each of which reflects a different observable central bank characteristic. Several 
of these CBI indices have been developed, each drawing on data sets containing different 
combinations of indicators and covering varying countries and time-periods (e.g. Bade and 
Parkin 1977; Grilli et al. 1991; Cukierman et al. 1992; Alesina and Summers 1993; Eijffinger 
and Schaling 1993).
But these CBI indices suffer from important drawbacks. First, they aggregate 
component indicators according to restrictive and somewhat arbitrary predetermined 
weighting schemes and in a manner that ignores the categorical nature of most indicators.
This may lead to the mis-measurement of CBI across countries, and in turn to biased 
inferences when the index is used as a predictor variable in regression analysis. Second, 
these indices do not quantify the uncertainty with which they measure CBI. As a result, when 
using a CBI index to proxy true CBI in regression analysis, scholars are unable to properly 
account for the measurement error inherent in this proxy. This is again likely to lead to 
biased inferences. In short, existing CBI indices suffer from potential shortcomings, and we 
should be concerned about these shortcomings because they may impact upon subsequent 
inferences regarding the economic consequences of CBI.
2 Of course, this is not the only problem facing scholars interested in the economic impact of CBI. For example, 
another key concern is the potential endogeneity of CBI (Posen 1993,1995).
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This paper addresses these concerns and in doing so makes three contributions to the 
study of monetary policy-making institutions. First, I introduce an item-response theory 
(IRT) approach to the measurement of CBI, and apply this approach to a prominent existing 
set of indicators to generate a new CBI index. IRT models are frequently used to measure 
latent variables in educational testing (e.g. Johnson and Albert 1999; Fox 2010) and 
increasingly so in political science (e.g. Martin and Quinn 2002; Clinton et al. 2004; Treier 
and Jackman 2008; Hoyland et al. 2009; Hanretty and Koop 2009), but this is the first time 
they have been used to study the independence of central banks. Using the IRT approach 
results in measurements that weight the information contained in component indicators in a 
principled statistical manner. The approach also explicitly models the categorical nature of 
many component indicators in CBI indices. Comparisons between this new CBI index and 
the existing index constructed from the same indicators suggest that the IRT approach leads 
to substantively different measurements for many country-periods.
The second contribution of this paper is to provide uncertainty estimates to 
accompany the new CBI measures generated using the IRT approach. The use of a full 
measurement model, and in particular its estimation via Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo 
(MCMC) methods, allows us to straightforwardly summarise the uncertainty with which we 
measure CBI for each observation. Moreover, inspection of uncertainty estimates suggests 
that measurement error is substantial in the context of CBI.
The third contribution of the paper is to present and apply a ‘simulation-
extrapolation’ method (Carroll et al. 2006; Battuaz et al. 2008 ) that allow us to properly
account for measurement error when using CBI as a predictor in subsequent regression
analysis. Like the IRT approach to measurement, this simulation-extrapolation method is
previously unused in the CBI literature. To demonstrate its usefulness and to investigate the
3 Hanretty and Koop (2009) employs an IRT approach to generate point estimates of the de jure independence of 
other regulatory agencies. However, unlike this paper, it does not estimate measurement error or examine how 
this can be dealt with in subsequent analyses where these measures are used as input variables.
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consequences of the IRT approach to CBI measurement, I use the ordinal IRT measures and 
simulation-extrapolation method to replicate one prominent empirical study of the economic 
consequences of CBI. Results suggest that the economic impact of CBI reported in the 
original study is robust to uncertainty in the measurement of CBI, and is likely stronger when 
we use statistical methods that extrapolate to a situation of no measurement error. Thus, at 
least in this case, our confidence in the economic benefits of CBI is reinforced.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section two, I describe the problems with existing 
approaches to the measurement of CBI in more detail and introduce the particular set of 
indicators that will be the focus of this paper. In section three, I present the IRT approach to 
CBI measurement and inspect the resulting set of estimates. In section four, I present and 
apply methods to account for estimated measurement error when using the new index to test 
for the economic consequences of CBI. Finally, section five concludes and discusses 
potential extensions of this new approach to the measurement of CBI.
2.2 The challenge of measuring central bank independence
Existing approaches to the measurement o f central bank independence 
Over the past three decades, numerous researchers have contributed to the effort to measure 
the degree of CBI across countries and over time. Bade and Parkin (1977) set the template 
for this type of endeavour, coding key characteristics of central bank laws in twelve OECD 
countries to produce a set of categorical indicators relating to the de jure  autonomy a national 
central bank. Subsequent researchers have tended to follow this basic template of coding 
different institutional aspects of central banks based on legal documents, but have broadened 
the scope of the countries and periods analysed and increased the detail of the indicators
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collected (e.g. Grilli et al. 1991; Cukierman et al. 1992; Alesina and Summers 1993;
Eijffinger and Schaling, 1993; Crowe and Meade 2008). In addition, recognising that legal 
provisions may not always reflect the practical functioning of monetary policy-making 
institutions, researchers have also sought to develop measures of the de facto independence of 
central banks (Cukierman et al. 1992; Cukierman and Webb 1995; Alpanda and Honig 2010), 
such as the rate of turnover among central bank governors. As a result of these numerous 
contributions, there exists today an impressive amount of data on various CBI-related 
indicators recorded for various ranges of countries and time-periods.4
This paper focuses on one particular set of de jure  CBI indicators developed by Alex 
Cukierman, Steven Webb and Bilin Neyapti (CWN hereafter) (Cukierman et al. 1992).5 
This choice is made for several reasons. First, the indices developed by CWN to summarise 
their de jure indicators are among the most widely used measures of CBI in the literature 
(Amone et al. 2006).6 Second, of all the available sets of indicators, the CWN data represents 
the richest source of systematically codified, fine-grained information regarding the 
institutional characteristics of central banks. Third, the CWN data also records this 
information for a uniquely extensive cross-section of countries and over a lengthy time- 
period. Fourth and finally, this data is publicly available in a fully disaggregated format 
(Cukierman et al. 1992 p.383-395; Cukierman 1992 p.396-414).
The CWN data covers seventy developed and developing countries over four time 
periods (p. 360): the ‘gold standard’ period (1950-59); the ‘dollar convertibility’ period 
(1960-71); the ‘two oil-shocks period’ (1972-79); and the ‘disinflation and debt crisis’ period
4 Amone et al (2006) provide an excellent and detailed review of the differences between existing sets of de jure 
and de facto CBI indicators.
5 It should be noted, however, that the methods presented below could be adapted to combine information from 
various sets of de jure and de facto CBI indicators. This is left to future work.
6 Aside from Cukierman (1992) and Cukierman et al (1992) other studies that use CWN’s indices to analyse the 
economic effects of CBI include: Posen (1995); Banaian et al (1995); Fuhrer (1997); Campillo and Miron 
(1997); Banaian et al (1998); Crosby (1998); Sikken and de Haan (1998); Cukierman and Lippi (1999); Oatley 
(1999); Way (2000); Keefer and Stasavage (2003); Hayo and Voigt (2008).
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(1980-89).7 For each country-period the authors code sixteen ordinal-level indicators, each of 
which captures a different aspect of the formal relationship between the central bank and 
other political institutional actors within a country. Each of these sixteen indicators is coded 
using equidistant increments on the [0, 1] interval, with higher scores assigned to categories 
that are perceived to be associated with greater CBI. Table 2.1 presents the coding scheme 
developed by CWN for each of these indicators in more detail.
[TABLE 2.1 ABOUT HERE]
Though some authors have critiqued CWN’s coding of particular indicators for 
particular countries (Mangano 1998; Banaian et al. 1998), this paper focuses on the problem 
of aggregating their data, as given, into a single measure of CBI. However, it should also be 
emphasised that we face the same essential aggregation problem when working with the 
CWN data as with any other existing set of de jure CBI indicators: namely, combining 
information from binary or ordinal indicators into a single summary measure of CBI 
(Banaian 2008). Therefore, an appropriate statistical approach for summarising the CWN 
indicators would also be applicable to other sets of de jure CBI indicators.
CWN’s own approach to this aggregation problem involves two stages. In the first 
step, and as detailed in Table 2.1, they group the sixteen indicators into four “clusters” (p. 
356): the terms of appointment for the chief-executive of the central bank; the central bank’s 
role in policy formulation; the objectives of the central bank; and the limitations on central 
bank lending to the public sector. For each country-period, CWN summarise the information 
contained in the ‘terms of appointment’ cluster by taking the un-weighted mean of these 
indicators. For the ‘policy formulation’ cluster, they perform the same procedure, but employ 
a weighted mean (with weights of 0.25, 0.5, and 0.25 respectively for the three policy
7 Crowe and Meade (2008) have extended the CWN data by coding the same set of indicators for countries an 
even broader set of countries in 2003. However, at present the fully disaggregated data (i.e. the values taken by 
each country on the sixteen individual indicators in 2003) are currently not publicly available. This fully 
disaggregated information is essential for the re-measurement procedure employed below, so in this paper I use 
only the data originally presented in Cukierman et al (1992).
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formulation indicators detailed in Table 2.1). The ‘objectives’ cluster consists of one 
indicator and so requires no further aggregation at this stage. For the ‘limitations on lending’ 
cluster, the first four indicators are treated separately, while the final four are summarised by 
taking an un-weighed mean. Thus, this first step yields eight variables: three variables 
corresponding to the first three clusters, and five for the final cluster.
In the second step of the aggregation procedure CWN calculate a weighted mean of 
the eight cluster variables generated in the first step, with the weights used in this second step 
detailed in the ‘weights’ column of Table 2.1. The resulting summary CBI index was dubbed 
the LVAW (legal variables aggregate weighted) measure in Cukierman (1992), which also 
presents an alternative summary index, LVAU (legal variables aggregate un-weighted). As 
its name suggests, this latter index is calculated using precisely the same procedure as for 
LVAW, except that in the second step the eight summary variables are aggregated via an un­
weighted average.
Problems with the Cukierman et a l (1992) approach to aggregating CBI indicators
The CWN data represents a uniquely rich source of information regarding the degree of CBI 
across countries and over time, but there are two key methodological drawbacks with the way 
in which the LVAW and LVAU indices summarise this information.
First, both indices aggregate component indicators according to restrictive a priori 
assumptions. For example, by assigning fixed weights to indicators during the aggregation 
procedure, CWN make very restrictive assumptions regarding the direction and strength of 
the relationship between each indicator and the underlying level of CBI that they seek to 
measure (Banaian et al. 1998). In the case of either LVAW or LVAU, these fixed weights 
imply an assumption that all cluster variables are positively related to underlying CBI and an 
assumption about the exact strength of these relations. This is the case whether weights are
25
fixed to a set of varying values under LVAW, or to a set of equal values as in the second 
stage of construction of LVAU.
A further complication here is the way in which CWN deal with missing entries for 
indicators. These occur at the data collection stage “whenever the charter of a [central bank] 
does not contain enough information to reliably code a particular legal variable” (Cukierman 
1992 p.378). When aggregating indicators into cluster variables for a given country-period, 
CWN drop any indicator with a missing entry for the country-period in question, and re­
assign the weight originally attached to that indicator proportionally to the remaining 
indicators within the cluster. They apply the same rule when aggregating cluster variables 
into the final LVAW or LVAU score. Thus, in the construction of these indices, a given 
indicator is assumed to differentially influence the level of measured CBI for two different 
country-periods if there happens to be a missing entry on another particular indicator for one 
country-period but not the other.
Overall, CWN give little theoretical justification for the particular weights they 
choose in either the first or second steps of the construction of LVAW, stating only that they 
use the weights that they “find most plausible” (p. 361). In a situation such as this one, where 
there do not appear to be strong theoretical reasons to guide the assignment of weights to 
each indicator, it is better to utilise an aggregation method that -  based on the data at hand -  
estimates the nature and strength of the relationship between individual indicators and a latent 
variable of interest (Rosenthal and Voeten 2007 p.716).
Recognising this, some researchers have previously sought to summarise the CWN 
data using methods that do not aggregate indicators according to restrictive weighting 
assumptions. Banaian et al. (1998) use principal-components analysis for this purpose. In 
fact, CWN themselves report using the same technique to check the robustness of the 
relationship between LVAW and average inflation across country-periods (p. 374).
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However, even the principal-components approach shares another restrictive 
assumption with the LVAW and LVAU aggregation methods: all falsely treat the CWN 
indicators as interval-level indicators when they are really only provide ordinal information. 
By treating these ordinal indicators as continuous and assigning equidistant values to 
categories on each indicator we are imposing the assumption that a movement from the first 
to the second category on a given indicator must imply the same change in our measure of 
CBI as a movement from the third to fourth category on the same indicator (Banaian 2008 
p. 10). Take the example of the monpol indicator in Table 2.1, which concerns the 
formulation of monetary policy: is it plausible that a movement from a situation where the 
central bank “only advises government” to one where the central bank “participates in the 
policy-making process, but has little influence” reflects the same increment in underlying 
CBI as a movement from the latter category to one where “the bank alone” formulates 
policy? Ideally, this is an assumption to be tested. Thus, we seek a measurement model that 
simultaneously allows us to relax assumptions regarding the relative weighting of different 
indicators and that explicitly models the ordinal nature of these indicators.
The second major drawback with the LVAW and LVAU indices is that they offer 
point estimates of CBI but do not provide information regarding measurement error. If we 
conceptualise each observed indicator in the CWN data as a function of the underlying level 
of CBI in a given country-period, then there are two principle sources of error inherent in
Q
attempts to infer latent levels of CBI based on these observed indicators. For one, as the 
earlier discussion regarding the weighting and ordinal nature of indicators illustrated, we do 
not know the values of the parameters that govern the relationship between observed 
indicators and underlying CBI levels. Rather, we have to make (uncertain) inferences 
regarding these parameters based on the data. Furthermore, even if we did know these
8 This assumes the specific data contained in the CWN data are not subject to coding errors.
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parameters with certainty, the function that maps underlying CBI levels to observed 
indicators is likely to be of a fundamentally stochastic nature. For example, we might 
generally expect that a country with a highly independent central bank will generally have an 
observed score of 1.00 on the monpol indicator (i.e. the bank will formally have the power to 
formulate monetary policy unilaterally). But we cannot be certain that this will be the case in 
every instance. Together, our uncertainty as to the parameters that relate latent CBI to 
observed indicators and the inherently stochastic nature of this very relationship, mean that 
we cannot infer CBI levels with certainty.
And this uncertainty matters because we generally want to use measures of CBI as 
independent variables in subsequent regression analysis. Using predictors measured with 
error in regression can lead to biased inferences if we naively treat these predictors as 
measured without error (Carroll et al. 2006; Jackman 2008). Brumm (2000) explicitly 
accounts for measurement error by estimating a measurement model that treats LVAW itself 
as a continuous indicator of CBI, alongside other proxies for de facto CBI. However, 
because it uses the LVAW index as given, this approach again does not account for the 
ordinal nature of the CWN indicators. Nor does it relax the restrictive assumptions CWN 
make about the relative weighting of indicators when creating the LVAW index. A 
preferable measurement model would estimate uncertainty at the stage where the CWN 
indicators are aggregated, and would simultaneously address other aggregation issues 
regarding the categorical nature of the indicators and the appropriate weighting of the 
indicators.
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2.3 An item-response approach to the measurement of central bank 
independence
The last section identified two major concerns with the methods used to construct the main 
existing measures of central bank independence: (1) these methods impose restrictive a priori 
assumptions during the aggregation of component CBI indicators; and (2) these methods fail 
to yield information regarding measurement error in resulting CBI indices. In this section I 
present an ordinal item-response measurement model that allows us to address these 
concerns. In doing this I draw on Treier and Jackman’s (2008) application of the ordinal IRT 
method to the measurement of democracy across countries, which demonstrates the 
applicability and utility of the approach in situations where the researcher wants to measure a 
continuous latent variable based on multiple ordinal indicators. Their ordinal IRT approach 
explicitly models indicators (items) as ordinal variables, each of which are related to a latent 
variable via a stochastic function. The parameters that govern this relationship are estimated 
alongside latent variable scores using a Bayesian Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) 
algorithm. This estimation method has the advantage of generating corresponding 
uncertainty estimates for all model parameters in a straightforward manner.
Model and estimation
To formally define the ordinal IRT approach to CBI measurement, let each entry x y  in the 
CWN data matrix be the value of indicator j  =  1,..., M for country-period i = 1,..., N. The 
labels of each indicator j  were transformed from equidistant increments on the [0, 1] interval 
(the labels assigned by CWN) to integer values k  =  1,..., Kj, where Kjis the total number of
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categories defined for indicator j 9 The ordinal IRT approach models the observed xtj as 
follows:
Pr[*i; =  !] =  ®[T; i ~  YjGi]
Pr[xtj =  ft] =  <D[t,* -  Yjdf] -  ®|ry,fc+1 -  Yjdil ft =  2, .. . ,  Kj -  1
Pr[xi;- =  ft}] =  1 -  <D \tj,K,-i ~  Yj0i\
where O is the normal cumulative distribution function. The 0* in these equations are our key 
parameters of interest, as they represent the latent level of central bank independence in 
country-period i. The other parameters in this model govern the nature of the relationship 
between latent CBI and each indicator variable j .  The Yj are discrimination parameters, 
which measure the strength and direction of the association between CBI and an observed 
indicator j .  For example, if yj =  0 then there is no association between latent levels of CBI 
and the probabilities of responses on indictor j ,  whereas if yj >  0 then an increase in CBI is 
associated with an increased probability of higher response categories on indicator j .  Given 
the labelling of indicator categories, our expectation is that yj are positive for all indictors in 
the CWN data. Finally, for each indicator j  there are Kj — 1 threshold parameters r;fe, which 
govern the way in which continuous latent responses yjOi are translated from a latent scale 
into observed response categories. Readers will note that this model is related to a simple 
ordered probit, except that there are multiple response variables and all terms on the right- 
hand side of each equation are unknowns about which we want to draw inferences.
This model is fitted to data containing the responses of N = 242 country-periods 
(seventy countries over a maximum of four time-periods) on M =  14 indicators. This 
analysis only includes country-periods that have enough observed indicator-responses for
9 This re-labelling of indicator values preserves the ordering implied by CWN’s original coding scheme.
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CWN to calculate their LVAW score.10 Also, of the sixteen original CWN indicators, two
binary indicators (adv and Iprim) are dropped from the analysis. This is because the 
responses for these indicators are extremely lopsided,11 resulting in highly unstable item- 
parameter estimates for these indicators during trial runs of the MCMC estimation 
procedure.12
The Bayesian MCMC algorithm used to fit the ordinal IRT model to this data
1 'Iproceeds by iteratively sampling from the conditional distributions of model parameters. 
This process yields a set of samples from the joint posterior distribution of the model 
parameters given the observed data and priors.14 I implement this MCMC estimation
10 CWN do not calculate summary LVAW scores for any country-period where the sum of weights for missing 
cluster variables is greater than 0.3.
11 Only two country-period observations (both corresponding to Ethiopia) score 1 on adv, while only four 
country-periods observations (all corresponding to China) score 1 on Iprim.
12 Other parameter estimates were however, robust to the inclusion of these two indicators in the model.
13 For more details on Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithms in general, see Gelman et al. (2003) Gill (2008), 
and Jackman (2009).
14I assign independent standard normal priors for the latent CBI parameters 0f. These priors induce “near­
identification” o f the latent CBI scores (Jackman 2009 p. 441). However, to ensure full identification of the 
location and scale of these latent scores, I follow Treier and Jackman (2008 p. 214-215) by standardising the 
vector of fy's sampled at each MCMC iteration to have mean zero and unit variance, and by transforming other 
model parameters to account for this standardisation.
Diffuse independent normal priors (mean zero, variance nine) are assigned for thirteen of the fourteen 
discrimination parameters Yj- To identify the direction of the latent CBI scale (Quinn 2004) I constrain the one 
remaining discrimination parameter to be positive (again using a normal prior with mean zero and variance nine, 
but truncating this to lie above zero). This constraint was applied for the y;- corresponding to the cow/indicator, 
and appears reasonable since the marginal posterior distribution of this parameter is concentrated a good 
distance from zero.
For threshold parameters the discussion of priors is a little more involved. This is because, for each 
indicator j ,  the MCMCordfactanal function in R automatically estimates an additional “negative item difficulty 
parameter” (assigned a normal prior with mean zero and variance nine), equivalent to an indicator-specific 
intercept on the latent response scale (Quinn 2004 p. 340). For any indicator j ,  if  the difficulty parameter is a 
free parameter to be estimated, then it and the threshold parameters TJk are only jointly identified if  one 
threshold parameter is fixed. The MCMCordfactanal function solves this by fixing r7l to zero for all indicators, 
and assigns remaining threshold parameters uniform priors (Quinn 2004).
The interpretation of an ordinal IRT model is more straightforward if  we can simply describe the properties 
of indicators in terms of item discrimination and threshold parameters, rather than referring to also difficulty 
parameters. Thus the results reported in this paper are based on a post-estimation transformation of the 
threshold parameter values generated by the MCMCordfactanal function. Specifically, at each MCMC 
iteration, for each indicator j ,  I subtract the sampled “negative item difficulty parameter” from each of the 
Kj — 1 sampled threshold parameters and store the resulting transformed threshold parameters. Estimating the 
ordinal IRT model via MCMCordfactanal and then transforming sampled threshold parameter values using this 
iteration-by-iteration procedure is equivalent to estimating an ordinal IRT model where no constraints are 
imposed on threshold parameters and the item-difficulty parameters are fixed to zero. The former approach is 
utilised here because of the greater computational efficiency of the MCMCordfactanal function compared to 
estimating a self-programmed ordinal IRT model using standard software such as WinBUGS (Spiegelhalter et al 
1999) or JAGS (Plummer, 2009).
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approach using the MCMCordfactanal function in the R package MCMCpack (Martin et al. 
2009). After discarding 100,000 iterations of the MCMC sampler as bumin, I ran 1,000,000 
iterations and stored every 100th. This generates a sample of 10,000 draws from the joint 
posterior distribution from which we can make inferences regarding model parameters.15
Before turning to the estimation results, it is worth noting that the MCMC procedure 
also deals with missing responses in a more principled manner than the CWN aggregation 
procedure. Of the 3388 cells in the data matrix described above, 313 entries (9 per cent) are 
missing. The Bayesian MCMC approach treats these missing responses as additional 
parameters to be estimated based on the model, observed data and priors (Jackman 2000a). 
Because these inferences are made with uncertainty and because the MCMC algorithm allows 
this uncertainty to propagate into estimates of other model parameters, it will tend to estimate 
latent CBI scores with greater uncertainty for country-periods that have more missing 
indicator responses. This more systematic treatment of missing values again demonstrates 
the advantages of utilising a fully specified measurement model together with MCMC 
estimation procedures, in order to measure levels of CBI across country-periods.
Estimation results
To ease interpretation, I present estimation results graphically. Figure 2.1 summarises the 
estimated ordinal IRT item parameters. The left-hand panel plots the posterior mean and the 
ninety-five per cent confidence interval for each of the fourteen item discrimination 
parameters. The majority of CWN indicators are estimated to have a clear positive 
association with latent CBI levels, as expected. But for four indicators we are plainly unable 
to distinguish estimated discrimination parameters from zero with ninety-five per cent 
confidence (too, app, off,\ Iwidth), and for one other indicator {Itype) we are marginally unable
15 Standard diagnostic checks recommended by Jackman (2009) indicated that the sampler had converged for 
each of the model parameters, and the sampler displayed good mixing with respect to each parameter.
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to do so. This raises a question as to whether these particular indicators, as currently defined 
by CWN, actually provide us with useful information regarding latent levels of CBI across 
country-periods. Future research could usefully re-examine the way in which the institutional 
characteristics classified by these indicators are likely to relate to CBI, and re-design the 
classification scheme for these indicators accordingly.
[FIGURE 2.1 ABOUT HERE]
More generally, the left-hand panel of Figure 2.1 makes clear that there is 
considerable variation across CWN indicators in terms of the strength of association between 
latent CBI levels on the one hand and response probabilities on the other. As was made clear 
in section two, the LVAW index is also constructed based on the assumption that there is 
such variation in the strength of association between indicators and underlying CBI levels.
But the advantage of the ordinal IRT approach is that it allows us to estimate the pattern in 
this variation in a principled manner, based on the model and data, rather than fixing  relative 
strengths of association a priori. Furthermore, note that the widths of the ninety-five per cent 
confidence intervals that surround the item discrimination parameter point estimates show 
that uncertainty in these parameters is non-negligible. The measurement approach adopted 
here allows this uncertainty to propagate into inferences regarding latent CBI levels across 
country-periods.
The right-hand panel of Figure 2.1 displays posterior means and ninety-five per cent 
confidence intervals for each of the threshold parameters relating to each indicator. Recall 
that the LVAW and LVAU indices treat the CWN indicators as interval-level variables, and 
hence assume that a movement from the first to the second category on a given indicator must 
imply the same change in CBI as a movement from the second to third category on the same 
indicator. This assumption appears to be unsupported when we inspect the threshold 
parameters estimated by the ordinal IRT model. For example, the relative distances between
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the thresholds estimated for the conf indicator suggest that a movement from the second to 
the third category of conf is associated with a much smaller increment in latent CBI than is a 
movement from the first to the second category of conf This illustrates the ability of the 
ordinal IRT model to accommodate nonlinear relationships between indicators and latent CBI 
levels, and also its usefulness for assessing the plausibility of assumptions made by other 
measurement approaches.
Of course, the parameters of primary interest in this measurement exercise are the 
estimated latent levels of central bank independence for different country-periods. How do 
the ordinal IRT estimates of CBI compare with the CBI scores assigned by the LVAW index? 
The left-hand panel of Figure 2.2 displays a simple scatter plot of LVAW scores 
(standardised to have mean zero and unit variance) against ordinal IRT point estimates of 
CBI, for the 242 country-periods in the data used to fit the ordinal IRT model. The general 
grouping of points along the diagonal, together with the reported Pearson correlation of 0.88 
suggests that both LVAW and ordinal IRT estimates are broadly measuring the same latent 
construct.
[FIGURE 2.2 ABOUT HERE]
However, scatter-plots and correlation coefficients can disguise the disagreement 
between two methods of measurement if the ‘between variation’ of scores across units is high 
relative to the ‘within-variation’ of measured scores recorded for the same unit by the 
different measurement methods (Bland and Altman, 1983). To assess agreement between 
two measures more clearly, we can use a ‘Bland-Altman plot’ which is commonly used for 
this purpose in clinical measurement (Cox 2004). For each observation, it plots the average 
of the measurements taken by the two methods on the x-axis, against the difference between
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the two measurements on the y-axis.16 Because the LVAW and ordinal IRT estimates both 
measure a latent construct, they exist on arbitrary scales. Therefore, when creating a Bland-
17Altman plot, I standardize each of these measures to have mean zero and unit variance.
The Bland-Altman plot is shown in the right-hand panel of Figure 2.2. The middle 
horizontal dashed line in this plot lies at the mean of the difference between standardized 
LVAW and ordinal IRT measurements, while the outer reference lines are drawn one 
standard deviation of this difference either side of the mean line. The Bland-Altman plot 
suggests that there is no distinct pattern that relates disagreement between the two 
measurement methods to average estimates of CBI. However, the vertical spread of points 
clearly demonstrates that there is substantial variation in the differences between the 
standardized LVAW and ordinal IRT estimates of CBI. The standard deviation of the 
difference in CBI scores assigned by these two methods is 0.5. In addition, many points 
(representing 35 per cent of country-periods) lie outside the region between the two outer 
horizontal reference lines on the plot: for all of these country-periods, the absolute value of 
the difference in CBI scores assigned by the two measurement methods is greater than 0.5. 
Given that both CBI measures are standardized to have a standard deviation of one, this 
implies that for 35 per cent of country-periods, standardised LVAW and ordinal IRT scores 
disagree by more than half a standard deviation on the latent CBI scale. Thus, there is 
considerable disagreement between the main existing measure of CBI and that generated 
from the same indicators using an ordinal IRT approach. These measures are not 
interchangeable, and I argue that the set of measurements generated in this paper are 
preferable because they are based on a more principled statistical procedure.
16 Bland and Altman (1995) show that if  we instead use the measurements obtained by one of the methods on 
the x-axis, we will tend to observe spurious correlation between x-axis and y-axis.
17 This standardization approach is based on Tractenberg and Asien (2009), who use the same strategy when 
creating Bland-Altman plots to compare measures of a different latent variable, cognitive impairment.
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The other major advantage of the ordinal IRT measurement approach is that it 
allows us to quantify our uncertainty regarding measurements in a straightforward manner 
(Treier and Jackman 2008). To allow us to gauge the extent of this uncertainty, Figure 2.3 
plots the posterior mean and the ninety-five per cent confidence interval for the latent level of 
de jure  CBI in each country during the 1980-89 period. This plot summarises CBI 
measurements for this period on all seventy developed and developing countries contained in 
the CWN data.
[FIGURE 2.3 ABOUT HERE]
The first notable feature of Figure 2.3 is that, perhaps unsurprisingly, Switzerland, 
West Germany, Austria and the United States are among the ten countries with the highest 
mean posterior CBI estimates. However, a number of developing countries also have 
relatively high mean posterior CBI estimates (e.g. Nicaragua, Honduras and Kenya). This 
finding is in line with the LVAW scores for the same 1980-89 period (CWN p.362).
The second notable feature of Figure 2.3 is the high level of uncertainty regarding 
levels of latent CBI for all countries. The CBI estimates for all countries during this period 
have 95 per cent confidence intervals that are at least 1.5 units wide. Again, recall that the 
latent CBI scale is standardized to have mean zero and unit variance across country-period 
observations. Thus, the results of the ordinal IRT model suggest that the information 
contained within the CWN data only allows us to measure latent levels of CBI across 
country-periods with substantial uncertainty: there is a clearly measurement error in our 
estimates. This finding is common among applications of IRT models to measurement 
problems (e.g. Treier and Jackman 2008; Hoyland et al. 2009).
To illustrate this point more vividly, Figure 2.4 summarises the marginal posterior 
distribution of each country’s CBI ranking for the 1980-89 period. The points in this plot 
represent the mean posterior rank of each country for this period in terms of latent CBI
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(averaged over the 10,000 samples from the joint posterior distribution of model parameters, 
which are generated by the MCMC estimation procedure), while the thick and thin black 
lines represent, respectively, fifty and ninety per-cent confidence intervals for this ranking. It 
is clear from this plot that our uncertainty regarding latent levels of CBI makes it very 
difficult to confidently distinguish between many countries in terms of CBI. For example, 
taking repeated samples from the posterior distribution, Ireland is on average ranked thirty- 
ninth in terms of latent levels of CBI for the 1980-89 period. However, in more than five per 
cent of draws from the joint posterior, Ireland is ranked either tenth and below or sixtieth and 
above, out of the seventy countries. Even among the high-CBI countries where the 
uncertainty in ranking is smallest (such as West Germany and Switzerland) CBI rankings still 
range by around ten places across repeated samples from the joint posterior.
[FIGURE 2.4 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 2.4 has important implications in and of itself. Mangano (1998) suggests that 
the problems of measuring CBI can be alleviated by using the rankings implied by CBI 
indices, instead of the raw scores on these indices, as measures of CBI in subsequent 
regression analysis. The findings presented in Figure 2.4 would suggest that such an 
approach is just as likely- and possibly more likely -  to result in misleading inferences as is 
the approach of using raw scores from existing CBI indices. This is because our uncertainty 
regarding the latent value of CBI for each country leads to even greater uncertainty regarding 
the CBI rankings of countries.
The final key point to note about the CBI estimates generated using the ordinal IRT 
approach is that our uncertainty regarding levels of CBI is not constant across country- 
periods. It is well understood in educational testing that when IRT models are used to 
measure the latent ability of students, measurements for extremely high- and low-ability 
students will contain more uncertainty than those for students with middling true levels if
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ability (Battuaz et al, 2008; Fox, 2005; Fox and Glas, 2003). The same pattern is observable 
in the current application. For example, if we return to Figure 2.3, we can note the 
progressive narrowing and then broadening of confidence intervals as we move from 
countries with low to high mean CBI estimates. Figure 2.5 illustrates the phenomenon more 
starkly. For each CBI parameter corresponding to each country-period z, it plots the mean of 
the marginal posterior density (the mean estimate of CBI for country-period i) against the 
standard deviation of this marginal posterior density (the standard error of the CBI estimate 
for country-period i). Though slightly obscured by the presence of some observations that 
have unusually high posterior standard deviations due to missing indicator responses, there is 
a general u-shaped pattern in the resulting plot. Our uncertainty regarding CBI inferences is 
greater for country-periods that have either very high or very low estimated latent CBI levels.
[FIGURE 2.5 ABOUT HERE]
This patent relationship between latent CBI levels and our degree of measurement 
uncertainty is something that should ideally be accounted for when using these measures in 
subsequent analyses of the economic consequences of CBI. This is a problem to which I turn 
in the next section.
2.4 Testing for the economic effects of latent central bank independence using 
ordinal IRT measures
The ordinal IRT approach to measurement provides us with two key pieces of information 
regarding latent levels of central bank independence: first, the posterior means of the CBI (#;) 
parameters represent a new set of CBI ‘measures’; second, the posterior standard deviations 
of the CBI parameters quantify the measurement error corresponding to each measured CBI
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value. The results presented in the previous section showed that these posterior standard 
deviations -  akin to standard errors -  are sizeable, and vary considerably across observations. 
In other words, we measure latent levels of CBI with both non-negligible and heteroscedastic 
measurement error. Given these properties, how can we appropriately utilise CBI measures 
as predictors in subsequent regression analyses aimed at testing the economic consequences 
of CBI?
Using predictors measured with error in regression can lead to biased inferences if 
we naively treat these predictors as measured without error (Carroll et al. 2006). In a simple 
linear regression where a single predictor is measured with error, estimated coefficients will 
suffer from an attenuation bias (Gustafson 2001; Carroll et al. 2006). But, Carroll et al. 
(2006) show that in a multiple regression set-up, measurement error in a single predictor can 
lead to: biased coefficient estimates for both the predictor measured with error and other 
predictors; the reversal of signs on parameter estimates; and also a loss of power to detect 
relationships. They point out that the impact of measurement error in a predictor is difficult 
to assess a priori because it depends on the relationship between the measurement error, the 
response variable, and the other predictors in the model. As Jackman notes, “when multiple 
predictors enter the regression and one or more of them is measured with error..., frankly, all 
bets are o ff’ (2008 p. 127). Because of the unpredictable nature of the biases caused by 
measurement error, it is vital that when noisy CBI measures are used as predictors in a 
regression, the researcher employs an estimation method that explicitly accounts and corrects 
for this measurement error.
In this paper, the proposed method for measurement error correction is that of 
“simulation extrapolation” (SIMEX) (Carroll et al. 2006). The rationale behind the SIMEX 
approach is that “the effect of measurement error on an estimator can be determined 
experimentally via simulation” (Carroll et al. 2006 p.98). The approach is relatively simple
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to implement, applicable to wide variety of models (both linear and generalized linear 
models), and its utility has already been demonstrated in political science by Benoit et al. 
(2009). Here I present a version of the SIMEX method that deals with heteroscedastic 
measurement error. This heteroscedatic-SIMEX method has been applied in educational 
testing (Battuaz et al. 2008), but this is the first time it has been presented in the political 
science or political economy context.
The heteroscedastic-SIMEX method is detailed more fully in Carroll et al. (2006 
p. 102) and Battuaz et al. (2008), but the general logic is as follows. Suppose we want to 
estimate /? from the regression
y t = a + p%i + ei, i = 
but is only observed via a noisy measurement f t  =  ft +  77*, where r]i~N(0, a f)  (i.e. f t  is 
an unbiased measure of & but is subject to heteroscedastic measurement error). Naively 
running the regression with f t  will generate a biased estimate Pnaive . The heteroscedastic- 
SIMEX algorithm corrects for this bias experimentally by: (1) simulating a large number of 
new datasets containing increasing amounts of additional measurement error; (2) generating 
naive parameter estimates based on each of these datasets; (3) modelling the relationship 
between these naive parameter estimates and the degree of measurement error; and (4) based 
on the model fitted in step (3), extrapolating back to the parameter estimates that would be 
obtained in the ideal case of no measurement error.
More formally, prior to estimation the researcher specifies an M-length vector of 
values £ (in this paper I assign a set of values that are standard in the SIMEX literature, 
setting f t  =  [0.5,1.0,1.5,2.0]). In step (1) the algorithm simulates m  = 1,..., M new data 
sets. For the 772th data set and fth observation the algorithm generates an independent pseudo 
error from a normal distribution with mean zero and observation-specific variance and 
adds this to the original f t  measurement. So, in this 772th dataset the total measurement error
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variance for is o f  + Zmo f  =  (1 +  ^m)o f.  In step (2), the algorithm generates naive 
estimates pm based on the mth dataset. To minimize Monte Carlo error, steps (1) and (2) are 
repeated a large number of times and, for each m, the average pm taken across these
— — 1 o
repetitions is stored as Pm. In step (3) the pm are modelled as a function of Finally, in 
step (4) the algorithm generates an estimate /?simex that corrects for measurement error by 
extrapolating the model fitted in step (3) back to £ =  —1, which corresponds to a dataset with 
zero total measurement error variance: (1 + Zm)of =  0.
The problem of estimating the economic impact of latent CBI using the noisy 
ordinal IRT measures of this latent variable can be conceptualised within the heteroscedastic- 
SIMEX framework. Let the ordinal IRT point estimates (posterior means) of latent CBI 
levels, Qi, replace the measured values f t  in the SIMEX setup. Within the SIMEX 
framework, these 0* are assumed to measure true levels of latent CBI on average (i.e. our 
ordinal IRT estimates are unbiased), but are subject to independent, identically distributed 
shocks drawn from a normal distribution with mean zero and observation-specific variance 
o f } 9 Each observation-specific measurement error variance, of ,  is approximated using the 
marginal posterior variance of the corresponding 0; parameter, taken from the MCMC 
samples generated for the ordinal IRT model. Re-casting the task at hand in this way allows 
us to use the heteroscedastic-SIMEX approach to estimate regressions which contain ordinal 
IRT measures of CBI as predictors.
Before continuing, it should be noted that there are other useful methods that allow 
us to test for the effect of a variable that is imperfectly measured. One approach is to jointly 
model the ‘measurement stage’ (in the current context, the ordinal IRT model) and the
18 Following the recommendations of Battuaz et al (2008), this paper employs a quadratic function at this stage.
19 Inspection of the estimated marginal posterior densities of the CBI parameters suggested that this normality 
assumption appears reasonable in the current context. Furthermore, Carroll (2006) et al report that “minor 
violations o f the assumption of normality in the measurement errors is not critical in practice” (p. 101).
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‘outcome stage’ (where latent CBI is a predictor of a given measure of economic 
performance). This approach can be implemented using Bayesian MCMC estimation 
methods (Gustafson 2003; Fox and Glas 2003; Carroll et al. 2006) and allows information 
from the outcome model to “feedback” into inferences regarding latent traits. However,
Lunn et al. (2008) caution that if this approach is employed the outcome model can unduly 
influence measurements, resulting in inferences that may not be robust, especially if we are 
unsure of the appropriate form of the outcome model. Treier and Jackman (2008) present a 
Monte Carlo approach that cuts this “feedback” between measurement and outcome model, 
but that does allow uncertainty at the measurement stage to propagate into inferences at the 
outcome stage. The SIMEX approach shares the advantage of separating measurement 
modelling from outcome modelling (Battuaz et al. 2008). However, it has the added 
advantage of allowing the researcher to extrapolate away from the uncertainty generated at 
the measurement stage, when drawing inferences regarding the outcome model.
An application
To demonstrate how the heteroscedastic-SIMEX method can be deployed to make 
appropriate use of the ordinal IRT measures of CBI generated in this paper, I replicate a key 
existing study of the economic effects of CBI. In this study, Keefer and Stasavage (2003) 
develop and empirically test a formal theoretical model which predicts that the impact of CBI 
is conditional. Specifically, de jure CBI should have a more negative effect on inflation as 
both the number of veto players in a political system increases, and as the divergence in the 
inflation preferences of these veto players’ increases.
The authors find empirical support for these propositions when they model average 
inflation levels across country-periods as a function of CBI (measured using LVAW) 
interacted with the number of veto players in political systems. Furthermore, their empirical
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results help to resolve an empirical puzzle noted when previous researchers had only tested 
for an unconditional economic impact of CBI (e.g. Cukierman et al, 1992). Specifically, 
researchers had previously found that de jure CBI was significantly associated with inflation 
levels in developed countries but was not so in tests that pooled these developed countries 
together with developing countries. In contrast, Keefer and Stasavage’s results regarding the 
conditional impact of CBI hold in a sample containing both developed and developing 
countries.
So, Keefer and Stasavage’s findings are substantively important. But we can be 
more confident in their substantive conclusions if their empirical results hold when we use 
the ordinal IRT measures of CBI presented in this paper (which aggregate the CWN 
indicators in a more principled manner than does the LVAW index), and when we account 
for the considerable measurement error in these measures.
To keep matters simple, I report replication results for the third model presented in 
Table 2 of Keefer and Stasavage. This linear model is specified by the authors as
Ininf. =  a  +  facbii +  /?2p°liticcil constriantsi +  p3cbii*political constraints. +
S'Zi +  et (1)
where Ininft is the log of average inflation for country-period /, cbii is the level of latent
central bank independence, political constraints. gauges the number of institutional veto
01players in the political system, and z x is a vector of controls that includes the average GDP-
20 The differences between original and replicated results follow similar patterns when other models in Table 2 
are replicated. Model 3 replications are reported here because this particular specification utilises approximately 
twenty-five per cent more country-period observations than do the other models presented in Table 2 of Keefer 
and Stasavage.
21 For more details on this variable, see Heinsz (2000). Strictly, this political constraints variable could also be 
considered subject to measurement error. However, because it is neither an additive index nor based on multiple 
indicators, the task of characterising the measurement-generating process for this variable, and therefore of 
estimating measurement error for it, is not amenable to an IRT approach and is therefore left to future work. 
Instead, here I focus on the impact of measurement error in the CBI variable. Experiments were run where 
equation 1 was estimated using the SIMEX algorithm, allowing for measurement error in both CBI and in 
political constraints, setting the level of measurement error variance in the political constraints at plausible 
conjectured values ranging between 0.1 and 0.3. Results are not reported here, but suggest that the coefficients 
on CBI and on its interaction with political constraints retain the significance patterns in column 3 o f Table 2,
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weighted value of imports (<openness.) and time-period fixed effects. Keefer and Stasavage 
estimate this model via OLS, using data for 152 country-periods, spanning the latter three 
time-periods defined for the Cukierman et al. (1992) indicators. I replicate this model using 
data obtained directly from the authors.
Table 2.2 presents three sets of point estimates and ninety-five per cent confidence 
intervals for the parameters in equation (1). The results in the first column are OLS estimates 
using the LVAW index to measure country-period latent levels of CBI -  the same measure as 
used originally by Keefer and Stasavage. Next, column two presents the results generated 
from an identical model and estimation method as in column one, except that latent levels of 
CBI are measured using the ordinal IRT point estimates (posterior means) rather the LVAW 
scores. Finally, the results in the third column of Table 2.2 are again generated using the 
ordinal IRT point estimates to measure latent CBI, but here the heteroscedastic-SIMEX 
procedure is used to correct for measurement error in these CBI measures. Confidence 
intervals in this third column are calculated based on standard error estimates generated using 
the asymptotic method described in Battuaz et al. (2008 p.301).
[TABLE 2.2 ABOUT HERE]
For each of the models presented in Table 2.2, Figure 2.6 plots the estimated 
marginal effect (and corresponding ninety-five per cent confidence interval) of a one standard 
deviation increase in latent CBI (however measured) on logged average inflation levels, as 
the number of veto players in a political system varies.
[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE]
The three sets of results summarised in Table 2.2 and Figure 6 allow us to separate 
out two possible factors behind any changes in parameter estimates across models (Treier and
but that the absolute magnitude of these coefficients increases as the conjectured measurement error variance in 
political constraints gets larger.
22 Following Stasavage and Keefer (p. 418), in creating Figure 7 the political constraints variable is set at 
0.167,0.67 and 0.80 to reflect a political system with one, two and three veto players, respectively.
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Jackman 2008). First, by comparing results generated using the LVAW scores and ordinal 
IRT point estimates of CBI (columns one and two), we can assess the effect of using a more 
principled method for the aggregation of CBI indicators into a CBI measure. To ensure 
easier comparability across these models, I standardize LVAW scores to have mean zero and 
unit variance before estimating the regression (recall that the ordinal IRT measures are
'J'Xconstrained to have mean zero and unit variance for identification purposes). Second, 
comparison of columns two and three allows us to assess the impact of accounting and 
correcting for measurement error in the ordinal IRT measures of CBI -  a correction that 
would not be possible using the LVAW scores because they are not accompanied by 
uncertainty estimates.
Encouragingly, initial inspection of the coefficient estimates in the second two 
columns of Table 2.2 indicates that CBI, as measured using the ordinal IRT estimates, has a 
more negative association with average inflation levels the greater are political constraints. 
That is, in both columns, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term 
cbi*political constraints is negative and distinguishable from zero with ninety-five per cent 
confidence. Because this result holds when we use a more principled measure of latent 
central bank independence and when we account for measurement error in this measure, we 
can be more confident of Keefer and Stasavage’s original headline conclusion that the impact 
of central bank independence on economic outcomes is conditional on the characteristics of a 
political system.
However, closer inspection of Table 2.2 and Figure 2.6 also reveals that the 
substantive inferences we can draw do vary depending on which measure of CBI is used and 
whether measurement error is accounted for during estimation. For example, from Figure 2.6 
we can see that when the LVAW index is used to measure CBI, then for a country with only a
23 When the non-standardized LVAW scores were used, results are identical to those reported by Keefer and 
Stasavage.
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single veto player in its political system, an increase in latent central bank independence is 
actually predicted to have a positive marginal effect on inflation levels with ninety-five per 
cent confidence. This is a rather counter-intuitive result: the theory presented by Keefer and 
Stasavage does predict that an increase in CBI should not have an effect on inflation levels 
when there is a single veto player (p. 410), but does not suggest that increasing CBI should 
cause an increase inflation levels. In contrast, we can see from Figure 2.6 that when the 
ordinal IRT point estimates are used to measure CBI (model 2 in the plot) then, for a country 
with a single veto player, the predicted effect of an increase in latent central bank 
independence is actually indistinguishable from zero using a ninety-five per cent confidence 
interval. This illustrates that our substantive inferences regarding the economic impact CBI 
are altered simply by re-aggregating the information contained in Cukierman et al’s (1992) 
indicators in a more principled manner.
But how does accounting and correcting for measurement error in our ordinal IRT 
estimates impact upon substantive inferences? First, by comparing columns two and three of 
Table 2.2 we can see that the estimated magnitude of the interaction between cbi and political 
constraints increases substantially when we account for measurement error using the 
heteroscedastic-SIMEX method. This is illustrated in Figure 2.6, where the estimated 
marginal effect of latent CBI levels varies with the number of veto players to a much greater 
extent under the heteroscedastic-SIMEX model than when ordinal IRT measures are used 
naively ignoring measurement error. Furthermore, Figure 2.6 suggests that for a political 
system with two veto players, we can only be ninety-five per cent confident that an increase 
in central bank independence is associated with a decrease in inflation levels when 
measurement error is corrected for.
In sum, this replication exercise not only demonstrates the applicability of the 
heteroscedastic-SIMEX method for making appropriate use of the ordinal IRT measures of
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CBI presented in this paper. It also increases our confidence in previous empirical 
conclusions regarding the conditional economic impact of CBI. Indeed, compared to existing 
empirical tests, the results generated when we use these new CBI measures and correct for 
measurement error are actually more supportive of Keefer and Stasavage’s theory.
2.5 Conclusion
Empirical evidence concerning the macroeconomic consequences of central bank 
independence is not just of academic interest, but can also inform the design of monetary 
policy-making institutions. This paper makes three contributions to the effort to gather this 
empirical evidence.
First, it provides a new improved set of country-level measures of de jure CBI.
These measures are generated by applying an ordinal item-response approach, previously 
unused in the CBI literature, to aggregate the rich information contained in Cukierman et al’s 
(1992) legal indicators. The ordinal IRT approach to measurement allows us to address the 
flaws in existing measures of CBI because it explicitly models the categorical nature of 
component indicators and avoids restrictive assumptions regarding the weighting different 
indicators receive during aggregation. Furthermore, comparison of the new CBI measures 
with the main existing ones used in the literature suggests that the ordinal IRT approach does 
make a difference: disagreement between the two measures is substantial, despite the fact that 
both are generated based on the same underlying indicator data.
Second, for the first time in the literature, this paper presents CBI measures that are 
accompanied by observation-specific estimates of measurement error variance. These 
measurement error estimates are generated in a straightforward manner when the ordinal IRT
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model is estimated using Bayesian MCMC methods, and allows us to assess the uncertainty 
in the measures of latent CBI. Results suggest that this uncertainty is substantively large, and 
should not be ignored by researchers seeking to test for the economic impact of CBI. It is 
worth emphasising here that such an assessment of measurement error would not be possible 
when using the main existing approaches to the construction of CBI indices, as these 
deterministic approaches do not aggregate information from component indicators using a 
properly specified statistical model (Quinn 2004 p.339).
Third, this paper presents a simulation-extrapolation method that enables researchers 
to deploy the new ordinal IRT measures of CBI in subsequent regression analysis while 
properly accounting and correcting for uncertainty in these measures. This is important 
because using CBI measures in regression analyses without accounting for measurement 
error can lead to biased inferences regarding the economic impact of CBI. The simulation- 
extrapolation method presented here is relatively straightforward to implement and handles 
the heteroscedastic nature of the measurement error in the ordinal IRT measures. To 
demonstrate how this method can be used in conjunction with the new CBI measures, I 
replicate a prominent existing study which tested for a conditional association between CBI 
and inflation levels. In this application, using the new ordinal IRT measures of CBI and 
properly correcting for measurement error yields results that not only reinforce our 
confidence in the conclusions of the original study, but are actually more consistent with the 
substantive theory that the original study sought to test.
There are a number of ways in which the IRT approach to the measurement of 
central bank independence presented in this paper can be usefully taken forward. Future 
researchers seeking to re-code the Cukierman et al. (1992) indicators, or to design schemes 
for the collection of new CBI indicator data, can draw on the item discrimination and 
threshold parameter plots presented in section 3 of this paper. These plots can act as a guide
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as to which indicators, and which categories of these indicators, are particularly informative 
with regard to latent CBI levels. Also, item-response modelling is very flexible and can be 
applied to a set of indicators that are not necessarily all ordinal, but also interval-level (Quinn 
2004), truncated, or counts (Hoyland et al. 2009). As a result, in future work the IRT 
approach could be applied to systematically combine various de jure and de facto indicators 
of central bank independence, yielding a CBI measure that draws on a greater variety of 
information.
Finally the particular simulation-extrapolation method presented in this paper, which 
deals with heteroscedastic measurement error in regression inputs, could prove very useful 
across a range of political science and political economy settings. The advantages of the 
general SIMEX approach in a setting with homoscedastic measurement error have already 
been amply demonstrated for the political science community by Benoit et al. (2009). 
However, in many political science applications, where researchers use IRT-generated 
measures of unobserved quantities (such as legislators’ ideal points, or countries’ levels of 
corruption), these measures are accompanied by observation-specific uncertainty estimates.
In these circumstances, researchers could take the average of these uncertainty estimates 
across observations and apply the generic SIMEX method. But this approach loses 
information. Rather, the heteroscedastic-SIMEX method would appear to be more 
appropriate in these circumstances, because it utilises all observation-specific uncertainty 
estimates when correcting regression estimates for measurement error.
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Table 2.1: Original CWN indicators of legal central bank independence and coding scores
Numerical
Variable description___________________________________________________________ Weight coding
1 Chief executive officer cluster 0.20
a. Term of office (too)
Over 8 years 1.00
6 to 8 years 0.75
5 years 0.50
4 years 0.25
Under 4 years at the discretion of the appointer 0.00
b. Who appoints CEO? (app)
Board of central bank 1.00
A council composed of central bank board, executive branch and legislative branch 0.75
Legislature 0.50
Executive collectively (e.g. council of ministers) 0.25
One or two members of the executive branch 0.00
c. Dismissal (diss)
No provision for dismissal 1.00
Only for reasons not related to policy 0.83
At the discretion of the central bank board 0.67
At legislature’s discretion 0.50
Unconditional dismissal possible by legislatures 0.33
At executive’s discretion 0.17
Unconditional dismissal possible by executive 0.00
d. May CEO hold other offices in government? (off)
No 1.00
Only with permission of executive branch 0.50
No rule against CEO holding another office 0.00
2 Policy formulation cluster 0.15
a. Who formulates monetary policy? (monpot)
Bank alone 1.00
Bank participates, but has little influence 0.67
Bank only advises government 0.33
Bank has no say 0.00
b. Who has the final word in resolution of a conflict? (conf)
The bank, on issues clearly defined in the law as its objectives 1.00
Government, on policy issues not clearly defined as the bank’s goals or in the case of
conflict within the bank 0.80
A council of the central bank, executive branch and legislative branch 0.60
The legislature, on policy issues 0.40
The executive branch on policy issues, subject to due process and possible protest by
the bank 0.20
The executive branch has unconditional priority 0.00
c. Role in the government’s budgetary process (adv)
Central bank active 1.00
Central bank has no influence 0.00
3 Objectives cluster 0.15
a. Objectives (obf)
Price stability is the major or only objective in the charter, and the central bank has the 1.00
final word in case of conflict with other government objectives 0.80
Price stability is the only objective
Price stability is one goal, with other compatible objectives, such as a stable banking 0.60
system
Price stability is one goal, with potentially conflicting objectives such as full 0.40
employment 0.20
No objectives stated in bank charter 0.00
Stated objectives do not include price stability
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Table 2.1 (continued)
Variable description Weight
Numerical
coding
4 Limitations on lending to the government cluster
a. Advances (limitations on nonsecuuritized lending) (lla)
No advances permitted
Advances permitted, but with strict limits (e.g. up to 15 per cent of government 
revenue)
Advances permitted, and the limits are loose (e.g. over 15 per cent of government 
revenue)
No legal limits on lending
0.15
1.00
0.67
0.33
0.00
b. Securitized lending (Us)
Not permitted
Permitted, but with strict limits (e.g. up to 15 per cent of government revenue) 
Permitted, and the limits are loose (e.g. over 15 per cent of government revenue) 
No legal limits on lending
0.10
1.00
0.67
0.33
0.00
c. Terms of lending (maturity, interest, amount) (Idee)
Controlled by bank
Specified by bank charter
Agreed between the bank and the executive
Decided by executive branch alone
0.10
1.00
0.67
0.33
0.00
d. Potential borrowers from the bank (Iwidth)
Only central government 
All levels of government (state as well as central) 
Those mentioned above and public enterprises 
Public and private sector
0.05
1.00
0.67
0.33
0.00
e. Limits on central bank lending defined in: (Itype) 
Currency amounts
Shares of central bank demand liabilities or capital 
Shares of government revenue 
Shares of government expenditures
0.025
1.00
0.67
0.33
0.00
f. Maturity of loans (Imat)
Within 6 months
Within 1 year
More than 1 year
No mention of maturity in law
0.025
1.00
0.67
0.33
0.00
g- Interest rates on loans must be (lint) 
Above minimum rates 
At market rates 
Below maximum rates 
Interest rate is not mentioned
0.025
1.00
0.67
0.33
0.00
h. Central bank prohibited from buying or selling government securities in the primary 
market? (Iprim)
Yes
No
0.025
1.00
0.00
Source: Table 2.1 of Cukierman et al. (1992 p.358-359).
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Table 2.2: replications of Keefer and Stasavage (2003) model 3
IRT
IRT point heteroskedastic
Explanatory variable_________LVAW________ estimates________ SIMEX
Intercept -2.46 -2.48 -2.48
[-2.79, -2.14] [-2.81,-2.16] [-2.83, -2.14]
CBI 0.34 0.31 0.45
[0.06, 0.62] [0.01,0.62] [-0.04, 0.93]
Openness -1.2 -1.17 -1.17
[-1.83, -0.56] [-1.81,-0.53] [-1.8, -0.54]
Political Constraints -0.6 -0.59 -0.57
[-1, -0.21] [-0.98, -0.19] [-0.98, -0.16]
Period 3 Dummy 1.08 1.08 1.07
[0.74, 1.42] [0.73, 1.42] [0.77, 1.37]
Period 4 Dummy 1.16 1.14 1.14
[0.82, 1.49] [0.81, 1.48] [0.78, 1.5]
CBI * Political Constraints -0.65 -0.67 -0.92
[-1.06, -0.23] [-1.14, -0.2] [-1.57, -0.27]
N 152 152 152
Note: These are results from replications of Model 3 in Table 2 of Keefer and Stasavage (2003). The model in 
the first column uses the standardised LVAW index to measure CBI and is estimated via OLS. In the second and 
third columns the new ordinal IRT point estimates are used to measure CBI. The results in the second column 
are estimated via OLS, while those in the third column are estimated using a heteroscedastic-SIMEX method 
that corrects for measurement error in the IRT point estimates of CBI. Estimated ninety-five per cent confidence 
intervals are presented in parentheses. For the heteroscedastic-SIMEX model, these are based on standard errors 
estimated using Carroll et al’s (2006) asymptotic method (see also Battuaz et al. 2008).
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Figure 2.1: ordinal IRT, estimated item discrimination and item threshold parameters
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Note: Both panels present item parameter estimates for the ordinal IRT model fit to the Cukierman et al. (1992) data (see Table 2.1 for full definitions of each indicator).
The left-hand panel plots item-discrimination parameter point estimates and ninety-five per cent confidence intervals for each indicator included in the model. The right-hand 
panel plots point estimates and ninety-five per cent confidence intervals for all item-threshold parameters. For each indicator, the points are labelled to corresponding to the k- 
indexing of threshold parameters in the main text. Where a given response category was never observed for a given indicator, this category is dropped from the analysis. 
Hence some indicators have fewer thresholds to be estimated than implied than in Table 2.1.
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Figure 2.2: (dis)agreement between new and old central bank independence measures
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Note: The left-hand panel plots standardized LVAW measures of CBI against ordinal IRT point estimates of CBI (posterior means), with a reference line along the diagonal. 
The right-hand panel presents a Bland-Altman plot. For each country-period, this plots the average of the standardised LVAW and ordinal IRT measures of CBI, against the 
difference between the two measures. The middle dashed reference line indicates the mean difference between the two measurement methods across country-periods, while 
the two outer lines are drawn one standard deviation of the difference either side of mean line.
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Figure 2.3: ordinal IRT, estimated levels of central bank independence for the 1980-89 period
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Note: Based on the ordinal IRT model estimated in Section 3, this plot displays the point estimate (posterior 
mean) and ninety-five per cent confidence intervals for latent levels o f CBI in different countries for the 1980- 
89 period. Estimates are presented for all seventy countries included in the Cukierman et al. (1992) data.
55
Figure 2.4: posterior central bank independence rankings for the 1980-89 period
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cent confidence intervals.
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Figure 2.5: non-constant measurement error variance in ordinal IRT central bank
independence estimates
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Note: Based on the ordinal IRT model estimated in Section 3, for every country-period this plots the posterior 
mean of the latent CBI parameter against the posterior standard deviation of this parameter.
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Figure 2.6: estimated marginal effect of central bank independence on log inflation
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Note: This plot is based on the three regression models reported in Table 2.2. Each point is indexed to a 
particular model, as indicated in the legend. For each of these models, and for a given number of veto players 
(indicated on the left-hand side) the points in the plot represent the mean estimated marginal effect of a one 
standard deviation increase in latent CBI on log average inflation levels. The horizontal lines indicate the ninety 
five per cent confidence intervals for these estimated marginal effects.
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3 From Doves to Hawks: A Spatial Analysis of Voting in 
the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of 
England*
Abstract
This paper examines the making of UK monetary policy between 1997 and 2008 by 
analysing voting behaviour in the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (MPC). 
We provide a new set of measures for the monetary policy preferences of individual MPC 
members by estimating a Bayesian item response model. We demonstrate the usefulness of 
these measures by comparing the ideal points of outgoing MPC members with their 
successors and by looking at changes over time in the median ideal point on the MPC. Our 
analysis indicates there has not been a straightforward electoral cycle in MPC appointments, 
but that the British government has been able to move the position of the median voter on the 
MPC through its appointments to the committee. This highlights the importance of central 
bank appointments for monetary policy.
Keywords: monetary policy, central banks, ideal point estimation.
* This paper is based on Hix et al (2010).
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3.1 Introduction
On 11 January 2007 the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) of the Bank of England 
increased the interest rate by a quarter of a per cent to 5.25 per cent. The increase came as a 
surprise to most observers given the economic conditions and past behaviour of the MPC. 
When the minutes of the meeting were published three weeks later, they revealed that the 
committee had split 5 to 4 in favour of the increase. In fact, the MPC has been divided about 
two-thirds of the time since the Bank of England was made independent in 1997, although 
rarely split down the middle as in January 2007. Presented with the same information about 
the state of the British economy each month, why do the members of the MPC disagree on 
the appropriate interest rate? Clearly, British central bankers, like all policymakers, do not all 
think the same way. This suggests that had the composition of the MPC been slightly 
different in January 2007, the decision might have been to hold rates rather than increase 
them.
We offer a spatial analysis of voting in the MPC from the first meeting of the 
committee after the Bank of England was made independent in June 1997 until April 2008. 
We use Bayesian simulation methods, introduced by Martin and Quinn (2002) and Clinton et 
al. (2004) in the context of courts and legislatures respectively, to estimate an item response 
model that measures the monetary policy preferences of all of the 25 individuals who have 
been members of the MPC during this ten-year period. We measure these preferences along 
an underlying dimension that we label a dove-hawk dimension, where ‘hawks’ tend to prefer 
higher interest rates than ‘doves’ when faced with identical economic conditions. Our 
estimates control for varying economic conditions across MPC meetings and incorporate 
information as to the substantive direction of the interest rate proposals voted on by MPC 
members. Furthermore, the Bayesian estimation method we employ ensures that our
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preference measures are accompanied by statistically valid uncertainty estimates and also 
makes it straightforward to draw inferences regarding auxiliary parameters of substantive 
interest. We demonstrate the value of these features by using our measures to investigate 
patterns in the monetary policy preferences of individuals appointed to the MPC, and in the 
median ideal point on the MPC over time. Our analysis indicates that the observed pattern in 
MPC appointments is not consistent with a simple political business cycle in central bank 
appointments. Nevertheless, through its appointment powers, the British government has 
been able to move the position of the MPC over time. This suggests that central bank 
appointments matter for monetary policy. In light of this, we discuss possible alternative 
incentives that might have motivated the British government’s appointment choices.
In the next section we provide a brief review of the existing literature on monetary 
policy-making on the MPC and on central banks more generally. In section three we 
motivate and develop the statistical model we employ to measure monetary policy 
preferences, as well as describing our data and estimation method. We present the resulting 
measures in section four. Finally, in section five we apply our measures to investigate 
whether there is a pattern in the composition of the MPC over time.
3.2 Studying the Bank of England MPC
One of the first acts of the newly elected British Labour government in May 1997 was to 
grant operational independence for setting monetary policy to the Bank of England. After 
almost two decades in opposition the new Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon 
Brown, was eager to demonstrate his party’s commitment to economic stability. Economists 
have argued that central bank independence with a clear and simple mandate is an effective
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institutional arrangement for delivering low and stable inflation (Rogoff 1985). The logic is 
that removing representative government from direct involvement in monetary policy-making 
and placing responsibility in the hands of a relatively inflation-averse central bank mitigates 
the ‘time-inconsistency problem’, where suboptimal inflation levels arise because a policy­
maker cannot credibly commit not to induce surprise inflation (Kydland and Prescott 1977; 
Barro and Gordon 1983). Granting independence to the Bank of England hence sent a strong 
signal to financial markets and the electorate that Labour could be trusted to manage the 
British economy.
The act of parliament which established central bank independence in the UK 
provided for the Chancellor to set an inflation target and for a Monetary Policy Committee to 
set monetary policy instruments at monthly meetings with the aim of achieving this target. 
The inflation target is currently set at 2 per cent on the Consumer Price Index (CPI). If this 
target is missed by more than one percentage point on either side, the Governor of the Bank 
has to write a letter to the Chancellor explaining why the target has been missed. This 
implies that the inflation target is symmetric (below-target inflation is not deemed to be more 
desirable than above-target inflation) and that a range of inflation rates around the target are 
politically acceptable. The key monetary policy instrument set by the MPC is the official 
Bank Rate; the interest rate at which the Bank of England supplies funds to the banking 
system for a two-week period.
The MPC consists of nine members who decide on the Bank Rate by majority vote at 
each monthly meeting. The decision-making process on the MPC has been described by 
Bank of England employees Bean and Jenkinson (2001p.435-437) as follows. First, 
committee members are presented with the latest economic information by Bank staff at a 
monthly briefing. Second, members discuss economic conditions on the first of a two-day 
policy-meeting the following week. Third, on the second morning of the policy-meeting, the
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Governor invites each member in turn to summarize his or her views regarding the 
appropriate monetary policy (usually including his or her preferred interest rate). Members 
are called in a random order, with the Deputy Governor responsible for Monetary Policy 
speaking first and the Governor concluding. Finally, the Governor proposes an interest rate 
“that he expects will command a majority” (p.438) and members vote on this proposal. The 
governor votes last. The preferred interest rate of a member who votes against the winning 
proposal is recorded.
Of the nine individuals who sit on the MPC at any one time, five “internal” members 
are appointed as staff of the Bank of England and four “external” members are appointed by 
the Chancellor. Of the internal members, the Governor and the two Deputy Governors of the 
MPC are appointed for renewable five-year terms by the Crown, which effectively means the 
Chancellor. The two other internal members, the Executive Directors of the Bank, are 
appointed for renewable three-year terms by the Governor of the Bank of England, after 
consultation with the Chancellor. The four external members are appointed for renewable 
three-year terms. Nominees are required to go before the House of Commons Treasury 
Select Committee, which can take a vote of approval, but does not have the power to veto a 
Chancellor’s appointment choice.1 Thus the government, and particularly the Chancellor, 
would appear to possess a great deal of control over the appointment of most MPC members.
Table 3.1 lists the details of the twenty-five individuals who were members of the 
MPC at one time or another between June 1997 and April 2008. As the table shows, there is 
variance in the career background of both internal and external members prior to their 
appointment. A plurality of the eleven internal appointees had a background within the Bank 
of England, but six came from other backgrounds such as financial institutions, academia and 
the civil service. Similarly, a plurality of the externally appointed members had a
11n fact, in May 2000 the Treasury Select Committee voted to reject Christopher Allsopp as the replacement of 
Charles Goodhart, but the Chancellor ignored the position of the committee.
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background in academia, but others come from financial institutions in the City of London, 
the civil service, or industry.
[TABLE 3.1 ABOUT HERE]
Turning to existing research on the MPC, several scholars have estimated reaction 
functions of varying specifications to assess the response of MPC interest rates to key 
economic variables (cf. Gascoigne and Turner 2004; Adam et al. 2005; Goodhart 2005).
Other researchers have exploited the availability of MPC voting records to investigate 
monetary policy-making behaviour within the committee. Some papers concentrate on the 
voting behaviour of groups of members, particularly internals versus externals. Spencer 
(2007) and Harris and Spencer (2007) find that external members are more likely to vote for a 
cut in interest rates than internal members. Gerlach-Kristen (2007) draws similar conclusions 
from an analysis of the relative voting behaviour of insiders and outsiders. In a slight 
modification of this result, Hansen and McMahon (2008) find evidence that, after their first 
year on the committee, external members tend to vote for lower interest rates than internal 
members.
In contrast to these studies, we analyse voting behaviour on the MPC at the individual 
rather than group level. This approach reduces the risk of confounding individual-level with 
group-level explanatory variables. To elaborate, the result that external members on average 
vote for lower rates than internal members might be caused by idiosyncratic factors rather 
than anything systematically related to being an external member. Of course, if this result 
was obtained from analysis of a time-period that included the terms of a large number of 
external and internal members, then we could be reasonably confident in attributing 
preferences for lower rates to the extemal-wess of a member. However, as the time-period 
reduces to include fewer numbers of individuals within each group, this confidence reduces. 
Unfortunately, the MPC has only been in existence since 1997 and, as of April 2008, any
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study can compare the votes of a maximum of only eleven internal and fourteen external 
members. Given this relatively small number of members within each group, we prefer to 
look at individual-level voting behaviour and assess patterns in group behaviour based upon 
our measures of individual-level behaviour.
Other studies of MPC voting records have also sought to measure differences in 
voting behaviour at the individual level. For example, Besley et al. (2008) estimate a reaction 
function for the preferred interest rate of each MPC member at each MPC meeting between 
June 1997 and July 2007. They find evidence of heterogeneity in reaction functions across 
individual members, but show that this heterogeneity does not appear to be systematically 
related to career background or the internal or external status of a member. Brooks et al. 
(2007) find evidence for significant differences in reactions to economic conditions across 
individual members. Finally, Bhattachaijee and Holly (2005) find that individuals place 
more weight on personal economic forecasts (and thus increasingly differ in preferred interest 
rates) as Bank forecasts become more uncertain. In addition to these studies of the Bank of 
England, Chappell et al. (2005) estimate individual FOMC member heterogeneity and 
investigate political influences on monetary policy via the Federal Reserve appointment 
process.
We depart from these latter studies by analysing member-specific voting behaviour on
the MPC within a spatial voting framework. As explained in more detail in the next section,
we operationalise the spatial voting theory with an item response model and estimate the
revealed relative monetary policy preferences of MPC members using Markov Chain Monte
Carlo (MCMC) methods. This approach allows us to make two key contributions to the
literature on the MPC. First, we provide a new measure of the relative voting behaviour of
the 25 individuals who have sat on the committee between 1997 and May 2008. Second,
2 Chang (2005) has analysed voting on the U.S Federal Open Market Committee within the spatial voting 
framework. However, her empirical analysis treats all votes to decrease interest rates and all votes to maintain 
interest rates as substantively the same, thereby losing valuable information.
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because the MCMC method we use estimates the posterior distribution of all parameters in 
the statistical model, it is straightforward to make inferences about any auxiliary or composite 
quantity of interest within the model (Clinton et al. 2004).
This latter feature allows us to draw inferences regarding the differences between new 
MPC appointees and their predecessors, as well as changes in the median monetary policy 
preference on the MPC over time. As a result, we are able to investigate whether the Labour 
government was able to use its MPC appointment powers to influence monetary policy and, 
if this was the case, what may have been its incentives in doing so. This is an important issue 
since, as Mueller notes: “if the government cannot commit itself not to meddle with the 
macropolicy in general, how can it credibly commit itself not to meddle with the central 
bank?” (Mueller 2003 p.465). Evidence of political patterns in central bank appointments has 
been reported in studies of the US Federal Reserve (Havrilesky and Gildea 1992; Chang 
2003; Chappell et al. 2005) and the German Bundesbank (Lohmann 1998; Berger and Woitek 
2005). We demonstrate how our preference estimates enable tests for such political patterns 
in the UK context. These estimates also provide political scientists with the opportunity to 
empirically assess more general theories of appointments to independent policy-making 
bodies in the context of central banks committees.
3.3 Measuring the Monetary Policy Preferences of MPC Members
Our dataset consists of the voting choices of sitting MPC members in all 95 non-unanimous 
votes taken on interest rates between June 1997 and April 2008.3 In total we observe the
3 Although there are 132 meetings in this time-period, observations from 37 meetings where voting was 
unanimous were dropped. These unanimous votes do not provide any information about relative differences 
between committee members on the underlying dove-hawk dimension.
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voting decisions of 25 MPC members over the period analysed. The data were coded from 
an MPC voting spreadsheet maintained by the Bank of England.4 Each observed pairwise 
vote choice y lU by individual i at meeting t, was coded as 0 if it was cast in favour of the 
lower nominal interest rate alternative and 1 if it was cast in favour of the higher nominal 
interest rate alternative.5
The starting point for our analysis of this data is the standard spatial model of voting 
(e.g. Hinich and Munger 1997). Our model assumes that monetary policy alternatives can be 
placed according to some underlying dimension, that MPC members have preferences over 
the location of policies on this dimension, and that each member maximises her utility by 
voting for the alternative closest to her most preferred location on the dimension (her ideal 
point).
At each meeting MPC members vote to set a nominal interest rate, the Bank rate. 
However, the same nominal interest rate of, say, 4 per cent, could be considered relatively 
restrictive if inflation and output growth were low, but relatively stimulatory if inflation and 
output growth were high. Therefore, through their choice of a nominal interest rate in a given 
meeting, we model policy-makers as choosing a point on an underlying dimension that 
measures the relative restrictiveness of a nominal interest rate given economic conditions.
We call this the ‘dove-hawk’ dimension.6
4 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/minutes/mpc/index.htm.
5 If votes at an MPC meeting were split three ways, where some members dissent in favour of higher interest 
rates than the majority position while other members dissent in favour of lower interest rates than the majority, 
we coded the decision as two separate pairwise votes: one the majority-preferred interest rate against the lower 
rate alternative; and the other the majority-preferred nominal interest rate against the higher rate alternative. We 
assume that somebody who supports lower interest rates than the majority in the former vote opposes higher 
interest rates than the majority in the latter vote. Our coding scheme thus implies that MPC members’ state their 
preferred interest rate truthfully. Overall, there were five MPC meetings in the time-period covered where 
members voted for three different interest rates; hence T = 95 pairwise votes from 90 MPC meetings.
6 Initial investigation of the MPC voting data suggests that the pattern of voting is overwhelmingly one 
dimensional. That is, members who tend to disagree with the majority tend to disagree in favour of a lower 
interest rate or tend to disagree in favour of a higher interest rate. The only exception to this one-dimensional 
structure is the behaviour of Buiter, who occasionally disagreed with the majority on the level of interest rate 
activism (in other words, Buiter is observed to vote on some occasion for greater rate increases than the majority 
and on other occasions for greater rate decreases than the majority).
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Formally, let the location of a nominal interest rate proposal on the dove-hawk 
dimension be a fu n c tio n ^ , xt), where rt denotes the nominal level of the proposed interest 
rate and x t is a vector characterizing contemporaneous economic conditions at meeting /. 
Although we leave the exact functional form ofy(.) unspecified, it is reasonable to assume 
that j[ru jtf) is increasing in rt . That is, if r} and r} are two nominal interest rates evaluated at 
the same meeting, where r} is the lower of the two nominal rates (i.e. r} < rth), then we 
assume that the higher nominal rate will always be a more restrictive policy than the proposal 
for the lower rate, and would thus be located higher on the dove-hawk dimension. Letting /, 
—fir}, x t) and ht =flrth, x t) denote the mapping of the lower nominal rate and higher nominal 
rate respectively onto the dove-hawk dimension, we thus assume that lt < ht. However, as 
economic conditions vary between meetings, the same nominal interest rate level would be 
mapped to different locations on the dove-hawk dimension.
Our goal is to use observed voting behaviour to make inferences about the systematic 
differences in the preferred points of MPC members on this underlying dimension. That is, 
we measure whether some members tend to prefer more restrictive interest rates relative to 
other members, across meetings which take place in different economic circumstances.
There are several possible reasons why members might disagree about the desired 
interest rate given a common set of economic circumstances. For example, members may 
have different perceptions about the level of potential output in the British economy 
(Gerlach-Kristen 2006; Blinder 2007). The size of the output gap is generally considered to 
be a key driver of future inflation, so if members differ in their assessment of potential 
output, and these differences are reasonably stable over time, then members are likely to 
exhibit differences in preferred interest rates across meetings. Alternatively, heterogeneity in 
underlying monetary policy preferences may reflect systematic differences in the way in 
which individual members believe economic variables interact to produce inflation. Hansen
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and McMahon (2008: 5) describe these as differences in the “philosophy” of members, while 
Blinder (2007 p. 109) labels them “differences in decision-making heuristics”. Finally, 
members may also have differing preferences regarding the short-run trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment, perhaps reflecting “personal judgements about the relative 
social costs of inflation versus unemployment” (Blinder, 2007 p.108).7
We are agnostic about the precise reasons why certain MPC members might tend to 
prefer higher interest rates to other members across different meetings. It is sufficient for us 
to assume that MPC members can be conceptualized as having reasonably stable underlying 
monetary policy preferences such that a member with more hawkish policy preferences will 
tend to prefer more restrictive interest rates relative to others.
Specifically, we model an individual MPC member as an actor who chooses between 
proposals for the nominal interest rate according to the relative distance between the location 
of these proposals on the dove-hawk dimension and his or her preferred point on this 
dimension. In a given MPC meeting at time t, committee member i evaluates the utility he or 
she would derive from two proposed nominal interest rates r} and rth, where rl < rth, as 
follows:
U ,(r!) = - (6 , - f i r / ,  x ,) )2 + r,u  = - (ft - I,)2 + Vu  (1)
Ui(r /')  = - (i91 - f i r / ' ,  x , ) f  + vu  = - (d, - h , f  + vu  (2)
where iju and v;>( are random independently distributed utility shocks with zero mean. The 0, 
parameter in equations (1) and (2) measure member i’s time-invariant preferred point on the 
dove-hawk dimension. In other words, Q\ represents the underlying monetary policy 
preference of individual i.
7 King (2002: 222) has argued that all MPC members have a responsibility to meet the same inflation target, so 
that there is no room for differences in preferred inflation levels. However, Blinder (2007: 110) states that in his 
experience as Vice-Chairman of the Federal Open Market Committee, such differences are ‘common in 
practice’.
8 See Bhattachaijee and Holly (2006) for an attempt to model the voting of a subset of five MPC members while 
relaxing the independence assumption.
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We follow Clinton et al. (2004) in deriving an item response specification, originally 
developed for education testing, to formalize the spatial model of voting. First, given the 
utility functions laid out in equations 1 and 2, we can write member f  s utility differential for 
two proposed interest rates at locations lt =flr!, x d and ht =j{rth, x t) on the dove-hawk 
dimension as
= [- (ft - h , f  + vu] -  [- (0, - l , f  + r,,A
= Pt @i — at + (viit - rji't) (3)
where = 2{ht - lt) and at = (ht2 - 12). Recall that ht denotes the more hawkish interest rate 
proposal. Individual i votes for the more hawkish proposal located at ht i f y , /  > 0, for the 
more dovish proposal at lt if yu  < 0, and is indifferent between the two proposals if y iit* = 0.
If we assume that the random variable (viit - r/j t) has a logistic distribution and is 
independent across MPC members and meetings, then we can express the probability of 
individual i voting for the more hawkish of the two interest rates proposed at time t as 
Pr(yu = 1) = 1/(1 + exp(a,- f i t 0,)). (4)
This is essentially a binary logistic regression to be estimated based on the observed binary 
vote choices, y iih of members over pairs of interest rate proposals.
Interpreting the proposal-related parameters in (4) substantively, is commonly 
called the “item discrimination parameter”, and measures the extent to which the two 
members’ preferences over the dove-hawk dimension determine their choice over two 
competing interest rate proposals observed at time t. For example, if  fit = 0 then the two 
competing interest rate proposals are at identical positions on this dimension and different 
voting behaviour between members does not reflect considerations captured by the dove- 
hawk dimension. at is the “difficulty parameter”, measuring the general probability of voting 
for the more hawkish interest rate proposed at time t. In a one-dimensional policy space, the
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ratio ajPt is equal to the midpoint between the two interest rate proposals on the dove-hawk 
dimension (Jackman 2000a). Holding member /*s monetary policy preference constant at 0/, 
as ajPt increases then the midpoint becomes more hawkish and the probability that i votes for 
the more hawkish proposal decreases. Conversely, holding constant atipt (i.e. for a given 
pairwise vote over interest rate proposals) if member i has an ideal point that is higher than 
that of member j  (i.e. 0/ > 6j) then i is more likely to vote for the more hawkish proposal than 
is j .
Note that by the derivation above, for a given pairwise vote, the parameters at and ftt 
are functions both of the nominal interest rate alternatives being voted upon at t and 
contemporaneous economic conditions at t. In this sense, the inclusion of these parameters, 
which are estimated (along with the 0,) based on observed voting patterns on the MPC and 
can be thought of as random effects for each specific pairwise vote, allows us to control for 
time-varying economic conditions. That is, by allowing the at and /^parameters to vary 
across time-periods we tap variance in the level of nominal interest rate proposals over time 
and variance in economic conditions over time. An alternative approach might be to model 
the proposal-related parameters for each pairwise vote as a function of observed economic 
indicators. However, since our primary focus is on the preference estimates 0„ we leave the 
inclusion of such variables for future research.
Model (4) is estimated using a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm.9 For 
the purposes of estimation, the model specified in (4) was identified by constraining the
9 We estimated the posterior distribution of the parameters in 4 using the MCMCirtKd function from the 
MCMCpack library in R (Martin and Quinn 2006). The MCMC algorithm iteratively updates the estimates of 
the model parameters. After a sufficient number of iterations (or bumin period), each set of parameter estimates 
for each given iteration represents a draw from the joint posterior distribution. This posterior distribution 
‘summarizes our information about the parameters having observed the [voting] data’ (Clinton et al. 2004 
p.357). Given the large number of iterations for which MCMC algorithms are generally run, the estimates from 
a smaller subset o f these iterations are stored and utilized for inference (for more technical details see Jackman 
2000a,b). The MCMC algorithm ran for 1,000,000 iterations, with the first 500,000 iterations discarded as 
bumin. Every 50th iteration after this bumin period was stored for inference. Therefore, the results presented 
below are based upon 10,000 draws from the posterior distribution. Standard tests show no indication of non­
convergence of the parameter estimates (Jackman, 2000b; Gelman et al. 2003).
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discrimination parameters /?, to be positive for every observed vote. This implies that the 
probability of observing = 1 is always increasing in 0,. Such a constraint is desirable in 
the monetary policy-setting because a vote for the more restrictive interest rate proposal in 
any pairwise vote is clearly a more “hawkish” vote and is always coded as 1 in the data.
Thus we include information as to the directionality of each voting alternative (i.e. which 
alternative is the more restrictive, or hawkish, of the two) in model estimation. This is 
unusual in applications of ideal point estimation which have generally focused on legislatures 
and the U.S. Supreme Court, since in these settings coding the substantive direction of voting 
alternatives on various different issues is more difficult (Batumi et al. 2005). In this 
application, each p t is assigned a prior distribution ftt ~N ( 1,10) truncated to lie above zero. 
The truncation ensures that the direction of the model is identified. Aside from the positivity 
constraint this prior distribution is relatively uninformative, in the sense that the relative 
differences in MPC member preferences estimates are robust to alternative specifications of 
the priors. Aside from the discrimination parameter, we select standard normal priors 0, ~
N(0,1) for all ideal point parameters and vague priors at ~ 7V(0,10) for the discrimination 
parameters. Again, the relative differences in MPC member preferences estimates are not 
sensitive to alternative specifications of these priors.
3.4 Estimates of MPC Member Monetary Policy Preferences
Our ideal point estimates for the MPC members are summarised in Figure 3.1. Each point 
indicates the median estimate of the ideal point of each individual, while the thick line 
indicates the 50 per cent credibility interval of the distribution and the thin line indicates the 
95 per cent credibility interval.
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Inspection of Figure 3.1 suggests three distinct groups of MPC members: the doves, 
centrists, and hawks. First, Wadhwani, Blanchflower, Julius and Allsopp are the doves. All 
of these four members have estimated monetary policy preferences that are clearly 
statistically distinguishable in the dovish direction from at least 18 other MPC members, in 
that none of the former has a 95 per cent credibility interval that overlaps with any of the 
latter. Second, Large, Besley and Sentence are the hawks. All have estimated monetary 
policy preferences that are statistically distinguishable in the hawkish direction from 14 other 
members if we consider 95 per cent credibility intervals, and 22 other members if we 
consider 50 per cent central tendencies. The remaining 18 MPC members are the centrists, as 
their monetary policy preferences are indistinguishable from each other if we consider 95 per 
cent credibility intervals. Davies’s ideal point is estimated with large uncertainty because he 
only voted in two MPC meetings.
[FIGURE 3.1 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 3.1 also reveals that, aside from Large, internal members tend to be located in 
the centrist group. Interestingly though, externally appointed members are found in both the 
group of hawks, the doves and amongst the centrist group. Thus our results, which are based 
upon an analysis of individual-level voting behaviour, do not entirely agree with the previous 
research that concluded that external members tend to vote for less restrictive interest rates 
than internal members (e.g. Spencer 2007; Harris and Spencer 2007; Gerlach-Kristin 2007).
Given that each committee member’s estimated ideal point is associated with varying 
degrees of uncertainty, it is useful also to compare members according to their probable 
ranking on a dove-hawk scale. For each of the 10,000 samples from the posterior 
distribution, we ranked the sampled ideal point of each of the twenty-five individuals on a 
dove-hawk scale and stored the resulting ranking. Table 3.2 summarises the distribution of 
rankings across these samples. A rank of one indicates that the individual was ranked as the
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most dovish of the 25 members, while a rank of 25 indicates that he or she was ranked the 
most hawkish.
[TABLE 3.2 ABOUT HERE]
The results in Table 3.2 support the idea that there have been three distinct groups of 
MPC members since 1997. Regarding the doves, Allsopp, Julius, Wadhwani, and 
Blanchflower were all ranked 5 or lower (i.e. as one of the five most dovish members) in at 
least 95 per cent of samples. Regarding the hawks, Large, Besley and Sentence were ranked 
21 or higher (i.e. as one of the four most hawkish members) in at least 95 per cent of the 
samples. Overall, then, these results corroborate our interpretation of Figure 3.1. It is also 
worth noting that we can be confident that the present Governor, Mervyn King, is among the 
more hawkish of the remaining centrists, since he is ranked between 16 and 21 at least 95 per 
cent of the time.
As a validity check, we compare our ideal point estimates with two alternative ways 
of measuring the preferences of the MPC members that are commonly used by the media and 
MPC-watchers. The first is a simple ‘batting average’ score, where members are ranked 
according to the proportion of times they voted for an increase in interest rates. The second is 
a measure which is commonly used by The Financial Times (FT) and other publications (e.g. 
Edmunds 1999). This measure is calculated by assigning scores for each vote of each 
member, where a member scores 1 if  he or she voted with the majority, 2 if he or she voted 
for a higher interest rate than the majority and 0 if he or she voted for a lower interest rate 
than the majority. An average of these scores is then calculated for each member across all of 
his or her votes.
The estimates from our Bayesian ideal point model compared to these ‘batting 
average’ and ‘Financial Times’ scores are illustrated in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3, 
respectively. The first thing to note is the relatively high correlation between our estimates
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and both these types of measures -  as shown by the clustering of most of the MPC members 
along the two regression lines. In other words, our method clearly passes the face validity 
test.
[FIGURES 3.2 AND 3.3 ABOUT HERE]
The figures nevertheless highlight some important differences between our estimates 
and the two more commonly used methods. The batting average method does not take 
account of the economic conditions at the time of each vote. For example, if a large portion 
of a member’s time on the committee happens to coincide with a period when economic 
circumstance dictates that the Bank cut interest rates, he or she will tend to be artificially 
located towards the dovish end of the scale. This is the case with both Allsopp and Bean: 
Figure 3.2 shows that who we locate in much less extreme (albeit still relatively dovish in the 
case of Allsopp) positions than does the batting average measure.
The FT method improves on the batting average method because it measures whether 
each vote is part of the majority or the minority. To the extent that the majority view on the 
MPC tends to reflect economic conditions, it provides some sort of control for economic 
conditions: that is, a dissent vote implies that an individual prefers lower or higher rates 
relative to the majority of members, given economic circumstances.
But our method improves on the FT measure in this regard also. For example, Figure 
3.3 shows that our method locates Allsopp in a less extreme position than the FT measure; 
which locates Allsopp as almost as dovish as Wadhwani. The close proximity of Wadhwani 
and Allsopp in the FT’s scores is due to the fact that, over the course of their respective terms 
on the MPC, they had a similar proportion of dissenting votes in favour of lower rates (13 out 
of 37 for Wadhwani and 11 out of 37 for Allsopp), while neither dissented in favour of higher 
rates. However, these simple summaries, which drive the FT scores, do not reflect the fact 
that, during the period when Wadhwani and Allsopp were simultaneously on the committee
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(between June 2000 and May 2002), Allsopp voted for higher rates than Wadhwani on eight 
occasions while Wadhwani never voted for higher rates than Allsopp. By modelling each 
voting observation directly, rather than averaging over a member’s entire voting history like 
the FT method, our measure picks up the fact that, given the same economic circumstances in 
the same meetings, Allsopp voted for higher rates than Wadhwani eight times.
Finally, neither the batting average nor the FT method provides uncertainty estimates 
surrounding MPC member preference estimates. This may invite the observer to conclude 
that any two individuals differ in their preferences when the difference between their 
estimated ideal points may in fact be well within the margin of error given the available data.
3.5 Patterns in the Composition of the MPC
With these estimates of the relative location of MPC members’ monetary policy preferences 
we can investigate patterns over time in the composition of the committee in terms of 
preferences. We test whether these patterns are consistent with an electorally driven cycle in 
appointments.
Is there an electoral cycle in appointments to the Bank of England MPC?
The classic ‘political business cycle’ (PBC) theory predicts that incumbent governments seek 
to engineer economic booms prior to elections, then implement restrictive policies after 
elections in order to deal with the inflationary consequences (Nordhaus 1975). In the present 
context, this would imply that the British Chancellor would have wanted to use his 
appointment powers to ensure favourable economic conditions prior to general elections.
That is, the Chancellor would be expected to use appointments to bias the MPC in a dovish 
direction in a pre-election period so that a comparatively easier monetary policy stimulates
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(or one that at least does not restrict) the economy in the run-up to the election. Given that it 
is generally thought that monetary policy affects output with a six to nine month lag (Clarida 
et al. 1999 p. 1685), and that appointment opportunities are relatively rare because of fixed 
MPC terms, it appears reasonable to focus on the period between 24 and 6 months prior to a 
general election as the ‘pre-election period’. In the remaining ‘non-election periods’, without 
pressing electoral incentives, the Chancellor would be expected to seek a more balanced, 
centrist MPC to deal more rigorously with the inflationary consequences of any pre-election 
stimulus.
It should be noted that the Chancellor could not possibly have perfect information 
about the likely behaviour of each member he appointed to the MPC. This may have limited 
his ability to appoint the ‘types’ of central banker he wanted given the political and economic 
circumstances. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that the Chancellor had some idea 
about the preferences of potential appointees. These beliefs, based upon past academic work 
by the individual, their career background and also information gathered via mutual 
acquaintances, can be thought of as probability distributions along the dove-hawk scale for 
each appointee, some relatively wide (indicating high uncertainty regarding preferences), 
some narrower (indicating less uncertainty regarding preferences). Of course, the Chancellor 
would also have been able to observe the voting behaviour of existing MPC members and use 
this information when deciding whether to re-appoint someone.
In order to investigate whether there are electorally driven patterns in MPC 
appointments, we first examine the outcome of each instance where a new committee 
member was appointed to replace an existing member. Each ‘appointment episode’ is 
measured in terms of the probability that a new member of the committee is more dovish than
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his or her predecessor was.10 A probability of 0.5 indicates that a new member is estimated 
to have an equal probability of being more dovish than was his or her predecessor and being 
more hawkish than was his or her predecessor. A higher score indicates a higher probability 
of an appointee being more dovish than was his or her predecessor. Likewise, a lower score 
indicates a lower probability of an appointee being more dovish than was his or her 
predecessor. These scores are presented in Table 3.3.11
[TABLE 3.3 ABOUT HERE]
The appointment data in Table 3.3 can be interpreted in terms of four key periods. 
First, consistent with a PBC pattern in MPC appointments, during the pre-2001 election 
period (June 1999 to January 2001) new appointees tended to be more dovish than the 
members they replaced. This trend is particularly pronounced in the cases of Wadhwani’s 
and Allsopp’s appointments. Wadhwani replaced the relatively hawkish Budd, who had only 
served on the committee for a shortened two-year term, in June 1999, two years before the 
general election. According to our ideal point estimates the probability that Wadhwani is 
more dovish than Budd is greater than 0.99. At the same time, the Chancellor opted to re­
appoint the executive director, Plenderleith, who appears to be relatively dovish compared to 
Budd.
Allsopp replaced Goodhart in June 2000, eleven months before the general election. 
Interestingly, Goodhart, relatively centrist on our dove-hawk scale, stated publicly that he had 
expressed an interest in serving a second term (Beattie 2000). Despite this, the Chancellor 
chose to replace him with Allsopp who again has an estimated probability of being more 
dovish than Goodhart that is greater than 0.99. Notably, most economic journalists at the
10 Each probability is based upon the 10,000 draws from the joint posterior distribution and corresponds the 
frequency with which the appointee in question is drawn as being more dovish than his or her predecessor.
11 The table does not include those individuals who were original members of the MPC in June 1997 (George, 
King, Buiter, Goodhart, Plenderleith and Davies), or who were appointed in the months thereafter to fill hitherto 
empty positions on the committee (Julius, Budd and Vickers).
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time of Allsopp’s appointment expected him to be a dove (Thornton 2000). The Chancellor 
is unlikely to have been unaware of these expectations.
Furthermore, in addition to these stand-out cases, every replacement during the pre­
election period for the 2001 general elections involved the appointment of an individual who 
has an estimated probability greater than 0.99 of being more dovish then his or her 
predecessor. The result of this appointment policy was that, from October 2000 until the 
general election in May 2001, the MPC contained three of the four individuals identified 
above as the clearest doves out of all MPC members since 1997: Allsopp, Wadhwani and 
Julius. In sum, the pattern of appointments in the pre-2001 election period is consistent with 
the predictions of the PBC theory.
Second, and again consistent with the PBC predictions, during the subsequent non­
election period (February 2001 to May 2003) MPC appointments reduced the dovish bias on 
the MPC. In this period, appointments resulted in either (1) the replacement of dovish or 
centrist MPC members with centrist individuals, or (2) the replacement of centrist MPC 
members with more hawkish individuals. The appointments of Barker, Tucker and Bell fall 
into the first category, while that of Large falls into the second. That is, although the 
estimated probability of Barker, Tucker and Bell being more dovish than their predecessors is 
lower than 0.01, 0.01 and 0.04 respectively, all are far from hawks according to our ideal 
point estimates in Figure 3.1. In contrast, the probability that Large is more dovish than his 
predecessor, Clementi, is lower than 0.01 and we have already identified Large as one of the 
clear hawks according to Figure 3.1.
Third, however, the observed pattern in appointments during the pre-2005 election 
period (June 2003 to December 2004) runs contrary to PBC expectations that the Chancellor 
would use appointments to induce a dovish bias on the MPC in the run-up to an election. 
During this period appointments made only a marginal difference to the overall balance
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between doves and hawks on the MPC. For example, Lambert, appointed in June 2003, has 
estimated probability lower than 0.01 of being more dovish than his predecessor Allsopp, but 
is still only a centrist according to Figure 3.1. In addition, according to our estimates, the
1 9probability that Lomax was more dovish than George, whom she replaced in July 2003, is
only 0.43. The policy of making a mixture of both dovish and hawkish replacements
continued during the final non-election period in our data (January 2005 to April 2008).
Another way of assessing whether there is a PBC pattern in MPC appointments is to
look at how appointments shift the location of the median member of the committee. Given
that the MPC is a collective choice body that make decisions by majority vote, the Chancellor
is able to influence monetary policy via appointments only to the extent that he or she can
move the position of the median voter on the committee (cf. Krehbiel 2007). In line with the
PBC predictions, we inspect the estimated change in the MPC median between key points in
the electoral cycle: namely, the last month of a “non-election period” and last month of the
11subsequent ‘pre-election period’, and vice versa. Figure 3.4 plots the median estimate of 
these changes, together with 95 per cent credibility intervals.14
[FIGURE 3.4 ABOUT HERE]
As with our analysis of individual appointment episodes, observed changes in the 
position of the MPC median are consistent with the PBC predictions in the pre-2001 election 
period but not in the pre-2005 election period. Figure 3.4 shows that, between the end of the 
first non-election period and the end of the pre-election period for the 2001 general elections 
(i.e. from June 1999 to January 2001), the estimated shift in the MPC median is negative and
12 While Mervyn King replaced Sir Eddie George as the Governor o f the Bank when Sir Eddie George’s term 
ended, it was Rachel Lomax who filled the resulting vacancy on the MPC.
13 These estimates are again based on draws from the posterior distribution. For each draw, the median ideal 
point of each combination of members that have sat on the MPC together at any point in time was calculated.
To obtain a draw of the change in the median between two time points we then took the difference between the 
median of the committee composition at the first time point and the median of the committee composition at the 
second time point. This exercise was repeated 10,000 times, yielding a sample from the posterior distribution of 
the change in the median MPC member at each time interval o f interest.
14 The final non-election period is defined using the last month o f observed voting data, and would correspond 
to a general election in April 2010.
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is statistically distinguishable from zero. In addition, between the end of the pre-2001 
election period and end of the subsequent non-election period (January 2001 to May 2003), 
the estimated change in the MPC median is positive and marginally indistinguishable from 
zero at the 95 per cent level. This is consistent with the PBC prediction that the Chancellor 
would seek to re-balance the MPC post-election after inducing a dovish bias in the pre-2001 
election period. However, between the end of this non-election period and the end of the 
subsequent pre-2005 election period (May 2003 to December 2004), where the PBC would 
predict a dovish change in the MPC median, the estimated change in fact tends to be positive, 
though clearly indistinguishable from zero at the 95 per cent level.
In sum, our analysis of individual appointments and of changes in the median does not 
appear to support the contention that there was a straightforward PBC-type electoral cycle in 
appointments to the Bank of England MPC. Though in the pre-2001 electoral period the 
Chancellor did tend to appoint relative doves to replace more hawkish predecessors on the 
MPC, and in doing this successfully shifted the MPC median in a dovish direction, no such 
pattern is apparent in the pre-2005 election period. These results are consistent with existing 
research that has found only weak support for political business cycles in the UK (e.g. 
Alesinaetal. 1997).
Discussion
Despite the lack of evidence for a straightforward electoral cycle in MPC appointments, it 
does appear that the British Chancellor is able to move the position of the median voter of the 
MPC through his or her appointment powers. Indeed, as Figure 3.4 shows, we estimate that 
there was a clear dovish shift in the MPC median between and June 1999 and January 2001, 
and that there was hawkish shift in the MPC median, marginally distinguishable from zero, in 
two later periods. This suggests that appointments to the MPC matter for monetary policy.
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As a result, it is important to develop a better understanding of the likely incentives of 
the Government with regard to MPC appointments. We have demonstrated that there is weak 
support for a straightforward electoral cycle in appointments. But given that monetary policy 
is one of the most powerful tools of macroeconomic management at a state’s disposal, it is 
likely that politicians will have some interests regarding the composition of the body that sets 
this policy.
One potentially fruitful avenue for future research would be to analyse the 
Chancellor’s monetary policy (and thus MPC appointment) incentives conditional on fiscal 
policy. Political economists have analysed the interaction of fiscal and monetary policy in 
the context of varying levels of central bank independence (Alesina and Tabellini 1987; Agell 
et al. 1996; Clark and Hallerberg 2000). However, the British Labour government operated 
in a context of varying levels of constraints on fiscal policy. Specifically, in order to 
demonstrate that Labour could be responsible with the public finances, during the 1997 
general election campaign the party leadership pledged that for its first two years in office 
Labour would stick to the public spending plans of the previous Conservative government. 
This pledge committed the new Labour government to a relatively austere fiscal policy for at 
least two years. For example, in the financial year 1999-2000 public expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP reached its lowest point since 1980 (HM Treasury 2007). During the 
financial year 2000-01 public expenditure began to rise, but only slowly. Moreover, the 
government continued to record a positive budget surplus until the end of the financial year 
2001- 02 .
Thus, there were political constraints upon fiscal policy in the period prior to the May 
2001 general election. Given these constraints, the Chancellor may have had an incentive to 
ensure that a relatively dovish MPC maintained economic growth in the run-up to this 
election.
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In contrast, from the financial year 2001-02 until the present, government expenditure 
as a percentage of GDP has increased rapidly, while the cyclically adjusted budget balance 
has been in deficit since 2002-2003 (HM Treasury 2007). Having gained a reasonable 
reputation for economic competence, Labour did not need to make similar restrictive fiscal 
policy pledges prior to the 2001 general election. In a context where increased public 
investment was likely to fuel continued economic growth, and was indeed electorally popular 
in itself, the Chancellor may have had an incentive to ensure a more centrist or hawkish MPC 
in order to minimise the inflationary consequences of fiscal expansion.
To explore the relationship between MPC appointments and fiscal policy, Figure 3.5 
and 6 plot the location of the estimated median preference on the committee between June 
1997 and April 2008 together with time series of the budget balance and public spending over 
this period, respectively.
[FIGURE 3.5 AND 3.6 ABOUT HERE]
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 raise the possibility that MPC appointments may be related to the stance 
of fiscal policy. Consistent with the evidence presented earlier, the plots in Figures 3.5 and
3.6 suggest that the MPC median became markedly more dovish in the two years prior to the 
May 2001 general election and then reverted back to a relatively more hawkish trend, which 
persisted during the pre-2005 election period and thereafter. We see in Figure 3.6 that when 
the budget surplus is at its highest we also measure the most dovish MPC median for the 
entire 1997-2008 period. As the budget surplus moves toward a deficit hawks and centrists 
start to replace doves in the committee and the estimated MPC median becomes more 
centrist.
This observed pattern is only suggestive, but raises the possibility that the Chancellor 
used MPC appointments to pursue a less constrained monetary policy during a pre-election 
period when public spending was constrained (prior to the 2001 general election), and then to
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pursue a more centrist or hawkish monetary policy after the initial spending constraints had 
been lifted (after Labour’s re-election in 2001). Given the evidence that MPC appointments 
matter -  in the sense that they have enabled the Chancellor to move the median -  and the 
inadequacy of a straightforward PBC-type explanation for appointment patterns, the 
possibility of an interaction between the Chancellor’s fiscal policy and MPC appointment 
incentives at least merits further investigation. We leave this to future research.
3.6 Conclusion
We have examined the making of monetary policy in the UK in the first ten years of the 
independence of the Bank of England. We employed a Bayesian estimation technique to 
undertake a spatial analysis of voting on the Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee 
between June 1997 and April 2008. To our knowledge, this is the first time such a statistical 
estimation technique has been applied to voting in a central bank committee and is also the 
first spatial analysis of voting in the Bank of England MPC. Using this method we produced 
an original set of estimates of the ideal points of MPC members on a ‘dove-hawk’ scale 
representing relative preferences over interest rates given economic conditions.
These estimates constitute a valuable contribution to the literature on the MPC, 
independent central banks, and on appointments to independent policy-making committees in 
general. They provide new and substantively motivated measures of the relative monetary 
policy preferences of individual MPC members together with easily interpretable uncertainty 
estimates for these measures. In addition, because we use Bayesian simulation to produce 
our estimates it is straightforward to make inferences about auxiliary or composite quantities 
of interest, such as the position of the median voter on the MPC.
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We illustrated the practical value of our dove-hawk measures by using them to 
investigate the British Chancellor’s appointments to the MPC. The observed pattern in MPC 
appointments, and in the movement of the median voter on the MPC over time, is not 
consistent with a political business cycle approach where the Chancellor seeks a more dovish 
MPC composition in the run-up to general elections. Although MPC appointments did lead 
to a clear dovish shift in the MPC median in the period prior to the 2001 general election, this 
was not the case in the period prior to the 2005 general election.
Nevertheless, our analysis indicates that MPC appointments do matter for monetary 
policy, in that the Chancellor has been able to move the MPC median through appointments. 
This finding has implications for research on independent central banks more generally, in 
that it suggests that politicians may still influence the monetary policy of a highly 
independent central bank via appointments. Some may argue that a degree of democratic 
control upon such a major macroeconomic policy tool is desirable, while others may argue 
the opposite. Either way, our results highlight the importance of appointments as a channel 
for political influence. Given the inadequacy of the straightforward political business cycle 
approach to explaining appointments, we have suggested that future research may usefully 
investigate the relationship between the Chancellor’s appointment incentives and the current 
stance of fiscal policy.
The Bayesian item-response model we use to study voting behaviour on the Bank of 
England MPC has already been demonstrated to be useful for studying voting in other 
committees such as courts (see Martin and Quinn 2002) as well as legislatures more generally 
(Clinton et al. 2004). But this approach is also applicable to other central banks that publish 
individual level voting data. These include the Federal Reserve, the Swedish Riksbank, the 
Bank of Japan, and the National Bank Poland. In different central bank settings scholars can 
use central banker preference estimates to test alternative theories of central bank
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appointments. Indeed, the next paper in this thesis demonstrates this point, exploiting 
variation in the partisan affiliation of political actors who appointing different central bankers 
to the National Bank of Poland to test for partisan appointments.
Furthermore, for every country that publishes central bank voting records, the 
opportunities to test alternative theories of central bank appointments will expand in the 
future: as time passes we will be able to observe the monetary policy voting behaviour of 
greater number of central bankers appointed under a greater variety of political 
circumstances. A case in point is the recent election of a new Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
coalition government in the UK. Here, in a number of years it will be possible to test whether 
the individuals appointed to the Bank of England by this new government have 
systematically different preferences to those appointed under the previous Labour 
government.
So that researchers can fully exploit these opportunities to test alternative theories of 
central bank appointments, in future work we aim to examine extensions of the ideal-point 
estimation framework presented above that may be possible in the context of monetary policy 
voting. Such extensions include explicitly incorporating economic information in the 
statistical model, incorporating information regarding the nominal interest rate alternatives 
being voted upon, and experimenting with alternative specifications of the utility function 
guiding the voting behaviour.
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Table 3.1
MPC Members, June 1997-April 2008
Name First Meeting Last Meeting Status
Background prior to 
appointment
Howard Davies June 1997 July 1997 Internal Bank of England
Willem Buiter June 1997 May 2000 External Academia
Charles Goodhart June 1997 May 2000 External Academia
Ian Plenderleith June 1997 May 2002 Internal Bank of England
Sir Edward George June 1997 June 2003 Internal Bank of England
Mervyn King June 1997 - Internal Bank of England/Academia
DeAnne Julius September 1997 May 2001 External Industry
David Clementi September 1997 August 2002 Internal Finance
Sir Alan Budd December 1997 May 1999 External Government
John Vickers June 1998 September 2000 Internal Academia
Sushil Wadhwani June 1999 May 2002 External Finance
Christopher Allsopp June 2000 May 2003 External Academia
Stephen Nickell June 2000 May 2006 External Academia
Charles Bean October 2000 - Internal Academia
Kate Barker June 2001 - External Industry
Paul Tucker June 2002 - Internal Bank of England
Marian Bell July 2002 June 2005 External F inance/Govemment
Sir Andrew Large October 2002 January 2006 Internal Finance
Richard Lambert June 2003 March 2006 External F inancial j oumalist
Rachel Lomax July 2003 - Internal Government
David Walton July 2005 June 2006 External Finance
Sir John Gieve February 2006 - Internal Government
David Blanchflower June 2006 - External Academia
Tim Besley September 2006 - External Academia
Andrew Sentance October 2006 - External Industry
87
Table 3.2 
Summary of Rankings by iteration
MPC Member Rank 5% Rank 25% Median
rank
Rank 75% Rank 95%
Large 21 23 24 25 25
Besley 21 23 24 25 25
Sentance 21 23 24 25 25
Budd 17 20 21 22 24
Vickers 16 19 21 22 24
King 16 18 19 20 21
Walton 9 14 18 20 23
Tucker 14 16 17 19 21
Buiter 9 14 17 19 21
Goodhart 10 14 16 18 20
Gieve 9 13 16 18 20
Lambert 7 9 13 15 18
Lomax 7 9 12 14 17
George 7 9 11 13 15
Barker 7 9 11 13 15
Clementi 7 9 11 13 16
Bean 7 9 10 12 15
Plenderleith 7 8 10 12 15
Davies 3 5 9 19 23
Nickell 5 5 6 7 7
Bell 4 5 6 7 8
Allsopp 3 4 4 4 5
Julius 1 2 3 3 4
Wadhwani 1 1 2 2 3
Blanchflower 1 1 2 3 4
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Table 3.3 
MPC Replacements
New appointee Predecessor Date of replacement Appointment
type
Probability that 
new appointee is 
more dovish than 
his or her 
predecessor
Clementi Davies September 1997 Internal 0.45
Wadhwani Budd June 1999 External >0.99
Nickell Buiter June 2000 External >0.99
Allsopp Goodhart June 2000 External >0.99
Bean Vickers October 2000 Internal >0.99
Barker Julius May 2001 External <0.01
■ GENERAL ELECTION, June 2001 -----------
Tucker Plenderlieth June 2002 Internal <0.01
Bell Wadhwani July 2002 External 0.04
Large Clementi October 2002 Internal <0.01
Lambert Allsopp June 2003 External <0.01
Lomax George July 2003 Internal 0.43
■ GENERAL ELECTION, May 2005-----------
Walton Bell July 2005 External 0.01
Gieve Large February 2006 Internal >0.99
Blanchflower Nickell June 2006 External >0.99
Besley Lambert September 2006 External <0.01
Sentance Walton October 2006 External 0.05
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Figure 3.1
Revealed Preferences in the MPC
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Figure 3.2
Comparison of Bayesian estimation with batting averages
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Figure 3.3
Comparison of Bayesian Estimation with FT Scores
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Figure 3.4
C hanges in MPC median betw een key points in electoral cycle
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MPC Appointments and Public Expenditure
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4 Do politicians make partisan appointments to central 
banks? Evidence from the National Bank of Poland
Abstract
In many countries today monetary policy is delegated to a highly independent central bank. 
Yet politicians may seek to exert a residual indirect influence on monetary policy via 
appointments to a central bank. This paper explores this possibility, testing for partisan 
political patterns in the behaviour of appointees to the Monetary Policy Council of the 
National Bank of Poland (NBP). The NBP provides a rare situation where the researcher can 
observe the interese rate voting of central bankers appointed by different partisan political 
actors. I derive and estimate a novel Bayesian hierarchical choice model to estimate the 
revealed monetary policy preferences of NBP appointees based on their voting behaviour. 
The model specification takes account of the discrete nature of the votes taken by NBP 
members and also makes use of proposal-related information so that revealed preference 
estimates can be measured on an interest rate scale. Using these estimates, I examine 
whether the left-right economic ideology of an appointing party is associated with the 
revealed preferences of NBP appointees. My results provide support for the proposition that 
parties seek to appoint central bankers with monetary policy preferences similar to their own. 
However, despite evidence of partisan appointments, parties are constrained in their ability to 
shift the position of the pivotal voter on the NBP Council.
Keywords: Monetary policy, central bank independence, partisan business cycle, 
appointments, committee voting.
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4.1 Introduction
Described by Layard as “the central tool of macroeconomic stabilization” (1998 p.ix), 
monetary policy is one of the most important economic policies at a state’s disposal. Political 
economists have argued that there will be systematic differences in the monetary policy 
pursued by left- and right-wing politicians because these politicians have differing partisan 
motivations (Hibbs 1977; Havrilesky 1987; Alesina and Sachs 1988). However, in many 
countries today, monetary policy-making responsibilities are delegated to highly independent 
central banks. In these countries elected politicians may choose medium- or long-term 
economic targets for the central bank, but they do not formally have a direct role in deciding 
the current setting of monetary policy instruments. This paper examines whether, unable to 
directly make monetary policy decisions, politicians attempt to exert an indirect partisan 
influence on monetary policy through appointments to independent central banks. It also 
assesses the extent to which they are successful in this endeavour.
To investigate this, I collect and analyse data on the voting behaviour of members of 
the Monetary Policy Council of the National Bank of Poland (NBP), the ten-person 
committee that sets interest rates in Poland. The NBP Council presents an advantageous 
context in which to test a partisan theory of appointments to independent central banks for 
three main reasons. First, the nature of appointment procedures for the NBP, together with 
Polish electoral developments over the last decade, have resulted in variation in the left-right 
economic ideology of the partisan coalitions involved in the appointment of Council 
members. Second, for nine of the ten members on the Council at any time, the nature of the 
appointment procedures has allowed both left- and right-wing coalitions to unilaterally make 
appointments, without having to bargain and compromise with actors from the opposing side 
o f the left-right economic divide. Thus, in the vast majority of cases, it is possible to clearly
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identify the partisan orientation of the actors that appoint individual Council members.
Third, because the NBP publishes the records of votes regarding interest rates on the Council, 
it is possible to compare the revealed monetary policy preferences of Council members 
appointed by different parties. The NBP Council is unique among central bank monetary 
policy-making committees in the degree to which it satisfies all three of these criteria.
I measure the revealed monetary policy preferences of NBP Council members by 
estimating a Bayesian hierarchical choice model of interest rate voting behaviour on the 
Council. This approach is similar in some senses to the item-response models already used 
to analyse voting in central banks (Hix et al. 2010) and before that legislatures (e.g. Martin 
and Quinn 2002; Clinton et al. 2004), in that it operationalises the spatial model of voting.
But it also makes novel use of extra information available in the monetary policy context, 
regarding prevailing economic conditions and interest rate proposals. Incorporating this extra 
information allows me to estimate revealed monetary policy preferences on an interest rate 
scale, so that the magnitude of estimates is easily interpretable.
These estimates are used to draw inferences regarding the differences in the monetary 
policy preferences of NBP Council members appointed by economically left-wing and right- 
wing parties. Consistent with partisan theories of appointments, I find that Polish central 
bankers appointed by left-wing parties tend to prefer lower interest rates than those appointed 
by right-wing parties, controlling for economic conditions. However, there is evidence of 
heterogeneity in the preferences of members appointed by the same party, suggesting that 
politicians cannot select agents who will perfectly accord with their preferred monetary 
policy. Furthermore, I find that politicians are limited in their ability to shift the position of 
the pivotal voter on the Council. Analysis suggests that this is due to a combination of 
politicians’ inability to appoint entirely reliable agents ex ante together with certain 
institutional features of the Council, in particular its fundamental multi-member nature and
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the disproportionate voting power of the NBP President, the only Council member appointed 
according to a different cycle and as a result of inter-institutional -  and thus, in some 
situations, left-right -  bargaining.
This paper not only contributes to the literature on partisan macroeconomic policy, 
but also relates to that on central bank independence. The delegation of monetary policy to a 
legally independent central bank has been advocated as a solution to a time-inconsistency 
problem (Rogoff 1985). Empirical studies have constructed indices to measure central bank 
independence in order to test its effectiveness in reducing inflation (e.g. Grilli et al. 1991; 
Cukierman 1992; Alesina and Summers 1993; Eijffinger and Schaling 1993). This paper can 
help inform the construction of such indices by providing micro-level evidence concerning 
politicians’ ability to influence monetary policy via central bank appointments and by 
exploring how this ability may be conditioned by the institutional design of a monetary 
policy-making committee.
The paper also demonstrates the usefulness of monetary policy-making committee 
voting records as a resource for testing more general theories of appointments to collective 
choice bodies. Recently, political scientists have sought to model such processes, often with 
courts in mind (e.g. Rohde and Shepsle 2005; Krehbiel 2007) but also applied to central 
banks (Chang 2001). The method presented here for measuring monetary policy preferences 
yields estimates of individual preferences and pivotal voter preferences, measured on a 
substantively meaningful scale, that are ideally suited for testing these appointment models in 
the central banking context.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews relevant 
literature and develops basic theoretical expectations. Then, section 4.3 introduces the case 
of the National Bank of Poland. Section 4.4 details the data set and statistical method used to
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develop measures of central banker behaviour in Poland. These measures are used to test for 
partisan influences on the National Bank of Poland in section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Politicians and central banks: theory and existing evidence
According to theories of the ‘partisan business cycle’ (PBC), political parties have 
macroeconomic policy preferences that differ systematically. Regarding monetary policy, it 
is asserted that economically left-wing parties tend to prefer a less restrictive monetary policy 
than economically right-wing parties. For most PBC advocates, such as Hibbs (1977) and 
Alesina and Sachs (1988), this difference is due to the higher relative inflation-aversion 
among a right-party’s core electoral constituency compared to a left-party’s core electoral 
constituency, and the higher relative unemployment aversion among a left-party’s core 
electoral constituency compared to right-party’s core electoral constituency. Havrilesky 
(1987) suggests an alternative motivation, stemming from the ideological preference among 
left-wing parties for fiscal redistribution to low income voters. He suggests that left-wing 
parties seek to mitigate the resulting disincentive effects of this redistribution, which might 
otherwise lower real output and reduce voter support, by pursuing a relatively loose monetary 
policy. Whichever motivational story is posited, in general the PBC asserts that, in general, 
parties with left-of-centre economic ideologies prefer a less restrictive monetary policy than 
parties with right-of-centre economic ideologies.
The initial formulations of the PBC assumed that politicians had direct control over 
key macroeconomic policy instruments, including monetary policy. For example, explaining 
their model in terms of the US, Alesina and Sachs make “the implicit assumption... that the 
[incumbent] administration has some direct or indirect control over monetary policy, despite
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the relative independence of the Federal Reserve” (1988 p.67). But given the prevalence of 
central bank independence in developed and developing countries today, a more complete 
understanding of politicians and the economy must account for how, and under what 
conditions, partisan politicians can influence the monetary policy of a highly independent 
central bank.
In the course of the past two decades, political scientists have begun to address this 
issue. Several scholars have identified appointments as a key channel through which political 
influence on a formally autonomous central bank may take place (Chang 2001; Havrilesky & 
Gildea 1992; Lohmann 1997; Waller 1998).1 They have formulated formal appointment 
models where politicians with partisan macroeconomic motivations seek to appoint central 
bankers whose views on monetary policy are aligned with their own. Generally, these 
models have been designed to examine how key institutional features of the appointment 
process affect equilibrium appointment outcomes. For the U.S., Chang (2003) models the 
President’s influence over monetary policy via Federal Reserve appointments, as constrained 
by the preferences of the Senate Banking Committee, the other key actor in the appointment 
game. Lohmann (1997) and Morris (2000) model how indirect political influence is 
constrained by staggered central bank committee appointment opportunities, and also 
decentralized appointment powers (where regional political actors control appointment for a 
number of posts).
In terms of empirical research, with regard to the Federal Reserve, Beck (1982) and
Mcrris (2000) find that the reaction function of the Federal Funds Rate is influenced by
poltical conditions. In the case of Germany, Lohmann (1998) and Berger and Woitek (2005)
estmate reaction functions of monetary policy and find that the partisan affiliation of the
median member of the Bundesbank Council affects monetary policy in a manner consistent
1 Sane have also analysed ‘direct’ political influence on legally independent central banks (Lohmann, 1998; 
Moris, 2000). From this perspective, politicians can pressurise the bank to implement a desirable monetary 
polcy using, for example, the threat of legislation to reduce the bank’s autonomy should it fail to comply.
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with partisan appointments (though Lohmann finds the effect to be non-significant). 
However, a focus on policy outcomes as the dependent variable leads to a reduced-form test 
of the partisan model of central bank appointments.
With this concern in mind, it is desirable to test whether the behaviour of individual 
central bank appointees accords with partisan appointment models. Where voting records for 
central bank monetary policy-making committees are available, researchers are able to 
perform this test. Taking advantage of the availability of Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) voting records, both Gildea (1990) and Havrilesky and Gildea (1992) find that the 
frequency with which FOMC members appointed by Democrat Presidents vote for easier 
policy is significantly higher than that of Republican appointees. Regarding the Bundesbank, 
Berger and Woitek (2005) study limited Bundesbank voting data from 1948-1961 and find 
that Christian Democrat appointees tend to dissent more against discount rate cuts.
Since they do not control for economic circumstances, these analyses might lead to 
biased inferences regarding appointee behaviour. For example, an individual who sits on a 
central bank committee during a period of relatively low economic growth may appear 
artificially ‘dovish’ because they vote for lower rates frequently given the economic 
circumstances. Chappell et al. (2005) and Chang (2001) address this problem, estimating 
reaction functions that measure the relationship between the votes of FOMC members and 
key macroeconomic indicators. Chang (2001) utilises estimated differences in the average 
preferred interest rate of FOMC members, controlling for economic conditions. She 
identifies the probable location of the median member of the FOMC at any given time, and in 
turn shows that movements of the location of the median member over time provide support 
for her model of partisan appointments. Chappell et al. (2005) also find evidence for indirect
2 Berger and Woitek (1997) also use the 1948-61 Bundesbank voting data to reject Vaubel’s (1997) hypothesis 
that central bankers appointed by the incumbent governing party favour easier policy in the run-up to elections.
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partisan political influences, in that being the appointee of a Democrat President has a 
statistically significant negative effect on the preferred interest rate of an FOMC member.
This paper contributes to this literature by using new data to provide a relatively clean 
empirical test of the simple motivational assumption underlying models of partisan central 
bank appointments. In other words, it asks: relative to an economically left-wing party, does 
an economically right-wing party seek to appoint a central banker who generally prefers a 
more restrictive monetary policy? To answer this I collect and analyse voting data from the 
Monetary Policy Council of the National Bank of Poland.
The NBP Council presents an advantageous setting in which to conduct such a test. 
Not only is there variation in the left-right orientation of political actors involved in the 
appointment of different Council members over the past decade, but almost all of the 
appointments to the Council in this period have also been products of either an economically 
left-of-centre or right-of-centre appointing coalition, rather than some left-right compromise. 
This latter feature results from the fact that the Polish President, Senate (upper house) and 
Sejm (lower house) each unilaterally appoint three members to the ten-person Council. The 
consequence is that, in the Polish context, the partisan appointments logic generates relatively 
clean expectations as to the relative monetary policy preferences of appointees, which can 
then be tested using the voting data. This also enables me to assess whether, even in 
favourable institutional conditions where a party is relatively unconstrained in its ability to 
appoint its ex ante preferred candidate, appointees may turn out not to be “perfect agents” 
(Lohmann 1997 p.228; see also Keech and Morris 1997). In other words, can central bank 
appointees be relied upon to act according to the wishes of the politicians who appointed 
them?
The features of NBP appointments can be contrasted with the more extensively 
analysed case of the twelve-person FOMC in the US. There all seven Board of Governors
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(BOG) appointments are the product of inter-institutional bargaining between the President 
and the Senate, while the five remaining positions are taken by individuals appointed by 
regional Reserve Banks. For the five latter positions, it is difficult to generate expectations of 
relative monetary policy preferences using the partisan appointment logic because they are 
not appointed directly by political actors. For the seven BOG positions, there is variation in 
the left-right orientation of appointing actors, but often BOG members are appointed in a 
period where party control of the Presidency and Senate differs. As a result, BOG 
appointments are often the product of some form of left-right interaction. For example, eight 
of the twenty-three BOG appointments analysed by Chang (2001) occur at a time when party 
control of the Presidency and Senate differs. Of course, Chang’s formal appointment model 
is specifically intended to tease out the monetary policy implications of this inter-institutional 
and cross-party interaction theoretically. Nevertheless, because of the frequency with which 
these left-right interaction appointments occur in the US case, it is difficult to use an 
empirical analysis of the Fed to separately test the partisan behavioural assumptions 
underlying Chang’s model and the conditional impact of institutional features posited by the 
model. The Polish case enables us to test partisan behavioural assumptions more directly.
The case of the Polish NBP is also advantageous for testing for partisan appointments 
relative to national central banks other than the Fed. Currently, six other OECD countries -  
namely, Czech Republic, Hungary, Japan, Korea, Sweden and the UK -  have central banks 
that publish voting records and consequently enable researchers to observe and analyse the 
voting behaviour of individual central bank appointees. However, in both Korea and 
Sweden political actors are involved in the central bank appointment process only indirectly. 
In the remaining four countries, politicians are directly involved in central bank appointments 
but there is little or no variation in the partisan orientation of appointing actors during the
3 For an analysis o f UK voting records, see for example, Besley et al (2008) and Hix et al (2010).
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time-period in which central bank votes are available. Finally, though voting data is also 
available for the German Bundesbank Council in the years 1948-1961, Berger and Woitek 
(2005 p.752) report that this data is not always complete. Thus it is difficult to test theories 
of partisan appointments in other countries where voting data is available. This underlines 
the value of studying appointments to the National Bank of Poland, where we are better able 
to perform this test.
4.3 The case of the National Bank of Poland: institutional and political context
Having outlined the theoretical motivation for the study of the National Bank of Poland, in 
this section I introduce the NBP and its Monetary Policy Council in more detail.
Institutional context
According to the 1997 National Bank of Poland Act, the Monetary Policy Council of the 
NBP is the body designated with the sole authority to determine monetary policy in Poland. 
While the Act mandates the NBP Council to pursue a primary objective of price stability, it 
leaves the Council to define price stability in operational terms. Since 1999 the Council has 
set multi-annual inflation targets and has set monetary policy with the stated goal of 
achieving this inflation target. These targets have generally taken the form of an acceptable 
inflation range measured on the Consumer Price Index (for example, since January 2004 the 
NBP inflation target has been 2.5 per cent CPI plus or minus one percentage point), and there 
are no formal sanctions for Council members if this target is missed.
The Council consists of ten individuals: nine ‘rank-and file’ members together with 
the NBP President. All are appointed for a non-renewable term of six years and can only be
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involuntarily removed from their posts on the grounds of serious misconduct. The Council 
has held a monetary policy meeting, chaired by the NBP President, once a month since 
February 1998. Decisions are taken by majority vote with the NBP President holding the 
casting vote in the event of a tie and any Council member can submit a proposal to be voted 
on (Maier 2007, pp.28). Records of these votes are available from January 2000 onward, 
enabling us to examine the relative monetary policy preferences of Council members (I detail 
below how these votes are coded and analysed). Though Sirchenko (2008) and Kotlowski 
(2006) have estimated economic reaction functions of NBP Council members, this is the first 
paper to exploit the variation in the partisan orientation of member’s appointing principals in 
order to examine political appointment patterns.
The appointment procedures for the NBP Council are as follows. Every six years, the 
Polish President, Senate (upper house) and Sejm (lower house) each unilaterally appoint three 
of the rank-and-file Council members. The tenth Council member is the NBP President and 
chair of the Monetary Policy Council, who is appointed by the President with majority 
approval from the Sejm. Originally following the same appointment cycle as the nine other 
Council members, since 2001 the NBP President has been appointed according to a cycle that 
is three years advanced to that of the nine other members.4
Political context o f appointments
Appointment procedures for the nine rank-and-file Council members present a unique 
opportunity to test for evidence of partisan appointments. Each of these members is 
appointed by a single partisan-controlled institution, so that the identification of the party 
responsible for selecting a Council member is straightforward. Furthermore, in instances 
where there have been majority coalitions in control of either the Senate or Sejm at the time
4 This is because of the early resignation of one NBP President, Hanna Gronkiewicz-waltz, with three years left 
of her term.
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of an appointment round, contemporary newspaper reports detail how party coalitions have 
divided up the available Council positions according to their respective seat-share and have 
agreed to support each other’s candidates in the floor vote. Contemporary newspaper reports 
also state which coalition partners nominated which candidates, enabling me to code the party 
responsible for the appointment of each rank-and-file Council member.5
Appointment procedures for the NBP President are not so straightforward, since his or 
her appointment is subject to the agreement of the Polish President and a Sejm majority. For 
each NBP President appointment I therefore code appointing parties as a combination of the 
party with control of the Polish Presidency and majority coalition partners in the Sejm.
Table 4.1 presents the appointment details of each of the twenty-one individuals to 
have sat on the NBP Council since 1998. The first three columns list each member’s name 
(with ‘Ch’ indicating the NBP President) along with the dates of their term on the Council. 
The fourth and fifth columns detail the institution (or set of institutions, in the case of the 
NBP President) and party responsible for appointing the member, respectively. Appointing 
party(s) are coded according to the scheme detailed above. Looking at the Appointing 
Party(s) column of Table 4.1, there has been variation in the party or party coalition that has 
appointed MPC members.
[TABLE 4.1 ABOUT HERE]
The final two columns of Table 4.1 show that there has also been variation in the 
economic orientation of NBP Council members’ appointing principals. These two columns 
characterize the economic ideology of these appointing actors in two ways. First, for each 
Council member I report the mean score of his or her appointing party(s) on the dimension 
concerning “state ownership of business and industry versus privatization” in Benoit and
5 A full list o f the newspaper reports used is available on request from the author.
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Laver’s (2006) expert survey-based party position data.6 I report Benoit and Laver’s 
privatization dimension scores rather than their tax/spend dimension scores because, for post- 
Communist countries such as Poland, the privatization dimension is “both more important 
overall [in terms of salience scores] and capture[s] more variation in economic policy among 
different parties” than the tax/spending dimension (Benoit and Laver 2006 p.244). 
Nevertheless, our confidence in the validity of using privatization scores as proxies for Polish 
parties’ economic ideologies may be enhanced by noting the similarity between privatization 
scores and tax/spending scores in the Benoit-Laver data: the relative ordering of the parties 
listed in Table 4.1 is the same on both dimensions save for a switch in the ordering of the 
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL), who are both relatively 
‘left-wing’ on each dimension anyway.
Comparisons with other potential measures of Polish party economic ideology also 
enhance confidence that the Benoit-Laver privatization dimension scores are a valid measure 
of the economic ideology of Polish parties. For example, the left-right economic scores 
assigned to Polish parties in the 2002 Chapel Hill expert survey data (Hooghe et al. 2010) 
yield the same ordering of parties as the Laver-Benoit privatization dimension scores. In 
addition, the Benoit-Laver privatization scores broadly agree with Markowski’s (2006 p.817) 
positioning of Polish parties along a “socialist/redistributive -  liberal/pro-market” axis, which 
is based on the mean self-placement along this dimension of voters for each party at the 2001
n
election. Perhaps most importantly, Markowski’s method also places the average SLD 
supporter as economically to the left of Solidarity (AWS), and both parties to the left of 
Freedom Union (UW).
6 These scores are measured on a scale from 1 to 20, with 20 being least favourable to state intervention in the 
economy. For NBP Presidents, I report the average score of the parties controlling the Presidency and the Sejm, 
with the Sejm parties weighted by their respective share of majority-coalition seats. The expert surveys upon 
which this data is based were conducted between 2002-4 (Benoit and Laver 2006).
7 Markowski uses the 2001 Polish National Election Survey data on the self-placement of voters for each Polish 
party.
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In order to simplify subsequent analysis, in the final column of Table 4.1 I classify the 
appointing party(s) for each Council member into three categories based on their Benoit- 
Laver privatization scores. A member is classified as being appointed by an economically 
‘Left’ party if the appointing party has an economic policy score lower than the midpoint 
10.5, and by an economically ‘Right’ party if the appointing party has an economic policy 
score greater than the midpoint 10.5. Where Presidents are appointed by a coalition of parties 
where some individual parties have a score greater than 10.5, and some lower, I classify them
o
as being appointed as a result of a left-right ‘compromise’. The left-right classifications in 
this final column will be used in section 5 to assess whether the revealed monetary policy 
preferences of NBP Council members’ are consistent with the economic policy orientation of 
their appointing principal.
4.4 Estimating a statistical model of NBP Council member voting behaviour
In order to assess whether there are partisan political patterns in the voting behaviour of NBP 
Monetary Policy Council members, we need to systematically measure the voting behaviour 
of these central bankers. In this section I describe the data and model specification used to do 
this.
8 For example, though the economic policy score for his appointing coalition is 12.17, Table 1 classifies 
Slawomir Skrzypek’s as being appointed as a result of a left-right compromise. This coding reflects the fact that 
to appoint Skrzypek the Law and Justice (PIS) party, which is measured as economically right-of-centre, 
required the support of two economically left-of-centre parties, Self-Defence (SRP) and League of Polish Families 
(LPR).
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NBP voting data
The data on NBP Council voting behaviour was coded from the English version of the 
official voting records. These records have been published in the annex of each NBP 
Inflation Report since 2000. Therefore, the voting data covers all monthly Council policy 
meetings held between January 2000 and August 2008, a sample of 104 meetings in total.
For each Council meeting, the official voting record contains details on any proposal 
submitted to the Council for voting. These details include: a description of the proposal; a 
list of members who voted ‘yes’; and a list of members who voted ‘no’. Thus, when a 
proposal is voted upon, we have a set of observations on a pairwise vote between two 
alternatives (the proposal versus the status quo), together with information as to the character 
of these alternatives.
In constructing the data set I coded only those votes taken by the Council on 
proposals that involved changes to the NBP reference rate9 and measure each proposal in 
terms of the reference rate choice it implies.10 For each reference rate-related proposal, I 
record the new reference rate level proposed and the status quo reference rate at the start of 
the meeting. The vote of a Council member is coded as: 0 if he or she voted in favour of the 
lower rate alternative; 1 if he or she voted in favour of the higher rate alternative (regardless 
of whether the status quo rate was the higher or lower alternative on offer); and ‘n/a’ if he or 
she was not present at the meeting in which the proposal was made.
9 The Council also periodically voted on separate proposals concerning administrative and long-term strategic 
monetary policy issues, and before 2002 occasionally took separate votes on other auxiliary policy instruments 
(mainly the Lombard and Rediscount rates).
10 A potential problem with this coding scheme would be that the proposals that contained changes to the 
reference rate also tended to contain alterations to auxiliary policy instruments (usually the Lombard rate and 
Rediscount rate). However, the reference rate is described by the Bank itself as the policy instrument “reflecting 
the current policy stance of the NBP” (National Bank of Poland 2000 p.8) and by Kokoszcynski (2002 p.212) as 
the Bank’s “major instrument” for conducting monetary policy. Given the primary importance of the reference 
rate, it appears reasonable to assume that a Council member’s vote on the proposals in question was driven 
primarily by the reference rate alternatives embodied within that proposal. Furthermore, in all but 11 of the 104 
meetings in the sample, any reference rate-related proposals that also contained provisions for auxiliary policy 
rates always specified equivalent percentage point changes to the reference rate and other auxiliary policy rates. 
Also, on the handful of occasions where votes were taken separately on auxiliary policy instruments, patterns of 
voting behaviour were the same as those for votes regarding reference rate alterations in the same meeting.
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* Multi-proposal* meetings
In 19 meetings more than one proposal concerning the reference rate was put to vote on the 
Council. For these ‘multi-proposal’ meetings I treat each member’s vote on each proposal as 
a separate observation, since each vote on a different proposal provides extra information as 
to a member’s underlying rate preferences in a meeting.11 In all but six of the nineteen 
‘multi-proposal’ meetings, the votes of each individual Council member across the different 
proposals were consistent with sincere voting and single-peaked preferences on the reference 
rate dimension. For example, a member who voted ‘yes’ for a defeated proposal to raise the 
reference rate by 0.50pp in a meeting also voted ‘yes’ when faced with a proposal to raise the 
reference rate by 0.25pp.
However, in the remaining six ‘multi-proposal’ meetings, at least one Council 
member votes in favour of the status quo when a proposal is made for a moderate cut in the 
reference rate but also votes in favour of a separate proposal for a more drastic cut in the 
reference rate.12 Such observations pose a problem in terms of inferring a member’s 
preferred reference rate in a meeting since, on face-value, he or she apparently prefers to 
lower the reference rate and maintain the status quo reference rate at the same time.
Examination of the voting records revealed that when a member exhibits this prima 
facie inconsistent behaviour, one of two situations holds. In the first, the drastic cut that the 
member supports is defeated by a Council majority and the moderate cut is passed despite his 
or her opposition. In the second situation, the moderate rate-cut proposal is defeated with the 
help of the member’s objection, and the proposal for a more drastic rate-cut subsequently 
receives support. That is, in neither situation does the member’s vote against the moderate 
rate-cut lead to the maintenance of the status quo reference rate as the policy-meeting
11 However, in the statistical model below, the meeting-effect term used to capture time-varying conditions are 
constrained to be equal for all proposals voted on in the same meeting.
12 The meetings in question took place in February, June and October 2001, and January, April and May 2002.
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outcome. Thus, I posit that in the first situation the member in fact prefers the moderate cut 
to the status quo reference rate, but can demonstrate his or her dissatisfaction that the more 
drastic cut was not undertaken by voting against the moderate rate-cut proposal in the 
knowledge that the moderate cut will receive majority-support. In the second situation I posit 
the member prefers the moderate cut to the status quo, but votes against the moderate cut in 
the knowledge that a more drastic cut would subsequently receive majority support. As a 
result, for both types of situation I code the members as supporting the moderate rate-cut 
proposal as well as the more drastic rate-cut proposal.
This is perhaps a strong assumption, but the reader should note that it need only be 
imposed for 18 observed votes cast by 5 individuals in a total of 6 meetings. Furthermore, I 
also re-ran the statistical analysis below on voting data where these 18 voting observations 
are not re-coded. The results of this analysis were substantively the same and in the same 
order of magnitude as those presented below.
*No-proposal9 meetings
Finally, there are also a substantial number of Council meetings in the sample time-period 
where the record indicates that no proposal to change the reference rate was put to a vote. 
These ‘no-proposal’ meetings make up 46 of the 104 meetings observed in the sample. In all 
46 of these meetings, the Monetary Policy Council maintained the reference rate at its current 
level.
One option would be to discard no-proposal meetings as irrelevant. But as scholars 
of legislative politics have shown, in contexts where votes are not recorded for a subset of 
legislative decisions, severely biased inferences can result when researchers analyse recorded 
votes only and fail to model the processes which lead to the non-recording of votes for some 
decisions (Carrubba et al. 2008; Hug 2009). Moreover, in the present context no-proposal
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meeting observations do contain information regarding the reference-rate preferences of 
Council members, to the extent that a lack of proposed alterations to the reference rate 
indicates that all Council members were satisfied with the current status quo reference rate 
(such an interpretation seems reasonable, given that the voting records reveal there were also 
numerous meetings where proposals to alter the reference rate are put to the council and 
defeated in a majority vote). If this interpretation holds, then discarding no-proposal meeting 
observations may well lead to an overestimation of disagreement on the NBP Council since, 
by definition, these no-proposal meetings are the ones where members did not choose to 
formally record disagreement with each other. Such a potential bias is particularly important 
given that the focus of this paper is the extent to which the partisan background of NBP 
Council members is associated with heterogeneity in their preferred interest rates. A method 
that conservatively estimates disagreement on the NBP provides a sterner test of this 
proposition than one which overstates disagreement.13
In light of these considerations, for each no-proposal meeting I code each member 
present at the meeting as having preferred the status quo reference rate to either a 25 basis 
point increase or a 25 basis point decrease in the reference rate. The two alternatives are 
chosen to reflect the fact that the NBP only ever alters the reference rate in discrete 
increments of 25 basis points or multiples of this during the sample period. Further details 
regarding how these observations enter the statistical model are provided below.
To summarise, the NBP Monetary Policy Council voting data contains 1239 member-vote 
observations on 21 individuals. These are observed across 104 meetings: 46 of these are ‘no­
proposal meetings’ where all members are coded as preferring the status quo reference rate;
39 of these contained a single proposal to change the reference rate; and 19 of these contained
13 An alternative approach might be to model the agenda-setting process in Council meetings. However, such an 
approach is beyond the confines of this paper.
113
at least two proposals to change the reference rate. In total there are 79 observed pairwise 
votes on proposals to change the reference rate, and 46 no-proposal meeting observations 
which each provide a single ‘inferred’ reference rate voting observation for sitting Council 
members.
4.5 A model for the latent preferred reference rate of NBP Council members
The preferred NBP reference rate of member i at time t is denoted y*t and is modelled as
yi,t =  a  + v  ■ + & + e;,t (i)
Eiit ~ LogistidSi, s).
Thus members’ preferred policy rates are composed of a time-varying component, ( t , a time- 
invariant member-specific component, and a grand mean, a. The observation-specific 
error term, £i t , has a logistic distribution with mean zero and scale s.
The time-varying component of equation (1), (t , captures meeting-specific conditions 
that influence preferred reference rates at time t and is modelled hierarchically as
Zt ~  M fii cP h -i +  f t  UPt- i  +  P sqrrt , co2), t  = 1, ...,103 (2)
where cp if-i is annual national inflation measured on the consumer price index, i ipt-i is 
trend-corrected annual growth in industrial production (excluding construction)14 and sqrrt is 
the status-quo reference rate at the start of each meeting.
The specification for the conditional mean of draws on Besley et al’s (2008) 
specification of reaction functions for individual Bank of England members: central bankers 
are allowed to respond systematically to inflation and growth in the manner of a Taylor rule 
reaction function (Taylor 1993) augmented with the status-quo reference rate (sqrrt) that
14 These variables were collected from the websites of the Central Statistical Office of Poland and Eurostat, 
respectively.
114
captures monetary policy inertia. Both the annual inflation and annual production variables 
are lagged by one month in order to better reflect the data actually available to the Monetary 
Policy Council at the time of each meeting (see Sirchenko 2008 for a discussion of this in the 
Polish context). Maria-Dolres (2005) also finds that such a backward-looking specification 
for central bank behaviour best describes the interest rates set by the NBP.
In addition to this systematic relationship with observed economic conditions, the 
random element of captures un-observed meeting-specific shocks that shift preferred 
reference rates up or down across all Council members.15 The parameter co measures the 
variability of the meeting-effect about its conditional mean. Note also that does not 
contain an intercept term, as the model intercept is included at the data-level (i.e. in equation 
(1)) as a.
The member-specific component of equation (1) is simply defined as a varying 
intercept,
77i~iV(0, a 2), i =  1,..,21. (3)
The rji are the key parameters for the purposes of this paper, as each one captures the average 
deviation of an individual member’s preferred reference rate from the Council average, given 
meeting-specific effects £t . Note that the o  parameter measures the extent to which there is 
heterogeneity in members’ preferred reference rate when faced with the same economic 
situation. The member-specific intercepts rji are used as a measure of the time-invariant 
relative monetary policy preference of a member.
15 Note that the meeting-effect (t is assumed to be common across all members sitting on the Council in meeting 
t, so the parameters capturing reactions to economic conditions ((3lt ($2, and p) are common across all members, 
while o)2 represents the variability of meeting-effects about this regression line. One avenue for future research 
may seek to relax this assumption and estimate member-varying coefficients for inflation and production.
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Linking latent preferred reference rates and observed voting records 
As discussed above, the latent preferred reference rate defined in equation (1) is not observed 
directly, but rather is partially observed via the voting record of Council members in each 
meeting. In order to make inferences about y l t and its constituent parameters based upon 
NBP voting records I operationalise spatial model of voting (e.g. Hinich and Munger 1997). 
To deal with the aforementioned occurrence of ‘no-proposal’ meetings, where no proposal to 
alter the reference rate is put forward, the link between the observed voting records and yf t is 
specified in two differing forms depending on whether or not proposals were recorded in a 
meeting.
First, consider any meeting t where the Council records indicate that one or more 
proposals to alter the reference rate were submitted to members and voted upon. For each 
meeting within this set, there may be multiple rounds of pairwise votes, so I index rounds of 
pairwise voting across all meetings by j  =  1 , . where each j  corresponds to one particular 
round of voting in one particular meeting t.16 Each unit of observation is a member’s 
observed vote choice y itj between two observed reference rate alternatives, denoted rj and 
rjl, where rj < rj1 for any pairwise voting round j .  Let y tj  =  0 if i votes for the lower rate 
alternative,^, and y itj =  1 if  z votes for the higher rate alternative, rj1.
I model the utility that member / derives from a given reference rate alternative rj as a 
quadratic loss function that declines in the absolute distance between the reference rate 
alternative and member Vs latent preferred rate in the meeting where rj is proposed,
ui(ri )  = -  (yi.tw ~ n f  ■ (4)
Thus, i votes for the higher alternative rj1 if
16 Thus, though one meeting t may feature a number of voting rounds, any given voting round j  is associated 
with only one meeting t (i.e. t is uniquely determined by j, though the inverse is not true). As a result, in what 
follows, the subscript t(j)is intended to denote the meeting t in which the voting round j  occured.
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UiW) a: Ui)-
Plugging in equations (4), then (1), and re-arranging, we can re-write this condition as
-  (yhu) ~ i1)2 -  (ylt o) -  if
via) *  -2(i + i)
ei,to) s  K'f + r/)  — (« + *!* + ftco)-
Further, by the definition of ei t in (1), the probability that the condition holds is
Pr h o )  ^  \ d  + r/ )  -(<x + m + 
= Pr [£U0) <(a + m + ho)) - \d + i)]
(a + tli + <ty)) -  1 {rj1 +  r/)‘
= logit
Thus the probability that member i votes for the higher reference rate alternative can be 
modelled in terms of the binary logistic regression
O+^+CtQ-))-1(^+ r j )
Pr[yij = l]  = logit 1 (5)
Usually in models of legislative voting behaviour, the latent threshold parameter 
(above which a realization of the unobserved latent dependent variable must fall in order to 
observe a one rather than a zero on the observed binary dependent variable) is a “difficulty” 
parameter to be estimated. However, the term for the latent threshold in equation (5) - i.e. the 
term -|( rj1 +  ry*) - is observed in the data as the numerical midpoint between the two 
reference rate alternatives. That is, in the parlance of spatial voting and ideal point 
estimation, we can directly measure the ‘cutpoint’ between any two alternatives being voted 
upon on an interest rate metric. This is analogous to the situation exploited by Krehbiel and 
Rivers (1988) in their study of minimum-wage voting in the US Congress. As they note, 
such information identifies the latent scale of the choice model, allowing the researcher to
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make meaningful statements about the magnitude of latent parameters. 17 In the application 
presented here, the scale of the latent parameters is defined in terms of reference rate 
percentage points.
Now, consider any meeting t where the Council records indicate that no proposal to 
alter the reference rate was voted upon by members. For each meeting t within this second 
no-proposal set, there is only one observation of each current NBP Council member per 
meeting. I label each of these member-meeting observations a ‘no-proposal observation’. I 
assume that where a no-proposal observation occurs, the latent reference rate, y£t , of member 
i at meeting t satisfies
(sqrrt — 0.125) <  y \ t <  ([sqrrt +  0.125). (6 )
The terms on far left and far right hand-side of (6 ) correspond, respectively, to the midpoint 
between the status quo reference rate and an alternative that is 0.25 percentage points lower, 
and the midpoint between the status quo reference rate and an alternative that is 0.25 
percentage points greater. Thus equation (6 ) represents a situation where j’s latent preferred 
reference rate is closer to the status quo rate than to either of the closest possible alternative 
reference rate settings (provided interest rates are altered only in 0.25 percentage point 
increments or multiples of this, as is standard currently in monetary policy). In other words, I 
assume that if no proposals are observed in a meeting, then all members sitting on the 
Council in that meeting preferred the status quo reference rate sqrrt to either a decrease of
0.25 or an increase of 0.25 in the rate. The probability of such a condition being satisfied can 
be expressed in terms of the parameters used to model the latent preferred reference rate:
Pr[no-proposal observation] =  logit- 1  ^ 59/7*+0-125) (g+Th+<t)j _
logit- 1  [( * ^ - ° 1 2 5 >-C«+^ + ^ |  (7 )
17 It also allows the estimation of the latent residual-variance parameter s, which normally has to be fixed ex 
ante for purposes of identification.
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Estimation
Equations (2), (3), (5) and (7) jointly define m y statistical m odel o f  NBP Council voting. I
estimate this model using Bayesian MCMC (Markov Chain Monte Carlo) methods, whereby
1 8an MCMC sampler iteratively updates the estimates of the model parameters. After a 
sufficient number of iterations (or bumin period) the vector of parameter estimates yielded 
during a given iteration represents a draw from the joint posterior distribution of the model 
parameters. 19 Because the MCMC method yields a sample from the posterior distribution of 
all parameters in the statistical model, it is straightforward to make statistical inferences about 
any auxiliary quantity of interest that is a function of the model parameters. The posterior 
distribution of the auxiliary quantity can be generated by calculating and storing its value for 
each sampled vector of model parameters (Treier and Jackman 2008 p.210). This feature of 
MCMC estimation is particularly useful for the purposes of this paper. For example, it 
allows us to examine the posterior distribution of the position of the pivotal voter on the NBP 
Council. 2 0
18 The MCMC sampler was run in JAGS from R using the ijags package (Plummer 2009). Initial values for 
model parameters were based on the results of previous trial runs of the sampler. A single chain was run for 
750,000 iterations, with the first 250,000 discarded as bumin. The chain was thinned by a factor of 25, leaving a 
sample of 20,000 draws from the posterior distribution to be used for inference. Standard convergence tests 
recommended by Jackman (2009) showed no indication o f non-convergence in any parameter estimates, and 
that the chain had run for a satisfactory number of iterations to make reliable inferences regarding the 95 per 
cent credible interval o f model parameters.
19 For more details see Gelman et al. (2003), Gill (2008), and Jackman (2009).
20 In specifying priors for the model parameters I endeavoured to keep these priors uninformative and let the 
data speak. However, in order to run the MCMC sampler efficiently and avoid crashes, the priors for some 
parameters were narrowed to restrict resulting estimates to a reasonable range. In these cases, priors were based 
on trial runs o f the sampler. For the uniform priors for variance parameters, I was careful to check that the 
marginal posterior density of these parameters did not place any substantial probability weight close to the prior 
bounds. Specifically, the priors for the model parameters were set as follows:
a ~ N(0,1)
/?i ~1V(0,1)
0, 1)
p ~  U n if ( -0.999,0.999)
~  U nif{0,0.5) 
a  ~  f /n i/(0 ,0.5)
5 ~  U n if(0 ,1)
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When estimating the model I had to drop voting observations for January 2000, 
because the CPI inflation series used is only recorded from January 2000 onward (recall that 
CPI is lagged by one month in the model). Therefore, the model is estimated based on voting 
observations in 103 NBP Council meetings.
Model estimates
Before examining estimated member-specific intercepts in the next section, the remainder of 
this section discusses the overall results for the hierarchical model of NBP Council voting. 
First, the fit of the model seems relatively good. Even with a relatively demanding predicted 
probability threshold of 0.7 the model correctly classifies 77 per cent of observed-proposal 
voting observations and 91 per cent of no-proposal observations.
Table 4.2 summarises the results for the model. The first column of Table 4.2 
contains the mean of the marginal posterior density for each parameter, while the second 
column contains corresponding 95 per cent credible intervals.
[TABLE 4.2 ABOUT HERE]
The parameter estimates for and /?2, which measure the average response of NBP 
members’ preferred reference rates to increases in inflation and output respectively, are 
positive and statistically distinguishable from zero according to 95 per cent credible intervals. 
This is consistent with a Taylor Rule-type reaction function where central bankers tighten 
monetary policy in order to mitigate increases in inflation and output, and vice versa. The 
estimate for p indicates high inertia in reference rates, though it is statistically distinguishable 
from unity according to its 95 per cent credible interval.
Looking at the estimates for the variance parameters, we see that the magnitude of the 
variation of meeting-effects about their conditional mean (a linear function of observed 
economic variables) is reasonably large in substantive terms: o>, the standard deviation of
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meeting-effects about their conditional mean, has a posterior mean of 0 . 2 1  reference rate 
percentage points. Furthermore, the magnitude of the variation in member-specific 
intercepts appears to be substantively significant: a , the standard deviation of member- 
specific intercepts about their mean value (which is constrained to zero in the model), has a 
posterior mean of 0.08 reference rate percentage points. In the next section I turn to look at 
these estimated member intercepts in more detail, examining whether they are consistent with 
the partisan background of NBP appointees.
4.6 Partisan appointments and NBP member revealed monetary policy 
preferences
In this section I test for partisan patterns in appointments to the NBP Council. To do this I 
use the estimated member-specific intercepts from the reference rate voting model estimated 
in the previous section as a measure of appointees’ revealed monetary policy preferences.
Patterns in revealed monetary policy preferences
Before assessing whether partisan patterns exist, Figure 4.1 simply plots the revealed 
monetary policy preferences for each of the twenty-one NBP Council members since 1998. 
These are the estimated member-specific intercepts, or rji terms, in the latent preferred 
reference rate model described in the section 4. Recall that these member intercepts represent 
the average differences in the latent preferred reference rate of different Council members 
when faced with the same economic conditions. Member-specific intercepts are measured on 
a reference rate scale and are zero-centred, since they represent deviations from the Council's 
mean response to economic conditions. The points in Figure 4.1 represent the median of the
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posterior density for the member-specific intercept, while the thick and thin black lines 
represent the fifty per cent and ninety-five per cent credible intervals for each member effect, 
respectively.
[FIGURE 4.1 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 4.1 suggests that, controlling for economic conditions, there is substantively 
meaningful heterogeneity across Council members in terms of preferred reference rates. For 
example, it suggests that on average, Miroslaw Pietrewicz prefers a reference rate 
approximately 20 basis-points lower than Marek Dabrowski. Furthermore, comparing 
marginal ninety-five per cent credible intervals, the eight members with the lowest estimated 
member-specific intercepts are statistically distinguishable from the eight members with the 
highest estimated member effects.
But do the revealed monetary policy preferences of NBP Council members’ exhibit 
patterns consistent with partisan appointments? Figure 4.2 allows us to begin to assess this 
question. It again graphs mean revealed monetary policy preference of each Council 
member, together with ninety-five per cent credible intervals. But it also indicates the 
political party or party coalition responsible for appointing each Council member, together 
with the left-right economic policy classification of the appointing actor(s), as coded in Table 
4.1.
[FIGURE 4.2 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 4.2 provides support for a partisan theory of NBP Council appointments. First, 
those members appointed by parties that are left-of-centre on economic policy tend to prefer a 
reference rate that is lower than those members appointed by parties that are right-of-centre 
on economic policy. Five of the six members appointed by economically right-of-centre 
parties have a median estimated member effect that is lower than all twelve members 
appointed by economically left-of-centre parties. That is, faced with similar economic
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conditions, right-of-centre party appointees to the NBP Council tend to prefer higher 
reference rate than left-of-centre party appointees to the NBP Council.
However, Figure 4.2 also shows that the remaining right-of-centre appointee, Janusz 
Krzyzewski, has a median estimated intercept lower than that of four left-of-centre 
appointees. Furthermore, the average latent preferred reference rate of four left-of-centre 
party appointees (namely, Filar, Noga, Wasilewska-Trenkner and Wojtyna) are statistically 
indistinguishable from the right-of-centre appointees in terms of ninety-five per cent credible 
intervals. These qualifications to the general observed pattern are consistent with the 
contention of Lohmann (1997) and Morrris and Keech (1997) that political parties face the 
possibility that appointee’s may not turn out to be ‘perfect agents’ once on the Council.
Further examination of Figure 4.2 reveals some other noteworthy results. Consistent 
with partisan appointments, two of the NBP Presidents that were appointed as a result of 
bargaining between left-of-centre and right-of-centre parties (Gronkiewicz-Waltz and 
Balcerowicz) are estimated to be relatively centrist in terms of average relative preferred 
reference rate. However, Skrzypek’s revealed preference for a relatively low reference rate 
might be something of a surprise, given that he is also classed as being appointed as a result 
of bargaining between left-of-centre and right-of-centre parties. Given the relative strength 
of the PIS party in Skrzypek’s appointing coalition (PIS held the Polish Presidency and were 
the largest party in the Sejm majority coalition) and the right-of-centre economic policy score 
they are assigned in Table 4.1, the partisan appointments logic would lead us to expect 
relatively restrictive monetary policy preferences for Skrzypek. It may be that the true 
economic policy stance of the PIS is inadequately measured in Table 4.1. However, taking 
these measures as given for the purposes of this paper, we must deem Skrzypek’s estimated 
monetary policy preferences to represent another qualification to the general support for 
partisan appointments in the data.
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I also conduct a more formal statistical test for partisan appointments to the NBP 
Council. To do this, I examine the posterior density of the difference between the mean 
member-specific intercept of left-party appointees and the mean member-specific intercept of 
right-party appointees.
It is relatively straightforward to generate this posterior density from the MCMC 
sample generated during model estimation, since that sample represents 2 0 , 0 0 0  draws from 
the joint posterior density of the model parameters. Specifically, for each draw k  from the 
joint posterior density, k  =  1, . . . ,  2 0 ,0 0 0 : first, take the twenty-one rji values drawn at k  for 
all NBP Council members; second calculate meanleftl, the mean of the 77* values drawn at 
iteration k  for all left-of-centre party Council appointees; third, calculate meanrightl, the 
mean of the r]i values drawn at iteration k for all right-of-centre party Council appointees; 
finally, store the value of the difference meanleftl - meanrightl. This yields 20,000 samples 
from the posterior density of meanleftl - meanrightl. I also generated a sample from the 
posterior density of medleftl - medrightl, the difference between the median member- 
specific intercept of left-party appointees and the median member-specific intercept of right- 
party appointees.
It is necessary to check that this test is robust to the economic left-right coding of 
Skrzypek’s appointing coalition, which as discussed in section 4.3 is not straightforward. 
Therefore, I repeated the above procedures, but included Skrzypek as a right-of-centre party 
appointee rather than classifying him as left-right compromise (reflecting the possible weight 
of the PIS in his appointment). The resulting quantities are labelled meanleft2 -  meanright2 
and medleft2 -  medright2.
Figure 4.3 provides a summary of the posterior density of all four measures of the 
difference between the latent preferred reference rates of NBP Council members appointed 
by economically left-of-centre and right-of-centre parties. These measures are all on a
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reference rate scale. Again, the point represents the median of the posterior density, and the 
thick and thin lines the fifty per cent and ninety-five per cent credible intervals, respectively.
[FIGURE 4.3 ABOUT HERE]
Examination of Figure 4.3 shows that according to all four measures, the difference in the 
latent preferred reference rate of left-of-centre and right-of-centre Council appointees is 
clearly distinguishable from zero and of the expected sign. For example, there is a ninety- 
five percent posterior probability that the measure meanleftl-meanrightl lies between -0.13 
and -0.08. That is, controlling for economic conditions, an NBP Council member appointed 
by an economically left-of-centre party can be expected to have a latent preferred reference 
rate that is between 8  and 13 basis points lower than an NBP Council member appointed by 
an economically right-of-centre party. Thus, this more formal test provides further evidence 
in support of a partisan theory of central bank appointments.
Appointments and shifts in the position of the pivotal voter on the NBP Council 
To what extent did the ability to appoint NBP Council members enable Polish political 
parties to influence monetary policy outcomes? It may be that politicians rationally appoint 
individual central bankers who have similar monetary policy preferences to themselves, but 
that they are unable to alter the preferred monetary policy of the pivotal voter on a central 
bank committee (Krehbiel 2007; Rohde and Shepsle 2007). In order to address this issue, I 
use my reference rate voting model estimates to assess changes in the monetary policy 
preferences of the pivotal voter on the NBP Council over time.
Again using the MCMC sample produced during model estimation, I generate the 
posterior density of the change in the position of the pivotal voter on the NBP Council 
following appointments. The position of the pivotal voter on the Council for a given 
composition of ten members is measured as follows. For a given draw k from the joint
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posterior density of the reference rate voting model parameters, take the ten rji values drawn 
at k  that correspond to the ten individuals that make up the Council composition. The NBP 
President has the casting vote in the event of a tie on the Council, which is equivalent to the 
NBP President having two votes on the Council. Therefore count his or her rji value drawn at 
k  twice, so that there are effectively eleven rjt values. Now, arrange all eleven ^values and 
store the median value. When this process is repeated across all 20,000 MCMC draws, the 
resulting vector of length 2 0 , 0 0 0  represents a sample from the posterior density of the 
position of the pivotal voter on the Council.
I classify three general ‘appointment episodes’ that have occurred since February 
1998, when the inaugural Monetary Policy Council first sat. This inaugural Council 
consisted of six appointees from economically right-of-centre parties, three appointees from 
economically left-of-centre parties, and one left-right compromise appointee (Gronkiewicz- 
Waltz). The first appointment episode occurred in January 2001, when NBP President 
Gronkiewicz-Waltz (who had resigned) was replaced by Balcerowicz, another left-right 
compromise appointee. The second appointment episode occurred between August 2003 and 
February 2004 and involved nine appointments to the Council. During this second episode, 
the six-year terms of the nine initial rank-and-file Council members ended, allowing the 
economically left-of-centre SLD and PSL the opportunity to appoint nine new Council 
members (the start-date for this episode is August 2003 because the death of Krzyzewski in 
this month led to the temporary appointment of Czekaj by the SLD, who was re-appointed for 
a full six year term in January 2004). The third appointment episode occurred in January 
2007, when the Balcerowicz’s term as NBP President ended and Skrzypek was appointed to 
replace him by a coalition of the economically right-of-centre PIS party and the left-of-centre 
SLP and PLR parties.
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Figure 4.4 summarizes the posterior density of the change in the monetary policy 
preference of the pivotal voter on the NBP Council following each of these three appointment 
episodes. These measures are all again on a reference rate scale. Again, the point represents 
the median of the posterior density, and the thick and thin lines the fifty per cent and ninety- 
five per cent credible intervals, respectively.
[FIGURE 4.4 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 4 provides qualified support for a theory of partisan appointments to the NBP Council. 
First, there appears to have been no distinguishable change in the position of the pivotal voter 
on the Council resulting from the replacement of Gronkiewicz-Waltz with Balcerowicz. This 
is in line with a logic of partisan appointments, since both were appointed by the same 
coalition of parties.
Second, according to Figure 4 the replacement of nine members between August 2003 
and February 2004 appears to have produced a negative shift of approximately 4 reference 
rate basis points in the monetary policy preference of the pivotal voter on the Council. This 
is again in line with a logic of partisan appointments, since this appointment involved the 
replacement of six economically right-of-centre appointees and three economically left-of- 
centre appointees with nine economically left-of-centre appointees. The partisan 
appointment logic would predict a negative change in the position of the pivotal Council 
voter in this situation.
Note however, that though the change in the position of the pivotal voter is in the 
expected direction and is marginally distinguishable from zero in terms of its ninety-five per 
cent credible interval, it is also relatively small in substantive magnitude. This suggests that 
politicians may be relatively constrained in their ability to move the pivotal voter on the NBP 
Council. One important constraint likely stems from the fact that the NBP President, who has 
disproportionate voting powers on the Council, is appointed according to a different
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procedure and happens to follow a different appointment cycle to rank-and-file Council 
members. As a result of this, during the August 2003 to February 2004 appointment episode 
the left-of-centre SLD/PSL coalition did not have the opportunity to replace the sitting NBP 
president and so a left-right compromise appointee continued to effectively exercise two 
votes on the Council. If one considers that this institutional constraint operates in addition to 
the aforementioned inability of parties to appoint perfect agents to the Council, then the small 
shift in the position of the pivotal voter on the Council during this appointment episode is less 
surprising. Thus this result can perhaps be interpreted as evidence that institutional design -  
here, disproportionate voting power for a committee member who is appointed via an inter- 
institutional compromise and according to a different appointment cycle to other members -  
can work to condition the impact of political appointments on monetary policy committees, 
even in the presence of partisan motivations (Lohmann 1997; Morris 2000). More generally, 
this finding accords with theoretical work suggesting that appointments to multi-member 
decision-making committees can only have a limited impact on the pivotal voter (Krehbiel, 
2007; Rohde and Shepsle, 2007).
Third, according to Figure 4.4, the replacement of Balcerowicz by Skrzypek as NBP 
President in January 2007 produced a surprising negative shift in the monetary policy 
preference of the pivotal voter on the NBP Council. This shift is at odds with the logic of 
partisan central bank appointments, though is unsurprising when we look at Skrzypek’s 
relatively dovish monetary policy preference estimate in Figure 4.1. Given the measures of 
party’s economic policy stance used here, the partisan appointments logic would predict that 
the pivotal voter on the Council should have remained relatively unchanged after this 
appointment. This result thus represents another qualification to the general support for 
partisan appointments in the data. Generally, it appears that Skrzypek’s appointment is an 
important outlier to a trend that is mostly consistent with partisan appointments.
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4.7 Conclusion
This paper has examined whether, in the context of a legally highly independent central 
bank, politicians attempt to exert an indirect partisan influence on monetary policy through 
central bank appointments. To do this it has analysed appointment and voting patterns in the 
previously unstudied case of the Monetary Policy Council of the National Bank of Poland. 
The Polish case provides an opportunity for a relatively clean test of the behavioural 
assumption underlying theories of partisan central bank appointments: specifically, that 
compared to parties to left-wing economic policy preferences, parties with more right-wing 
economic policy preferences seek to appoint central bankers who prefer a relatively 
restrictive monetary policy.
To test this assumption, I coded a new dataset on monetary policy voting behaviour in 
the NBP Council. I then derived and estimated a novel Bayesian hierarchical choice model to 
measure the revealed monetary policy preferences of Council members based on their relative 
voting behaviour. These measures, together with measures of the economic policy 
preferences of appointing actors, were used to assess whether the revealed monetary policy 
preferences of Council members were consistent with the logic of partisan central bank 
appointments.
My results provide qualified evidence of partisan appointments to the NBP Council. 
First, in line with the partisan appointments logic, Polish central bankers appointed by parties 
with right-of-centre economic policy preferences tended to prefer a more restrictive monetary 
policy. Controlling for economic conditions, right-of-centre Council appointees on average 
preferred a reference rate that is approximately ten basis points higher than left-of-centre 
appointees. Such differences are substantively meaningful in terms of their magnitude. Thus
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this paper provides support for the partisan theory of central bank appointments, and the 
motivational assumptions of partisan business cycle theories more generally.
Second, I found heterogeneity in the revealed monetary policy preferences of both 
right-of-centre and left-of-centre Council appointees, and individuals appointed as a result of 
a left-right compromise. One particularly prominent outlier from this general pattern was the 
current NBP President, Slawomir Skrzypek. Thus it appears that central bankers are not 
perfect agents of their political principals, even in the Polish context where parties are 
relatively unconstrained in most appointments.
Third, examination of changes in the policy preference of the pivotal voter on the 
NBP Council suggests that politicians have been able to move the pivotal voter on the 
Council, but that their ability to do so has been limited. In two of the three main appointment 
episodes examined since 1998, the change (or lack of change) in the preference of the pivotal 
voter on the Council are consistent with the partisan appointments logic. However, where the 
preference of the pivotal voter changes, the magnitude of the change is small substantively. 
Possible reasons for the limited impact on the position of pivotal voter may include: the 
inability of parties to appoint perfect agents to the Council; or the specific institutional 
context of the NBP Council, where the NBP President holds disproportionate voting power 
and happens to be appointed according to a different cycle than that of rank-and-file Council 
members. This relates to the central bank independence literature. Even though politicians 
seek to make partisan appointments, their inability to appoint perfect agents, together with 
institutional features such as different appointments cycles for powerful committee positions, 
appear to insulate monetary policy from political influence at least to some extent.
In closing, it is worth noting that while the focus of this paper has been partisan 
influences on monetary policy via central bank appointments, the evidence presented here 
also has implications for more general research on partisan economic cycles in post-
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Communist Eastern European countries. For example, my headline finding -  that 
economically right-wing parties appoint central bankers who prefer more restrictive monetary 
policies -  contrasts somewhat with Tavits and Letki (2009), who examine cross-country data 
for Eastern Europe and find that economically right-wing governments implement less 
restrictive fiscal policies than their economically left-wing counterparts. This rather stark 
disagreement in conclusions may in part be due to differences in time-periods analysed. To 
elaborate, Tavits and Letki explain their counter-intuitive results as being a product of the 
particular political circumstances that arise during transitions from Communism to 
democracy, and these contextual factors could reasonably be expected to play a stronger role 
in determining political behaviour during the immediate post-Communist transition period 
than in later years. Whereas Tavits and Letki analyse fiscal policies in Eastern Europe over a 
period (1989-2004) that includes these immediate post-Communist transition years, this 
paper has focused on Polish monetary policy-making only from 1998 onwards (i.e. after the 
NBP Council was established). In this sense, perhaps the evidence presented in this paper 
indicates that a more conventional partisan pattern in macroeconomic policies had taken hold 
in Poland by the beginning of its second decade of post-Communist politics.
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Table 4.1:
Summary of NBP Monetary Policy Council members, 2000-2008
NBP Council Member First Meeting Last Meeting
Appointing
Institution(s) Appointing Party(s)
Party L-R Economic 
Score of Appointing 
Party(s)
L-R Economic 
Classification of 
Appointing Party(s)
Dariusz Kajetan Rosati Feb-98 Jan-04 Pres SLD 8.27 Left
Grzegorz Wojtowicz Feb-98 Jan-04 Pres SLD 8.27 Left
Wieslawa Ziolkowska Feb-98 Jan-04 Pres SLD 8.27 Left
Hanna Gronkiewicz-Waltz (Ch) Feb-98 Dec-00 Pres & Sejm SLD & (AWS, UW) 10.60 L-R Compromise
Janusz Krzyzewski Feb-98 Jul-03 Sejm AWS 11.76 Right
Jerzy Pruski Feb-98 Dec-03 Sejm AWS 11.76 Right
Marek Dabrowski Feb-98 Jan-04 Sejm UW 16.81 Right
Boguslaw Grabowski Feb-98 Dec-03 Senate AWS 11.76 Right
Cezary Jozefiak Feb-98 Dec-03 Senate UW 16.81 Right
Wojciech Laczkowski Feb-98 Dec-03 Senate AWS 11.76 Right
Leszek Balcerowicz (Ch) Jan-01 Dec-06 Pres & Sejm SLD & (AWS, UW) 10.60 L-R Compromise
Jan Czekaj* Aug-03 - Sejm SLD 8.27 Left
Miroslaw Pietrewicz Jan-04 - Sejm PSL 7.42 Left
Halina Wasilewska-Trenkner Jan-04 - Senate SLD 8.27 Left
Marian Noga Jan-04 - Senate SLD 8.27 Left
Stanislaw Owsiak Jan-04 - Senate SLD 8.27 Left
Andrzej Slawinski Feb-04 - Pres SLD 8.27 Left
Andrzej Wojtyna Feb-04 - Pres SLD 8.27 Left
Dariusz Filar Feb-04 - Pres SLD 8.27 Left
Stanislaw Nieckarz Feb-04 - Sejm SLD 8.27 Left
Slawomir Skrzypek (Ch) Jan-07 - Pres & Sejm PIS & (PIS, SRP, LPR) 12.17 L-R Compromise
Source: Appointment details collected from NBP website and contemporary newspaper reports. Party left-right economic scores based on the privatization dimension scores in Benoit and 
Laver’s (2006) expert survey data. Party left-right economic classifications based on author’s own coding, described in main text.
Party key: AWS = Solidarity Electoral Action, LPR = League of Polish Families, PIS = Law and Justice, Union
PSL = Polish Peasants' Party, SLD = Democratic Left Alliance, SRP = Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland, UW = Freedom Union.
* Czekaj appointed to fill temporary vacancy caused by death of Krzyzewski, and is subsequently appointed for second term. Though NBP Council membership is generally non-renewable, 
members can be re-appointed if initially appointed to serve out his or her predecessor’s term.
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Table 4.2
Summary of param eter estimates for NBP hierarchical voting model
Parameter
Posterior
Mean 95% Credible Interval
a -0.08 [-0.22, 0.06]
Pi 0.10 [0.07, 0.13]
Pi 0.02 [0.01,0.03]
P 0.94 [0.93, 0.96]
0) 0.21 [0.18, 0.24]
a 0.08 [0.05, 0.11]
s 0.03 [0.027, 0.034]
Total N 1229
Members 21
Meetings 103 ( incl. 45 no-proposal meetings)
Voting rounds 125 (incl. 45 no-proposal meetings)
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Figure 4.1
Estimated NBP Member-Specific Intercepts
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Figure 4.2
Estimated NBP M ember-Specific Intercepts by Appointing Party
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Figure 4.3
Average differences in revealed monetary policy preferences by appointing party
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Note: for details of the variable construction, see text (page 126).
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Figure 4.4
Confidence intervals for change in pivotal voter on NBP Council after key appointment
episodes
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Note: See text (page 127-128) for details of how the change in pivotal voter is calculated
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5 Critical discussion and conclusion
The introduction to this thesis argued that political scientists are compelled to study the 
political economy of monetary policy because monetary policy has such important economic 
consequences. The papers that followed have made two types of contribution to the study of 
this subject:
i. Substantive -  providing new insights into the political, economic and 
institutional processes that interact to generate monetary policy outcomes
ii. Methodological -  introducing powerful new empirical techniques to the study 
of these processes, and employing these to generate new and improved 
measures of key theoretical variables.
In this concluding discussion I summarise each of these contributions in turn and consider 
how future research can build on the work presented in this thesis.
Substantive contributions o f this thesis
Concentrating first on substantive contributions, the three papers in this thesis have not 
attempted to develop a grand over-arching account of the political economy of monetary 
policy. Rather, their purpose has been to address specific key substantive questions through 
rigorous empirical enquiry, and in doing so to provide some of the foundations upon which a 
more general understanding of this topic can be developed. The first paper did this by 
refining our knowledge of the levels of central bank independence that have prevailed in 
different countries during different time periods. It challenged previous assumptions about 
which observable institutional characteristics of central banks, and which gradations of these 
characteristics, are strongly related to underlying levels of central bank independence. It also
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showed that, given the data on central bank characteristics currently available in a codified 
format, we can only measure levels of central bank independence with a large degree of 
uncertainty. Finally, it suggested that, once appropriate techniques were employed to account 
for this uncertainty, regression results strengthen our confidence in previous research which 
suggested that central bank independence has a negative impact only when there are 
sufficient veto players in a political system.
Though we may use statistical techniques to correct for it in subsequent analysis, the 
striking scale of the uncertainty surrounding CBI scores in the first paper is nevertheless a 
signal that the institutional indicators upon which the scores are based provide only limited 
useful information concerning the latent concept being measured. Furthermore, the scale of 
measurement uncertainty was particularly high for countries with extremely low or high 
latent levels of central bank independence -  in other words, existing institutional indicators 
are even less informative for distinguishing between ‘low-CBI’ countries or between ‘high- 
CBI’ countries. This is important because, following the widespread reforms to increase 
central bank independence over the past two decades (see Chapter 1), today there are many 
countries to which the ‘high-CBI’ label applies. If we want to examine whether the degree of 
political influence on monetary policy varies among this growing proportion of high-CBI 
countries -  and to examine the causes and consequences of any such variation -  then we need 
to develop a more fine-grained understanding of how the interaction between politicians, 
central bankers and institutional rules shapes monetary policy outcomes.
The second and third papers in my thesis addressed this task. Both focused on 
countries with relatively high levels of formal central bank independence (according to the 
key criteria identified in Chapter 2) and examined how politicians in such countries might 
attempt to exert an indirect influence upon monetary policy via appointments to central bank 
monetary policy-making committees. By using innovative techniques to assess patterns in
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the monetary policy preferences of central bank appointees, both papers yielded new insights 
as to the motivations of politicians when making central bank appointments. Chapter 3 
provided evidence that when a government is able to make unilateral central bank 
appointments it does not appear to use this power to induce a straightforward electoral cycle 
in monetary policy, but that it may condition its appointment strategy on fiscal policy 
constraints. In contrast, Chapter 4 provided clear evidence that politicians do attempt to exert 
a partisan influence on monetary policy: parties further to the right in terms of economic 
ideology tend to appoint central bankers with more restrictive monetary policy preferences.
In addition, by looking at how appointments have shifted the preference of the 
pivotal voter on a central bank committee, both papers begun to map the extent to which 
politicians have been successful influencing monetary policy via appointments. There was in 
fact clear evidence in Chapters 3 and 4 that politicians have been able to shift the pivotal 
voter on central bank committees with their appointments. But results also suggest that the 
magnitude of these shifts is limited by politicians’ inability to appoint entirely reliable agents 
ex ante, and by key institutional features of committees such as staggered appointment cycles 
and dispersal of appointment powers for key committee positions.
By providing new empirical insights into the motivations of politicians when making 
central bank appointments, and by beginning to map how these may translate into political 
influence on monetary policy, the second two papers in my thesis aid the development of a 
richer account of the political economy of monetary policy in high-CBI countries. In terms 
of immediate implications for the literature, the evidence presented in these papers can 
provide an empirical basis for the behavioural assumptions scholars choose to make about 
political actors when constructing theoretical models of the monetary policy-making process. 
Making accurate assumptions about the motivations of politicians is particularly important if 
researchers want to use theoretical models to examine the likely consequences of different
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institutional designs for central bank appointment procedures, and in turn make practical 
recommendations for central bank reforms based on their conclusions (e.g Waller 1998). The 
evidence presented in Chapters 3 and 4 suggests that these scholars are on firmer empirical 
ground when assuming that politician’s central bank appointments are driven by partisan 
motivations rather than by an electoral cycle.
Chapters 3 and 4 also raise important issues that merit further investigation in future 
work. For example, results in Chapter 4 suggested that when a chief-executive of a central 
bank holds a casting vote on an even-numbered central bank committee -  as is the case in 
Poland -  then the rules under which this chief-executive is appointed are especially important 
in conditioning political influence on monetary policy. Existing theoretical models of 
political committee appointments do consider even-numbered committees (in as far as the 
committees they model are even-numbered when vacancies arise) but do not model the 
political consequences of handing a casting vote to a certain committee member (e.g. Waller 
1998; Rohde and Shepsle 2007; Krehbiel 2007). From the perspective of central bank design, 
it would be interesting to investigate these consequences in future work.
Another example is Chapter 3’s suggestive evidence that politicians’ incentives 
regarding central bank appointments may be conditional on fiscal policy. Though political 
economists have so far theorised about fiscal policy incentives conditional on monetary 
policy constraints (Alesina and Tabellini 1987; Agell et al. 1996; Clark and Hallerberg 2000), 
they have not devoted the same attention to politicians’ interactions with a central bank in a 
situation where it is fiscal policy that is constrained. The results in Chapter 3 suggest that this 
could be a fruitful direction for future work. It is also particularly relevant in the current 
global political context, where central bank appointments are made by governments that face 
severe pressure to reduce budget deficits.
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Methodological contributions o f this thesis
The three papers in this thesis also make significant methodological contributions to the study 
of the political economy of monetary policy. Indeed, one of the primary purposes of each 
paper has been to generate new and improved measures of theoretically important latent 
variables that are difficult to characterize empirically. Thus, the first paper provided a new 
set of measures of central bank independence levels for seventy countries across four 
decades. In addition, the second and third papers provided new measures of the monetary 
policy preferences of appointees to central bank monetary policy-making committees in the 
UK and Poland respectively, and of the preferences of the pivotal voter on these committees. 
It was argued in each paper that these new measures improve on existing ones because (1) 
they make full use of available observable information in a more principled and appropriate 
manner, and (2) are accompanied by uncertainty estimates which allow us to account for our 
inability to measure latent concepts without error when we make inferences. By generating 
these measures, the three papers in this thesis have provided political scientists and 
economists with new data that can be used to more effectively test theories concerning the 
impact of central bank independence and the politics of appointments to central banks or 
independent agencies more generally.
Furthermore, in the process of producing these new measures this thesis has also 
introduced Bayesian measurement models, estimated via Markov chain Monte Carlo 
(MCMC) algorithms, to the study of the political economy of monetary policy. This is in 
itself a significant methodological contribution because, as the various applications presented 
throughout this thesis demonstrate, there are a number of key advantages to using the 
Bayesian approach to measurement modelling. For one, it enables the straightforward 
estimation of sometimes complex statistical models linking observed information to 
unobserved quantities of interest. For example, in Chapter 2 the use of the Bayesian
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measurement approach permitted uncomplicated estimation of a model that properly 
accounted for the categorical nature of observed central bank independence indicators, in 
contrast to previous measurement approaches that forced researchers to wrongly treat these 
indicators as continuous. Also, in Chapter 4 the Bayesian approach permitted the estimation 
of a non-standard vote-choice model that incorporated extra observable information to 
identify latent cutpoints between proposals and that simultaneously handled response 
observations of a different categorical nature (voting observations from single-proposal, 
multi-proposal, and no-proposal meetings). By making more complex models easier to 
estimate, the Bayesian measurement approach enables those studying the political economy 
of monetary policy to make less restrictive assumptions, and frees them from having to 
discard as much useful information, as would be the case when operating with standard 
measurement models.
Another key advantage of the Bayesian measurement approach relates to the fact 
that estimation via MCMC yields a set of draws from the joint posterior density of model 
parameters, in contrast to the single point estimate and standard error estimate for each 
parameter that maximum likelihood methods yield. As a result of this feature, and as 
demonstrated throughout Chapters 2 to 4, it is relatively easy to use MCMC output to make 
inferences regarding auxiliary quantities of that are of critical theoretical interest. This allows 
researchers to test theories of the political economy of monetary policy head-on, rather than 
having to rely on primary parameter estimates to test theories indirectly. For example, in 
Chapter 3 it was straightforward to calculate the posterior probability that a new Bank of 
England appointee was more hawkish than their predecessor based on the number of 
posterior draws in which the ideal point parameters for the new appointee was greater than 
that of their predecessor. Also, both Chapters 3 and 4 showed that it was relatively easy to 
generate a posterior distribution for the ideal point of the pivotal voter on a monetary policy­
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making committee using sampled values of the ideal points of individual committee 
members. These auxiliary quantities made it possible to draw direct inferences regarding key 
outcomes of central bank appointment episodes.
Overall then, the Bayesian measurement approach employed throughout this thesis 
represents a new, powerful and flexible methodological tool for scholars of the political 
economy of monetary policy. Moreover, each paper in this thesis has demonstrated how to 
tailor general Bayesian measurement models to the particular data encountered in this field of 
study so that researchers can utilise relevant information in as principled and efficient manner 
as is possible.
It should also be emphasised that the methodological innovations in this thesis were 
not related exclusively to Bayesian measurement models. Chapter 2 introduced simulation 
extrapolation (SIMEX) procedures to the study of the political economy of monetary policy. 
The specific ‘heteroscedastic-SIMEX’ technique presented provides researchers with an 
easy-to-implement method to correct for observation-specific uncertainty in measurements 
when these measurements themselves are inputs in subsequent regression analysis. Not only 
does this technique enable researchers to properly utilise the inherently noisy monetary 
policy-related measures generated in this thesis, but it can also be usefully applied in a 
number of other political science contexts. For example, legislator ideal points (Clinton et al. 
2003), levels of democracy (Treier and Jackman 2008), and party ideologies (Benoit et al. 
2009) are all measured with observation-specific uncertainty. When scholars run regression 
with these measurements as input variables and do not account for the associated 
measurement uncertainty in these variables, biased inferences are likely to result.
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Directions for future research
Of course, there are limitations to each paper in this thesis, and these in turn provide 
opportunities for future work. One principle limitation is the quality and quantity of data 
available for analysis. For example, in Chapter 2 item discrimination parameter estimates 
indicated that some existing indicators of central bank independence, as currently coded, do 
not appear to yield useful information regarding underlying levels of central bank 
independence. As argued in that paper, these results suggest that we could improve our 
information on levels of central bank independence if -  based on substantive theoretical and 
empirical findings concerning the avenues through which politicians may influence central 
bankers -  we re-designed some indicators so that they capture more relevant aspects of 
central bank law, and collected data on additional indicators. In undertaking such 
endeavours, an advantageous feature of the Bayesian ordinal IRT method presented in 
Chapter 2 is that the item-parameter estimates it yields provide us with a guide as to which 
indicators, and which indicator-categories, are candidates for re-design or otherwise may be 
dropped from the analysis all together.
In addition, in future work it would be extremely informative to extend the temporal 
coverage of the central bank independence measurements presented in Chapter 2 by using 
Crowe and Meade’s (2008) new data, which updates Cukierman et al’s (1992) central bank 
independence indicators up to the 2000s. Applying the ordinal IRT approach to this data 
would enable us to properly account for measurement error when assessing the extent to 
which central bank independence levels have increased across countries in the last two 
decades. Once the Crowe and Meade (2008) data is available in its fully disaggregated form, 
it will be possible to carry out this extension.
Turning to the second and third papers in this thesis, our ability to use central bank 
voting records to test theories of central bank appointments is also limited at present by data
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considerations. Ideally (from a researcher’s perspective at least), we would like to be able to 
observe (1) a long series of monetary policy votes by many central bank appointees, (2) each 
of whom are appointed by clearly defined political parties with (3) varying economic 
ideologies, (4) at different times in the electoral cycle. Unfortunately, as discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 4, the number of countries that publish central bank voting records is small -  
at the time of writing, only seven OECD countries publish contemporary central bank voting 
records (Germany also publishes these records, but only after a thirty year lag) -  and, in all 
but the US, voting records have only been published for less than fifteen years.
Compounding these constraints, the onset of severe global financial crisis in late 
2008 renders voting data collected in the years immediately afterward difficult to analyse.
Not only is it of questionable validity to compare policy-making in such extreme 
circumstances with that in the ‘normal times’ which came before. But also, in most countries 
during the last two years there has also been very little variation in central banker voting 
behaviour, because even the most hawkish central bankers tended to unanimously agree that a 
drastic loosening of policy was appropriate. To use an educational testing analogy, test- 
takers (central bankers) all responded in the same manner after being assigned extremely easy 
items (the monetary policy choices on offer given the extreme economic circumstances), so 
the observed responses to these items do not enable us to distinguish between test-taker 
abilities (preferences).
The inevitable consequence of all of these data constraints is that it is difficult to 
locate cases where we can clearly identify political actors responsible for appointments, and 
where there is variation on key political variables. Among the cases currently available for 
study, Chapters 3 and 4 analyse the two where we come closest to satisfying as many as 
possible of the criteria laid out above. But, as central bank voting records accumulate over 
the coming years, and as more countries choose to publish these records in the interests of
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transparency, we will have richer data with which to test theories of central bank 
appointments. For example (and as noted in Chapter 3), following the recent election of a 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat government in the UK, in a number of years it will be 
possible to estimate the monetary policy preferences of central bankers appointed under this 
new government and compare these with the preferences of central bankers appointed under 
the previous Labour government. The general accumulation of central bank voting data, and 
any future reforms to appointment procedures in countries, should allow us to more directly 
test how institutional rules condition politicians’ ability to influence monetary policy via 
central bank appointments. Whatever opportunities arise, papers two and three have 
presented powerful and flexible methodologies that will enable us to analyse new central 
bank voting data.
Furthermore, as more data on central bank voting becomes available for analysis it 
may be possible to estimate more advanced voting models in future work. One possibility 
would be to estimate a variant of the dynamic Bayesian ideal point model developed by 
Martin and Quinn (2002) for the US Supreme Court. This would allow us to explicitly test 
the assumption made in Chapters 3 and 4 that bankers’ monetary policy preferences are fixed 
over time, as some authors have argued that such preferences evolve as central bankers 
accumulate experience on a monetary policy-making committee (Hansen and McMahon 
2008). Another possible modelling extension would include the direct incorporation of 
individual background characteristics into statistical models of monetary policy voting. This 
type of information could be integrated into hierarchical voting models as a predictor of 
monetary policy preference parameters, allowing us to examine whether, for example, the 
career background of a central banker matters for their outlook on policy. These types of 
extensions would allow us to explore new substantive questions and to check the robustness 
of the substantive inferences drawn in this thesis.
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Finally, before closing this discussion it should be noted that the three papers in this 
thesis are not just of relevance for researchers studying the political economy of monetary 
policy, but for political scientists more generally. In particular, questions relating to the 
levels of political influence on central banks and the consequences of this influence can be 
seen in the context of the broader study of delegation to and bureaucratic control over 
regulatory agencies (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984; Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Huber 
and Shipan 2002; Gilardi 2002; Thatcher and Stone Sweet 2003; Alesina and Tabellini 2007, 
2008).1
From this broader perspective, Chapter 2’s investigation of levels of central bank 
independence provides us with new empirical evidence concerning the extent of delegation to 
a particular type of regulatory agency across different countries, and new evidence regarding 
the possible consequences of this delegation. In doing so it also demonstrates new 
methodological tools which political scientists can use to better measure and analyse levels of 
delegation in contexts other than central banking. For example, the Bayesian ordinal IRT and 
heteroscedastic SIMEX methods are of great relevance for recent work aimed at constructing 
indices of regulatory independence for a variety of type of agency, such as competition 
agencies, media regulators and financial regulators (Gilardi 2002; Hanretty and Koop 2009).
Furthermore, Chapters 3 and 4 show that even given the current data limitations 
discussed above, central bank committees provide political scientists with an unusually 
information-rich environment in which to study appointments as a mechanisms through 
which political principals may exert influence over agents to whom policy decision-making 
responsibility has been delegated (Rohde and Shepsle 2007; Krehbiel 2007). This is because 
in the central bank committee context we often observe a lot of information about the 
substantive nature of the proposals voted upon by appointees. We know the levels of the
1 See Chapter 1 of Huber and Shipan (2002) for a particularly comprehensive and enlightening review of this 
literature.
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interest rate they vote upon, and the economic conditions at the time of their vote. This 
proposal-specific information helps us estimate and identify the latent preferences of 
appointees more confidently and efficiently (Clinton and Meirowitz 2001; Quinn et al. 2006). 
Contrast this with voting on courts or legislative committees, where each proposal voted upon 
tends to be of a different substantive nature to the last. Other scholars have begun to develop 
ways of incorporating proposal-specific information in these settings (Clinton and Meirowitz 
2001; Quinn et al. 2006). But, as demonstrated in the third paper of this thesis, voting in 
central bank committees is particularly amenable to such methodological refinements.
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